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Environmental and resource management decision-making can be extremely complex, 
controversial, ambiguous and difficult. Uncertainty, or the imperfect and inadequate 
understanding of a system, is an inherent part of decision-making. Impact assessment (IA) 
is an important tool that is used to evaluate, and inform decision makers of, the likely 
environmental effects of major proposals. There is widespread recognition of the 
importance of acknowledging, understanding and managing uncertainty that arises in 
resource management problems. Despite this, the recognition and treatment of uncertainty 
in the IA and subsequent decision-making process is often not well handled and in many 
cases not recognised, managed or taken into consideration. This research aimed to 
understand how decision-makers recognise the presence of uncertainty, particularly in the 
effects information, and how uncertainty is managed within the resource consent decision-
making in New Zealand. In order to achieve this 104 experienced resource consent 
decision-makers, who act as internal or independent commissioners, were surveyed.  
 
The results suggest that decision-makers’ have varied perceptions of the acceptability of 
uncertainty, the need for applicants to disclose uncertainty and decision makers to take it 
into account. The primary cause of uncertainty for decision-makers was poor quality 
effects information lacking important detail, although conflicting information, inherent 
uncertainty, and difficulty interpreting certain parts of the Resource Management Act 1991 
were also emphasised as other notable sources of uncertainty. Decision-makers manage 
uncertainty in a variety of different ways, but predominantly used strategies to further 
understand and reduce uncertainty, rather than strategies to cope with the uncertainty once 
it has been accepted. Some recognised strategies were not used as frequently as they 
maybe could be (such as the precautionary principle and adaptive management), while 
others were used without properly considering the implications. Finally, it seems that the 
experience and professional background of decision-makers influences the way in which 
they understand and manage uncertainty. However, these characteristics do not fully 
explain the diversity in results, and it is likely that there are many other factors influencing 
decision-makers behaviour. The diversity in decision-makers responses suggests decision-
makers are not being given substantive guidance about how to manage uncertainty and that 
the commissioner accreditation process is not moulding diverse individuals into decision-
makers who are able to cope with uncertainty in a consistent manner. They still have a 
certain level of freedom to respond as they see fit, and are falling back to a large extent on 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The scale of environmental degradation caused by human exploitation of natural resources 
is at an all time high. It is widely accepted that the quality of life of current, and future 
generations, as well as that of other species, is being threatened by the manipulation and 
exploitation of natural resources (Dryzek, 2013).  This has fuelled calls for more effective 
sustainable management of natural resources. 
 
The sustainable management of the environment and its resources is heavily dependent on 
informed and balanced decision-making that considers natural, economic, social and 
cultural aspects of the environment. At the same time, it is widely recognised that resource 
management decision-making can be extremely complex, controversial, ambiguous and 
difficult (Balasubramaniam and Voulvoulis, 2005). Decisions are often made with high 
stakes and potentially long-term implications, and may involve many stakeholders with 
multiple and conflicting values. In addition, decision-makers are often under time pressure 
to make a decision on a proposed activity or development where all information may not 
be known or available (National Research Council of the National Academy, 2005).  
 
Impact assessment (IA) is a process that has a primary aim of providing decision-makers 
with an indication of the likely consequences (both positive and negative) of a proposal on 
the natural and man-made environment (IAIA, 1999; Wood, 2003). IA is an anticipatory, 
systematic, integrative and participatory environmental management tool, which should 
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facilitate sound, integrated and informed decision-making (IAIA, 1999; Leknes, 2001; 
Sanderson, 2001; Wood, 2003; Jay et al., 2007; Jalava et al., 2013).  
 
However, due to the complexity encountered in environmental and resource management 
and the incomplete and imperfect understanding of current and future natural and social 
systems, anticipating and understanding potential impacts of a proposal is often difficult 
(Mitchell, 2002; Balasubramaniam and Voulvoulis, 2005). It comes as no surprise that 
decision–makers are inherently more comfortable making decisions based on certain, 
uncontroversial, unambiguous evidence; however, this is rarely the case and uncertainty is 
often a central issue in resource management decision-making (Mitchell, 2002; 
Balasubramaniam and Voulvoulis, 2005; van Bree and van der Sluijs, 2014). It is, 
therefore, important that, instead of being thought of as a problem best ignored, 
uncertainty is recognised and managed, and that decision-makers determine how to 
function under the challenge of uncertainty (Mitchell, 2002; Geneletti et al., 2003). In 
practice, the recognition, treatment and handling of uncertainty in the IA and subsequent 
decision-making process is not well handled, and in many cases is not recognised, 
managed or taken into consideration (Reckhow, 1994; Geneletti et al., 2003; Lawrence, 
2005). Therefore, this study is focused on decision-makers’ recognition and management 
of uncertainty in IA and resource management problems in New Zealand. 
 
Environmental and resource management in New Zealand is administered under the 
Resource Management Act 1991. This Act governs the use and development of natural and 
physical resources, and certain activities require permission which comes in the form of 
resource consents. Impact assessment is integrated into this project approval process with 
impact statements (in the form of an Assessment of Environmental Effects or AEE) being 
required for all resource consent applications. Thus, thousands of impact assessments are 
generated in New Zealand each year with the primary purpose of informing decision-
makers of the potential consequences of proposed activities. The purpose of this study is to 
evaluate the extent to which resource consent decision-makers operating under the RMA 
recognise and respond to uncertainty, especially in the impact assessment information. 
 
This chapter explains the broad background to the study, the evolution, development and 
procedures of impact assessment and the role of uncertainty.  The New Zealand context is 
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briefly introduced, followed by an explanation of the specific aims and objectives of the 
study. 
 
1.2 Impact Assessment  
1.2.1 Evolution of impact assessment  
IA emerged in the late 1960s and coincided with increasing awareness of the implications 
of environmental change brought about by human actions, public demand and pressure 
that environmental factors be explicitly considered in development decisions (Noble, 
2010; Morgan, 2012). The first formal incorporation of IA into legislation was in the 
National Environmental Policy Act 1969 (NEPA). This Act established an environmental 
policy that federal agencies proposing to undertake certain development projects that had 
the potential to affect people, communities and the natural environment in significant 
ways, had to demonstrate that the project would not adversely affect the environment 
(Noble, 2010; Morgan, 2012). Proponents were therefore required to produce an 
environmental impact statement describing the proposed development, the affected 
environment, the likely impacts and actions to mitigate or manage impacts, and to release 
it to the public, in order to demonstrate how these considerations had been recognised and 
addressed.  
 
Since the initial inception, IA has been adopted, in some form, into formal procedures or 
legislation in more than a hundred countries (Wood, 2003; Morgan, 2012). While IA is 
used in policy, plan and programme development, it is most widely used at the project 
level. 
 
1.2.2 The IA process 
Figure 1.1 shows the key steps in the IA process as typically represented in the literature 
on IA. Although the steps are displayed in a linear fashion, IA should be an iterative 
process with feedback and interaction between the various steps (Wood, 2003; Glasson et 
al., 2013).    
 
The first stage in the IA process is the design of the proposal which should be a thorough, 
systematic and documented process which considers other feasible approaches to establish 
the most environmentally sound option. Next is screening, or the determination of whether 
the action has significant enough environmental impacts (under the relevant regulations 
	 4 
and guidelines) that an IA is required and if so, what type or level of assessment is 
required. Following this is scoping, which identifies, from all the project’s possible 
impacts, the most crucial and significant issues associated with the proposal, thus 
determining the issues to be addressed in the IA report (IAIA, 1999; Wood, 2003; Noble, 
2010; Glasson et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 1.1: The main elements in the impact assessment process (Adapted from Wood, 2003; 
Wathern, 2013) 
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The next step in the process is to identify the main impacts, their nature, magnitude, 
likelihood and significance. This information, along with the description, purpose and 
rationale of the project and a detailed explanation of the environmental baseline, makes up 
the IA report. Once complete the next step is report review, which involves a systematic 
appraisal of the quality of the IA report ensuring that it contains all the information 
required in the decision-making process (IAIA, 1999; Wood, 2003; Noble, 2010; Glasson 
et al., 2013). 
 
Following this step is the decision-making, which is the consideration as to whether to 
approve or reject the proposal and to establish the terms and conditions for its 
implementation. If the proposal is approved, the next stage is post decision monitoring 
which involves recording the outcomes associated with the development to ensure that the 
terms and conditions of the approval are met and that mitigation measures are effective. 
Finally, auditing involves comparing actual outcomes with predicted outcomes and can be 
used to assess the quality of predictions and the effectiveness of mitigation (IAIA, 1999; 
Noble, 2010; Glasson et al., 2013). 
 
There are two important components which should be take place in each stage of the 
process. First is public consultation and participation, which refers to the involvement of 
individuals or groups affected by the project to ensure that their views are adequately taken 
into consideration in the decision-making process. Second is the consideration of, and 
preparation for, mitigation and impact management, which is the introduction of measures 
to avoid, minimise, remedy or compensate for any significant adverse impacts (IAIA, 
1999; Noble, 2010; Glasson et al., 2013). This is the idealised model of IA, and in each 
country that uses IA tends to design the process to suit the local institutional conditions, so 
may vary in some respects from this model. 
 
1.3 Uncertainty in resource management  
Uncertainty is not a simple or well-defined concept that is easy to describe (Kujala et al., 
2013); it is a non-intuitive term that can be interpreted differently depending on the 
discipline and context in which it is applied (Ascough Ii et al., 2008). As a result, there are 
many different definitions, some of which are very complex. However, uncertainty can be 
defined as an incomplete understanding of a particular subject or system (Harwood and 
	 6 
Stokes, 2003; Brugnach et al., 2008). Traditionally, uncertainty was considered to be a 
lack of scientific knowledge; however, current usage tends to be broader and more diverse, 
encompassing societal, political and cultural systems and can be caused or exacerbated by 
a lack of transparency and clarity in communication.  
 
1.3.1 Current state of uncertainty literature and research rational  
Uncertainty is a subject of interest in many fields of study, including ecology and 
conservation (Regan et al., 2002; Harwood and Stokes, 2003); climate change (Patt and 
Dessai, 2005; Kujala et al., 2013; Larsen et al., 2013); risk assessment  (Morgan and 
Herion, 1990); and water management (Newig et al., 2005; Sigel et al., 2010; Raadgever 
et al., 2011). Across the different fields of research, there is little consistency in the 
approach taken to carrying out research into uncertainty; each field has its own tailored 
definition and context for understanding uncertainty.  
 
Within the field of IA, since 2005 there has been an increase in the amount of literature 
addressing uncertainty. However, there appears to be no common, underlying conceptual 
framework used to guide analysis. Rather, the research approach is guided by the 
individual researcher’s interpretation, conceptualisation or understanding of uncertainty 
(Leung et al., 2015). 
 
The majority of IA research addressing uncertainty focuses on the recognition and 
reduction of uncertainty present in the practice of IA (Leung et al., 2015). In a review of 
research into uncertainty in impact assessment, Leung et al. (2015) found that research 
specifically  focused on matters such as:  uncertainty in the prediction of impacts (Dipper, 
1998; Peche and Rodríguez, 2011); better methods to quantify, model and cope with 
uncertainty (Geneletti et al., 2003; Bastola et al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2011; Jalava et al., 
2013; Mesa-Frias et al., 2013); disclosure and communication of uncertainty (Tennøy et 
al., 2006) and post-decision follow-up and adaptive management strategies (Arts et al., 
2001). 
 
Despite the large proportion of literature focused on minimising uncertainty, it is widely 
accepted that uncertainty is an inherent part of the impact assessment process and more 
often uncertainty cannot be totally removed. There is, therefore, research aiming to 
understanding uncertainty in decision-making and its importance (Reckhow, 1994; Sigel et 
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al., 2010; van Bree and van der Sluijs, 2014) and the use of decision support tools to assist 
in the management of uncertainty (Walker et al., 2003; Ascough Ii et al., 2008). However 
there is little research into the way in which decision-makers perceive, manage and cope 
with uncertainty (Larsen et al., 2013).  
 
1.4 Research aims and objectives 
The aim of this research is to understand the role of uncertainty, particularly within the 
environmental effects information, in resource consent decision-making in New Zealand. 
To achieve this aim a number of specific objectives have been developed: 
1. To understand what decision-makers recognise to be the main cause/source of 
uncertainty in resource consent applications; 
2. To understand how decision-makers perceive uncertainty in resource consent 
applications; 
3. To characterise and evaluate decision-maker’s responses and management 
strategies to uncertainty. 
 
In order to achieve the aim and objectives a predominantly qualitative methodology was 
adopted. A theoretical framework was developed, which provided focus and direction for 
the study. Using this framework, a survey was developed with a purpose of understanding 
how decision-makers understand and manage uncertainty in resource consent decision-
making. Open and closed questions were used to gain both qualitative and quantitative 
responses.  In order to identify possible participants, consenting authorities throughout 
New Zealand were contacted and asked to provide the names of experienced resource 
consent decision-makers, who act as internal and independent commissioners. 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework exploring the theory of uncertainty in 
decision-making and focusing on uncertainty in IA information. It also explores the 
different management strategies used to cope with uncertainty in a resource management 
situation. In Chapter 3 New Zealand resource management, decision-making and IA 
context are examined in more detail, focusing specifically at the Resource Management 
Act 1991, the resource consent process and ways in which the process addresses 
uncertainty. 
	 8 
The research strategy used in the investigation is described in Chapter 4. It describes the 
specific research methods utilized in this study to address the research aims and objectives, 
specifically the sampling strategy, data collection and analysis. Chapter 5 details the 
results of the survey, including the decision-makers’ broad perceptions of uncertainty, the 
main sources and causes of uncertainty in the resource consent and impact assessment 
processes and the key ways in which decision-makers manage uncertainty in the decision-
making process. 
 
The results of the study are discussed in Chapter 6. The main reasons for uncertainty in 
resource consent decision-making are examined, decision-makers’ views regarding the 
acceptability and disclosure discussed and the approaches to the management of 
uncertainty evaluated. The wider implications of this research are considered and the study 
is reflected upon. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the main findings of the study and 









Chapter 2: Uncertainty and 




The primary purpose of this chapter is to draw on the research literature to develop a 
conceptual understanding of uncertainty in resource management decision-making. In 
order to achieve this, this chapter outlines the main types of uncertainty that commonly 
occur in resource management at the project level, with a particular focus on the effects 
information. It then goes on to examine the relationship between decision-makers and 
uncertainty, factors influencing differing perceptions of uncertainty, and the importance of 
acceptance, disclosure and communication of uncertainty. Finally, the main management 
strategies decision-makers commonly use to cope with uncertainty are considered.  
 
2.2 Uncertainty in resource management – a conceptual understanding 
Despite the fact that uncertainty has been acknowledged as an important consideration in 
resource management and environmental decision-making for decades, there is 
considerable variation in the way in which uncertainty is thought of. There is a lack of 
commonly shared terminology and no agreed generic typology of uncertainty or means of 
dealing with it. In addition there is a lack of information and agreement on the 
characteristics, relative magnitudes and importance of different types of uncertainty. As a 
consequence, within the fields of environmental management and decision support, many 
different typologies and classifications of uncertainty have been developed and adapted. 
As a result there are many different ways of conceptualising the dimensions of uncertainty 
(Regan et al., 2002; Walker et al., 2003; Ascough Ii et al., 2008; Brugnach et al., 2008; 
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Maier et al., 2008; Sigel et al., 2010; Raadgever et al., 2011; Kujala et al., 2013; van Bree 
and van der Sluijs, 2014).  
 
The way in which individuals think about uncertainty affects the way in which uncertainty 
is considered in the decision-making process. Therefore this section provides a general 
outline of the dimensions of uncertainty in resource management at a project level. Some 
of the classifications of uncertainty are technically complex and multifaceted, and focus in 
detail on the specific mechanisms that cause uncertainty in the resource management 
process. As this research is predominantly focused on the ways in which decision-makers 
perceive and respond to uncertainty, such complex and technical classifications of 
uncertainty are less likely to be relevant or applicable. Accordingly, this chapter focuses 
on the broad types of uncertainty that may occur, the importance of recognising the level, 
or significance, of the uncertainty and the likely places within resource management in 
which uncertainty will manifest.   
 
2.2.1 Reasons for uncertainty  
Uncertainty occurring in resource management can be broadly categorised as either 
inherent uncertainty or epistemic uncertainty. Inherent uncertainty occurs because, while 
some natural environmental systems can be simple or only moderately complex, most are 
highly chaotic, turbulent, non-linear and unstable, resulting in a system that is inherently 
complex that will always have associated uncertainty, regardless of how much research is 
undertaken. This is compounded by the fact that in impact assessment, particularly in New 
Zealand, social, cultural and economic systems are also important components of the 
environment and they also have high levels of uncertainty. The highly variable, chaotic 
and constantly changing nature of these systems arises due to complex individual and 
group worldviews, attitudes, discourses and behaviours (Wilson and Bryant, 1997; Wood 
et al., 2000; Vanclay, 2003; Walker et al., 2003; Lawrence, 2004; Berkes, 2007; Dovers et 
al., 2008; Mesa-Frias et al., 2013; O'Riordan, 2014; van Bree and van der Sluijs, 2014). 
 
More often than not, resource management involves considering all aspects of the 
environment; however, until recently, natural and social systems have often been 
examined in isolation of each other. Berkes (2007) and O'Riordan (2014) both argue that 
ways in which social systems change will depend on biophysical variables, and in turn, 
changes in the biophysical variables will depend on the extent, intensity, and type of 
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human activity. Understanding how the two types of system interact, though necessary, is 
difficult and complex and can further complicate existing uncertainties. 
 
Epistemic uncertainty refers to the fact that resource management information is often 
uncertain simply because knowledge about the relevant system is frequently incomplete or 
imperfect. Although a lack of knowledge is the most common cause of epistemic 
uncertainty, uncertainty is also caused by conflicting evidence or information (Table 2.1). 
This is because there are a large number of sources of information available to decision-
makers including impact statements, experts, other authorities (e.g. air pollution 
controllers), consultancy advice, information from previous projects, advice from planners 
and information from the public consultation. Decision-makers also frequently gain 
information, advice, and comment from more informal sources. While this may lead to 
very informed decision-making, having so many different forms of information can 
cause/increase uncertainty about the effects of a proposal, in which case a decision-maker 
must weigh large amounts of evidence. In some cases, there may simply be too much 
information for decision-makers to process (Zimmermann, 2000; Van Asselt and Rotmans, 
2002; Wood, 2003; Ascough Ii et al., 2008). 
 
Table 2.1: Overview of the three main types of epistemic uncertainty and the reasons for their 





Lack of observations/measurements, inexactness in measurement caused by 
imprecision or inaccuracy or because a system was practically immeasurable 
(in principle can be measured, but in practice too expensive, too lengthy, 





The limited ability of human beings to simultaneously perceive and process 
large amounts of data. Usually occurs in situations in which more 
information is available than they can ‘digest’ or when dealing with 





Some of the information available is wrong (but not identifiable as wrong 
information by the system), information of non-relevant features of the 
system is being used, the model, which the observer has of the system, is 
wrong, etc.  
 
It is crucial to determine the type of uncertainty present because, while epistemic 
uncertainty can be reduced through additional research, inherent uncertainty cannot. 
However, this is generally not recognised, often resulting in futile attempts to reduce 
 12 
uncertainty (Walker et al., 2003; Berkes, 2007; Ascough Ii et al., 2008; Mesa-Frias et al., 
2013; van Bree and van der Sluijs, 2014). 
 
2.2.2 The level of uncertainty 
The level of uncertainty can be classified on a spectrum of knowledge, ranging from 
certainty to total ignorance (Figure 2.1). Certainty can be defined as being when a person 
is confident about their knowledge relating to a specific question, while total ignorance 
occurs when a person has no knowledge relating to a specific question (to the extent that 
they are not aware that they do not know). Uncertainty refers to the middle of the spectrum 
between the two extremes of certainty and total ignorance (Walker et al., 2003; Sigel et 
al., 2010; van Bree and van der Sluijs, 2014).  
 
In decision support literature, authors distinguish between different levels of uncertainty 
using categories: statistical uncertainty (where probabilities are known, but outcomes are 
not), scenario uncertainty (knowing outcomes but not likelihood), recognised ignorance 
(knowing very little but recognising such). However, environmental policy literature takes 
a more conceptual approach, arguing that on the spectrum of uncertainty the transition 
between certainty and total ignorance is continuous (Wynne, 1992; Walker et al., 2003; 




Figure 2.1: The progressive transition between certainty and total ignorance. 
 
Regardless, in resource management decision-making it is important to consider the level 
of uncertainty that is acceptable, allowing a permission to be granted, and when the level 
of uncertainty is unacceptable, resulting in a project being declined. Decision-makers do 
not have to treat all uncertainty equally. The importance of the uncertainty in the decision-
making process should depend not only on the level of the uncertainty, but also on the 
significance attached to the uncertainty in the particular decision-making context (Peel, 
2005). For example, when the uncertainties are low, but have a high degree of 
Certainty  Uncertainty  Total ignorance 
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significance, decision-makers should still place importance on them in the decision-
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Figure 2.2: Matrix showing the level and significance, and thus importance of, uncertainty in 
decision-making. 
 
2.2.3 Location of uncertainty in resource management projects 
Uncertainty can manifest itself within any part of a resource management problem. There 
are many different ways to conceptualise ‘location’ and there is little consistency in the 
way in which research has categorised this (often the classification is specific to the 
particular area of research). Therefore, the following section describes some of the broad 
areas of resource development applications in which uncertainty is likely to arise, and 
particular emphasis is placed on uncertainty within the effects information, and the way in 
which other parts of the resource management process influence, or are linked to, the 
assessment of effects process. 
 
Uncertainty within proposal 
Uncertainty in the project proposal can be a result of many factors such as the project 
being poorly defined, lacking specificity or having insufficient detail or technical 
information, or due to unanticipated changes to the project after the initial proposal was 
developed.  In situations where there is uncertainty in the proposal, the IA process can be 
affected negatively. For example, there can be difficulties predicting and mitigating 
impacts, which can lead to decision-makers having doubts about the reliability of 
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information presented to them (De Jongh, 1988; Geneletti et al., 2003; Wood, 2003; 
Cashmore et al., 2004; Lawrence, 2004; Glasson et al., 2005; Tennøy et al., 2006; Wood, 
2008; Glasson et al., 2013). 
 
Uncertainty due to public involvement and consultation 
Public involvement is critical to the success of IA for a number of reasons: to incorporate 
public views; to improve the environmental outcomes; to ensure that the process is 
transparent and open; to identify socially acceptable solutions and minimize conflict, legal 
challenges and costly delays; and to promote social learning and empower the community 
in the decision-making process (Morgan, 1998; Johnson, 2001; Noble, 2010; Glasson et 
al., 2013). However, the process can give rise to, or increase uncertainty in the decision-
making process. 
 
When involving the public in consultation it is difficult to gain a representative sample of 
the population. This is in part because citizens are not paid to engage in the consultation 
process, therefore the process can be highly dominated by interest groups (whose 
livelihoods or values might be strongly affected), or by those who live comfortably enough 
to allow them to participate (often affluent, middle class, articulate people). This can cause 
uncertainty as some interests may be missed or others over-represented and therefore the 
information presented to the decision-maker is not fully representative of the views of, and 
impacts on, the affected population (Harding, 1998; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004). In 
addition, uncertainty which otherwise would not be recognised or considered may be 
brought to the attention of decision-makers during the consultation process. For example, 
an issue that seemed clear might be reframed by public participation (Newig et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, public consultation can also add erroneous information, which can result in 
confusion over the issues and see the emphasis move away from important issues to 
frivolous ones (Johnson, 2001).  
 
Uncertainty in effects information 
The primary function of impact assessment is to provide decision-makers with sound 
information about the likely impacts of human actions on the environment. Often this 
information is presented in the form of an environmental impact statement. The quality of 
the impact statement has direct consequences for the decision-making process and is a key 
factor influencing the overall effectiveness of impact assessment. In order for IA to meet 
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the aim of informing decision-making, the information presented to decision-makers must 
be of a high standard, and must provide a full assessment of potential impacts. In practice, 
the quality of impact statements is highly variable and there is concern in many countries 
over the poor quality of impact assessment information. Not only can uncertainty that is 
not managed well contribute to poor quality effects information, poor quality effects 
information itself can cause uncertainty for decision-makers. Moreover, uncertainty is one 
of the main factors that influences the use of the effects information in decision-making. 
Of particular concern is the uncertainty associated with baseline information, the 
prediction of impacts, the scoping of impacts, and in the use of expert judgement. (Glasson 
et al., 1997; Morgan, 1998; Barker and Wood, 1999; Schijf, 2003; Wood, 2003; Sandham 
and Pretorius, 2008; Jalava et al., 2010; Petersen et al., 2010; Pölönen et al., 2011; Chang 
et al., 2013; Glasson et al., 2013). Each of these is discussed below. 
 
The collection of baseline information about the current and future state of the 
environment is an important step in the IA process. Baseline data can be collected from 
both existing information sources (e.g. census data, land use information) as well as 
gathered through data collection. Regardless of the source, all baseline data suffers from 
some level of uncertainty. There are a number of reasons for this, such as resource and 
time constraints limiting new data collection, or there may be ample resources, but they are 
devoted to collecting irrelevant information distracting attention from significant effects 
(Wood, 2003; Lawrence, 2004; Glasson et al., 2005; Noble, 2010; Glasson et al., 2013). 
There may also be error in measurement caused by sampling and other inaccuracies or 
imprecision (Walker et al., 2003). Not only that, the quality and credibility of impact 
assessments are strongly bound to the quality of the baseline information; all errors, 
assumptions, generalisations and inaccuracies in the baseline will propagate through the 
entire process causing further uncertainty. It is, therefore, important to devote sufficient 
effort to carefully and systematically describing the baseline conditions, as without doing 
so it is not possible to present an accurate and convincing picture of the likely effects that 
the development will have in the environment (Geneletti et al., 2003; Wood, 2003; Tennøy 
et al., 2006; Jalava et al., 2013). 
 
IA should be explicit and objective in the prediction of impacts, including their nature, 
extent, magnitude and significance; however, in practice, predictions are one of the main 
causes of uncertainty. Not only are predictions often constructed to appear more robust and 
 16 
certain than they actually are, they may be based purely on personal judgment/opinion 
with little to no reference to substantive evidence or direct observation of the environment 
(Morgan, 1998; Benson, 2003). Models (whether they be physical, mathematical or 
conceptual/mental) may also cause uncertainty, as they are imperfect simplifications of 
reality that do not take into account all the complexities of a system and therefore cannot 
precisely reproduce what happens in reality. Uncertainty may also occur due to a lack of 
sufficient understanding of the system (past, present, or future evolution), its behaviours 
and the interrelationships between the elements of the systems. Prediction also often 
involves assumptions which can contribute to uncertainty particularly when forming 
complex predictions that rest on each other. Regardless of the reason, even when an effort 
is made to reduce uncertainty, in most cases residual uncertainties will remain that require 
scientific (and community) interpretation. Predictions that are not acknowledged to have 
associated uncertainty may cause the unforeseen violation of environmental quality norms 
and standards, which can result in costly mitigation measures. It is, therefore, important 
that when communicating the results of predictions, the limitations, accuracy and/or 
confidence levels of predictions should be recognised and explained (De Jongh, 1988; 
Hellström, 1996; Sadler, 1996; Glasson et al., 1997; European Commission, 2001; Morris 
and Therivel, 2001; Geneletti et al., 2003; Walker et al., 2003; André et al., 2004; Tennøy 
et al., 2006; Jay et al., 2007; Jalava et al., 2010; Noble, 2010; Glasson et al., 2013; van 
Bree and van der Sluijs, 2014). 
 
Scoping is an important part of impact identification and prediction, and if not carried out 
adequately, can cause uncertainty in the effects information. This is particularly true when 
consultation is not undertaken in the scoping process, as if they are not involved early 
enough, significant impacts on communities might not be identified. There is also the 
potential for uncertainty due to a divergence of opinion on the key impacts for 
investigation and their likelihood (Morgan, 1998; Wood, 2008). 
 
Finally, uncertainty in effects information may be caused by expert judgment. The use of 
expert opinions to provide relevant effects information is indispensable: as there many 
factors that must be taken into account, some of which are qualitative in nature and can 
only be assessed on the basis of human judgements (Kontic, 2000; Noble, 2010). 
Uncertainty often arises when expert opinions are used, as the process is qualitative, 
subjective, interpretive and reflective in nature, and human beings have an inconsistent 
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ability to provide accurate judgment (Wang et al., 2006; van Bree and van der Sluijs, 
2014). Furthermore, prediction involves subjective judgement and experts may exhibit 
systematic bias or be over-confident. There is also pressure on consultants and experts to 
ensure that the assessment of effects reflects well on the applicants and their proposal 
(Morgan, 1998). This is because, while there are often large investments at stake, the 
future employment of consultants is also determined by applicants opinions and 
perceptions of whether they are able to deliver what is required (Beder, 1993). Not only 
can there be a strong temptation to emphasise the benefits of the proposal (and to hide 
adverse effects), there is a certain level of inevitability that the collection, analysis, 
interpretation and presentation of the data in the effects information will be shaped by the 
values and goals of the individuals involved (Beder, 1993; Morgan, 1998). Therefore, 
although ideally experts are impartial, this is not always the case and should not be 
assumed without question. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that the interpretation 
and assessment of expert opinion can vary widely – it is inevitable that individuals with 
different interests will interpret opinions and attribute levels of credibility differently 
(often no matter how it relates to the scientific correctness of the opinion) (Kontic, 2000). 
 
Uncertainty in legislation 
It may also be that legislation causes uncertainty. Environmental policy research has 
identified different reasons for uncertainty in legislation. One example is ‘linguistic 
uncertainty’ which is introduced when language and expressions are ambiguous, vague 
and context-dependent, or when terminology is used that does not have a widely accepted 
definition (and is not then defined) (Regan et al., 2002; Carey and Burgman, 2008; Kujala 
et al., 2013). A specific example of linguistic uncertainty is identified by Masden et al. 
(2010) who found that applicants in the UK are often uncertain about assessing cumulative 
effects, and decision-makers were uncertain about the adequacy of the assessment, because 
within the literature, and legislation, there is a lack of guidance about the requirements of 
assessing cumulative effects, and there is a the lack of a comprehensive definition. 
 
2.2.4 Conclusion  
While there is no commonly shared terminology and no agreed generic typology of 
uncertainty, there are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the body of 
uncertainty literature. Understanding uncertainty is incredibly complicated, and has the 
potential to be very challenging. Resource management itself has the potential to be very 
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complex, and therefore there are many reasons for uncertainty. Although uncertainty can 
manifest itself almost anywhere within a resource management problem, it is important to 
recognise that not all uncertainty needs to be treated equally. The level of uncertainty 
present is an important consideration which should influence decision-makers attitudes 
towards, and management of, uncertainty. 
 
2.3 Decision-making and uncertainty  
Many factors have the potential to influence the way in which decision-makers understand, 
and inevitably respond to, uncertainty. The following sections describe different decision-
making behaviours with reference to uncertainty, and then consider a number of factors 
that may affect an individual’s behaviour in the decision-making process.  
 
2.3.1 Decision-making theories and uncertainty  
Resource management decision-making is often a complex process (Iftekhar and Pannell, 
2015). Because of this, understanding how decisions are made is difficult – decision-
makers can explain their thinking and actions, but the way in which decision are actually 
made is very difficult to understand in a definitive sense (Schijf, 2003). Therefore, there 
are many different theories that attempt to explain different decision-making behaviours. 
One way in which these theories can be understood is on a continuum which places 
rational decision-making at one end and purely intuitive decision-making at the other. A 
large number of decision theories fall between the two, which can be broadly grouped 
together as incrementalism (Etzioni, 1967; Weston, 2000; Leknes, 2001).  
 
It has been said that rational decision-making theory explains the way in which decision-
making should take place, rather than how it takes place in practice (Weston, 2000). This 
is because it assumes decisions are made under specific conditions, which in reality are 
rarely met. For example, it assumes decision-makers have a well-defined problem with 
complete baseline information, a full array of alternatives to consider and adequate time, 
skill, professionalism and resources. In practice, decision-makers can be faced with: 
ambiguous and poorly defined problems; incomplete information about the baseline and 
the background of the problem, the alternatives and their consequences, the range and 
content of values, preferences and interests; and have limited time, skills and resources. 
Not only that, decision-making in the real world takes place in complex, unpredictable, 
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systems, that themselves are characterised by uncertainty (Forester, 1984; Weston, 2000; 
Nilsson and Dalkmann, 2001).  
 
Intuitive decision-making assumes that individuals base decisions on professional 
judgement, habit, tradition, imitation of successful people, emotive reasoning, prior 
experiences, intuition, and/or political values (Kørnøv and Thissen, 2000; Weston, 2000; 
Nilsson and Dalkmann, 2001). Moreover, in complex and uncertain decision-making 
situations, rather than use decision tools, individuals will rely on intuitive techniques in an 
attempt to simplify the task and make the process more manageable (Plous, 1993; Kiker et 
al., 2005).  
 
One way in which decision-makers can simplify decision-making is through the use of 
heuristics, which are general rules of thumb, mental shortcuts, common sense reasoning 
strategies and approaches that deviate from formal, logical and systematic choice. The 
benefit of using heuristics is that they can yield results that are very close approximations 
to the optimal answers. They are a ‘fast and frugal’ way to make virtue of limited time and 
knowledge as they reduce the time and effort that is required to make reasonably good 
judgements and decisions. However, the disadvantage is that the use of heuristics has the 
potential to lead to biases and inconsistencies (Plous, 1993; Gigerenzer, 2008; Iftekhar and 
Pannell, 2015; Burgess et al., 2016)  
 
Decision-making needs to be robust, consistent, and defensible, and it is clear that not all 
of the decision approaches will produce such decisions. Although intuitive decision-
making techniques are common when there is uncertainty, their use has the potential to 
result in inconsistent decision-making fraught with bias. While rational decision-making 
leaves less room for such inconsistences, in practice not all the assumptions of rational 
decision-making are likely to be met. A number of different decision models have been 
developed which attempt to combine the hard, top-down, rational comprehensive approach 
with the other approaches. These models are considered to be better able to manage 
uncertainty (Buchanan and O Connell, 2006). 
 
One example is mixed scanning, which is based on the view that decisions are made 
through a rational process within restrictions imposed by political and societal realities. 
Therefore, while the decision-makers systematically assess evidence and weigh 
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alternatives (using rational techniques such as environmental assessment, cost-benefit 
analysis or goals-achievement matrices), the decision is also influenced by intuitive 
judgements and the political context. It is less demanding and detailed than rationalism but 
is more strategic, comprehensive and innovative than intuitive methods (Etzioni, 1986; 
Weston, 2000; Etzioni, 2001; Nilsson and Dalkmann, 2001). It is likely that when making 
decisions that involve uncertainty, decision-makers are using a mixed-scanning type 
approach, combining rational and intuitive techniques. It is therefore important to consider 
the ways in which different individuals will view uncertainty. 
 
2.3.2 Uncertainty: perceptions, conceptualisations and attitudes 
If sound environmental decisions are to be made, uncertainty must be considered. The way 
in which different individuals understand, perceive and conceptualise uncertainty varies.  
Attitudes differ, as does the degree to which individuals consider uncertainty to be 
acceptable, or not. The way in which an individual considers, and responds to, uncertainty 
depends on their values, attitudes and beliefs, which in turn are influenced by many things 
including: culture, religion, ideology, lifestyle, personal experiences, professional 
background, political affiliation, and relationships between individuals in society (Harding, 
1998; Vlek, 2004; Dessai and van der Sluijs, 2007). When it comes to environmental 
decision-making, of particular relevance is how risk averse an individual is, their 
experience, and their proximity to the generation of knowledge. These are discussed 
below.  
 
Some individuals have a risk averse attitude and therefore will often dislike any 
uncertainty in decision-making and will be conservative in their decision-making (Vlek, 
2004; Dessai and van der Sluijs, 2007; Thissen and Agusdinata, 2008). For some such 
people, risk and uncertainty can invoke negative emotions of anxiety or fear and these 
feelings may restrict or suffocate their problem-solving and decision-making ability 
(Etzioni, 2001; Vlek, 2004). In addition, in the face of great uncertainty, individuals can be 
mentally short-sighted and insensitive to rational aspects of decision-making. In these 
situations, decision-makers act in predictable ways such as delaying decisions unduly 
(defensive avoidance), making decisions impulsively in order to escape the anxious state 
(overreaction) or obsessively collecting more information instead of making a decision 
(hypervigilance). In contrast, other individuals have a more risk-tolerant attitude, and are 
more comfortable with uncertainty and are less conservative in their decision-making. 
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Furthermore, some people find that risk and uncertainty invoke positive feelings: having 
successfully completed a risky task with an uncertain outcome may be a true learning 
experience that challenges an individual’s self-confidence and competence, and may 
enhance their self-esteem and social status. Without a certain amount of willingness to take 
risks, individuals would not be able to develop and learn new things or innovate the social, 
physical or economic environment (Janis, 1977; Etzioni, 2001; Vlek, 2004; Dessai and van 
der Sluijs, 2007; Thissen and Agusdinata, 2008). 
 
An individual’s attitude towards uncertainty will also be affected by their experience. The 
extent of experience is often one of the most important factors influencing the 
effectiveness of resource management decisions. Attitudes towards uncertainty will inform 
decisions and guide behaviour – they will influence an individual’s interpretation, 
acceptance and response to uncertain information. Attitudes towards uncertainty form as a 
result of both direct experience or through second-hand information about it, and are by no 
means static – they are dynamic and ever changing, influenced by new experiences (Fazey 
et al., 2005; Upham et al., 2009). Both their personal experiences, as well as their level of 
professional experience therefore influence decision-makers’ attitudes towards uncertainty. 
They often come from a variety of different professional backgrounds (for example they 
may be democratically elected councillors or environmental, legal, or cultural experts), and 
therefore not only will experience in decision-making influence attitudes towards 
uncertainty, so too will other professional experience.  
 
Finally, an individual’s perception of uncertainty is also influenced by their proximity to 
the generation of knowledge. This relationship can be explained by the concept of the 
‘certainty trough’ (Figure 2.3) which suggests that there is a ‘distribution of certainty’ and 
that an individual’s proximity to the production of knowledge will influence their views of 
the credibility of, or their degree of confidence in, the knowledge (MacKenzie, 1993; 
Duncan, 2008). Knowledge producers, knowledge users and those opposed to the proposal 
will each view the level of uncertainty differently: knowledge producers tend to attribute a 
high level of uncertainty to their work, while those opposed to the project (often members 
of the public) will perceive an even higher amount of uncertainty than the producers. In 
contrast, knowledge users (such as project applicants and decision-makers) tend to 
attribute a comparatively low level of uncertainty. As knowledge changes hands, the 
perception of uncertainty changes – knowledge users lack an intimate connection with the 
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knowledge production and will attribute a relatively low level of uncertainty to the 
knowledge compared to those who produce the knowledge (MacKenzie, 1993; Duncan, 
2008). Moreover, an individual’s perception of, or attitude towards, uncertainty is often 
shaped and influenced by the way in which the information is communicated by those who 
control the information flow, often the applicant. Not only that, the adequate disclosure of 
uncertainty should lead to the consideration of the decision and influence the decision-
maker's determination about the acceptability of a project (Duncan, 2013). The following 
section considers the importance of disclosing and communicating uncertainty to decision-
makers. 
 
Figure 2.3: The certainty trough adapted from (MacKenzie, 1993). 
 
2.3.3 Disclosure and communication of uncertainty to decision-makers   
Although it is widely accepted that uncertainty occurs in the IA process, it is also 
acknowledged that impact statements often appear to be more certain than they should be, 
and therefore that decision-makers are often not made aware of the actual level of 
uncertainty (Tennøy et al., 2006). This poses a challenge because, in order for uncertainty 
to be acknowledged and managed in the decision-making process, the decision-makers 
must first be made aware of these uncertainties.  
 
It is important that uncertainties are clearly expressed, and if necessary clarified, in all 
documents and communications with decision-makers. The benefits of informing decision-
makers of uncertainty are that it leads to a greater level of scrutiny in proposals and also 
increases their awareness of the merits of the alternatives, allowing them to better orientate 
their management strategies. It also allows consideration of the risks of the project, assists 
in applicant and decision-maker accountability, and also encourages transparency and 































appropriately disclosed and communicated, there is a risk that decisions made on the basis 
of erroneous information will result in unwanted environmental consequences (Geneletti et 
al., 2003; Tennøy et al., 2006; Wardekker et al., 2008; Duncan, 2013; Lees et al., 2016). 
 
While in theory it is important for applicants to be transparent and acknowledge and 
disclose uncertainty, it is recognised that in practice communicating uncertainty is 
difficult. Often decision-makers are not made aware of the uncertainty present in resource 
management as it is not disclosed (and when it is, it is often inadequate and poorly 
communicated) (Dipper, 1998; Geneletti et al., 2003; Tennøy et al., 2006; Duncan, 2013; 
Larsen et al., 2013; Lees et al., 2016). For example, Tennøy et al. (2006) investigated 
disclosure and communication of uncertainty in IA in Norway and found that only a small 
minority of the impact assessment documents disclosed or thoroughly discussed 
uncertainty. Lees et al. (2016) found that decision-makers in Canada are rarely presented 
with detailed information about the nature and implications of uncertainty as impact 
information is often communicated in such a way that portrays a greater degree of 
confidence than may actually exist. Moreover, Leung et al. (2016) found that decision-
makers generally believe that uncertainty disclosure and communication practices in 
Canada were poor.  
 
The poor disclosure of uncertainty in impact assessments can be explained in a number of 
ways. Some scientists may feel that disclosing uncertainty could reflect badly on their 
professional competence and reduce the perceived value of the information in the IA 
(Reckhow, 1994). In addition, while applicants and their consultants need to disclose 
uncertainty, they do of course have a vested interest in making proposals and IA’s 
defensible, and may seek to minimize the public disclosure of uncertainty (Duncan, 2008). 
Another reason that uncertainty is often undisclosed is that any individuals who oppose the 
proposals can use uncertainty information to raise public opposition and manipulate the 
legitimacy of information (Leung et al., 2016). In saying this, it can be difficult to 
determine whether applicants deliberately hide uncertainty or if they just think it is too 
difficult or not worth the effort to disclose uncertainties to the public and to decision-
makers (Lees, 2014). 
 
While simply disclosing uncertainty is important, there is also a need for these 
uncertainties to be communicated in a style and language that, while matching scientific 
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practice, is able to be clearly understood by non-experts and lay people (Petersen, 2002; 
Tennøy et al., 2006). This is particularly difficult when dealing with scientific information 
because while there is a scientific need for the precise quantification of uncertainty, 
decision-makers (and the public) require a simplified analysis directed at those less 
familiar with the underlying science (Larsen et al., 2013; Leung et al., 2016). It has been 
argued that the influence of scientific evidence on decisions can be severely diminished 
when the uncertainty associated with impacts is not adequately explained (Reckhow, 1994; 
Dovers et al., 1996; Harwood and Stokes, 2003).  
 
In addition, if attention is not paid to the way the effects information is communicated, 
there is the potential that more uncertainty can be introduced in the form of linguistic 
uncertainty, a source that is often over-looked as an important cause of uncertainty in the 
effects information (Regan et al., 2002; Carey and Burgman, 2008; Kujala et al., 2013). 
 
Although there is a need for better communication of uncertainty, decision-makers also 
need to be less reliant upon, and accepting of, an applicant’s disclosure of uncertainty.  
Decision-makers need to undertake a deeper consideration of an applicant’s narrative and 
see through the smoke screen of the applicant’s certainty about what was actually 
uncertain (Duncan, 2008; Allen and Gunderson, 2011; Duncan, 2013; Leung et al., 2015). 
2.3.4 Uncertainty and guidance  
Despite the recognition of the importance of acknowledging and addressing uncertainty in 
IA and subsequent decision-making, there has been limited general guidance developed for 
consultants or decision-makers on how to interpret and manage uncertainty in resource 
management.  
 
Guidance for applicants 
Although there is a large body of academic literature addressing uncertainty in resource 
management, this does not seem to have been translated into guidance material for 
applicants and practitioners. In order for better informed decisions to be made, there is a 
need for applicants to adopt a more analytical, pragmatic, systematic and explicit approach 
to dealing with uncertainties (Isendahl et al., 2010). However, it is also recognised that 
there are some difficulties associated with developing, and using guidelines. Every 
resource management situation is unique: no two projects are identical, the specific 
 25 
uncertainties will differ, the broader political and social context will be unique, and the 
decision-making legal framework may differ, etc. It is therefore not possible to provide 
specific guidance for every possible situation or scenario (Kloprogge et al., 2007). In 
saying this, the Netherland’s Environmental Assessment Agency has provided a large 
number of different guidance documents including guidance for applicants and impact 
assessors to better manage uncertainty in the assessment process and to improve the 
communication of uncertainty to decision-makers (Petersen et al., 2003; Kloprogge et al., 
2007; Petersen et al., 2010; Petersen et al., 2013).  
 
Guidance for decision-makers  
In general, decision-makers are given little guidance on how best to interpret and manage 
uncertainty (Leung et al., 2015). As a result, decision-making under uncertainty is often 
based on intuition, heuristics and experience or on expert assessments which are often only 
of a limited use (Isendahl et al., 2010). It is understandable then that there are criticisms 
that decisions are made based on assessments with no consideration of the associated 
uncertainty (Reckhow, 1994). However, there are many ways to manage uncertainty 
(section 2.6) and before robust guidance can be produced, there is a need for more 
agreement about the most appropriate way to approach uncertainty. 
 
2.4 Managing uncertainty in decision-making 
Strategies that can be used to manage uncertainty with the impact assessment process are 
well documented. Many studies focus particularly on ways in which information in the 
impact assessment can be improved and tools which can be used to reduce uncertainty 
(such as sensitivity analysis, fuzzy logic, scenario analysis risk-based approaches, 
research, etc.) (Leung et al., 2015). However, most uncertainties cannot be eliminated, 
therefore decision-makers must accept, understand and manage them. Managing 
uncertainty requires a decision-maker first to recognise that uncertainty exists and then to 
determine whether it matters. Often the way in which decision-makers view uncertainty 
will determine the way in which they go about managing it (Benson, 2003; Walker and 
Marchau, 2003; Brugnach et al., 2007). For example, decision-makers who understand 
uncertainty as an inherent part of the resource management process will often accept the 
uncertainty and will often chose strategies which aim to manage the system with its 
irreducible uncertainties. On the other hand decision-makers who view uncertainty as a 
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lack of knowledge, will manage uncertainty by employing strategies aimed at remedying 
the deficiencies in the knowledge, such as by doing more research and gaining more 
information in the hope that the uncertainties are reduced. If a decision-maker views 
uncertainty as a manifestation of differing or conflicting views or knowledge frames, 
strategies that are employed to manage uncertainty are often those that aim to resolve 
conflicting views. Overall, those who are more risk-averse will have a more preventive 
management style, while those who are risk-tolerant tend to have an adaptive management 
style (Brugnach et al., 2008). 
 
Similarly, the level of uncertainty that an individual is willing to accept is variable, and 
can be influenced by a number of factors including the extent of the benefits and the 
severity, likelihood, familiarity, spatial and temporal distribution of adverse impacts (Vlek, 
2004). Given the complexity of impact assessment and subsequent decision-making, trade-
offs (whereby gains in one area are made at the expense of losses in another) are an 
inherent aspect of the decision-making process (Morrison-Saunders and Pope, 2013). 
Trade-offs can be substantive (the actual win-loss outcomes of decisions which occur 
when gains in one area occur at the expense of losses in another area) or process orientated 
(when the ideal is compromised for the practical; e.g. trade-offs are made between the 
urgency of the decision and the need for further information or between certainty and 
uncertainty) (Wood, 2003; Morrison-Saunders and Pope, 2013). 
 
A number of different approaches can be used to help to understand and manage 
uncertainty, and Larsen et al. (2013) have developed a conceptual model, which outlines 
the key approaches used to manage uncertainty in the decision-making process (Figure 
2.4). This initial way of theorising uncertainty management strategies is useful as many of 
the more specific techniques fit well within the framework. Larsen et al. (2013) explain 
that the basic premise for understanding how decision-makers handle uncertainty is to 
know if they are aware of the uncertainty in question. This awareness, as previously 
discussed, is reliant upon either the adequate disclosure and communication of 
uncertainties by the applicant, or the decision-maker identifying the uncertainty 
themselves. If the decision-maker is aware of the uncertainty present, they can then make a 
choice to accept its presence and thus acknowledge the uncertainty or not. If the 
uncertainty is not acknowledged then it may reflect a strategy of denial by decision-
makers, which can occur when decision-makers refuse to believe that the uncertainty 
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exists or, if it does exist, that it is relevant. Denial is “a refusal to believe something no 
matter what the evidence” (Larsen et al., 2013: 145). 
 
When uncertainty is acknowledged there are two main types of strategies that can be used 
to ‘manage’ it – these are ‘handling’ strategies and ‘non-handling’ strategies. When a 
decision-maker chooses to ‘handle’ uncertainty, they can do one of two things, attempt to 
reduce the uncertainty or accept the presence of uncertainty and be resilient. The ‘non-
handling’ strategies are to postpone decision-making or to ignore the uncertainty and 
proceed. The following sections explore these four main strategies (reduce, accept, 




Figure 2.4: Conceptual model of different strategies of managing uncertainty in resource 
management problems. 
 
Ignoring uncertainty occurs when decision-makers purposefully choose to carry out the 
decision-making process without regard for the uncertainty (Raadgever et al., 2011; 
Larsen et al., 2013). Traditionally, this is the easiest and most common way to deal with 
uncertainty. However, overlooking uncertainty involves tolerating what could be a large 
amount of uncertainty, and therefore risk, associated with the outcomes of the decision, 
which could in turn lead to significant negative outcomes of the decision.  This strategy 
does not solve the problem of uncertainty; it merely sweeps it under the rug and can have 












Postponing decision-making in the face of uncertainty is based on the belief that 
uncertainty will be dealt with when a larger and more robust body of scientific knowledge 
and information is available and thus the uncertainty will be reduced in the future (Larsen 
et al., 2013). However, there is also the risk that while some uncertainties will be reduced 
or disappear altogether, new ones might emerge, therefore the benefits of acting quickly 
are lost (Thissen and Agusdinata, 2008). In consent decision-making this strategy involves 
delaying the decision; however, in policy making there are examples of cases where whole 
areas have not been considered (e.g. climate change) because there is too much uncertainty 
for the issues to be meaningfully considered. 
 
The first of the ‘handling’ strategies for managing uncertainty in a resource development 
proposal is to reduce the uncertainty by gaining more information (Thissen and 
Agusdinata, 2008; Raadgever et al., 2011; Larsen et al., 2013). Through the collection of 
more information and increasing the amount of knowledge about the proposal and its 
effects it is believed that any uncertainty that is present will be reduced and thus lead to 
improved decisions being made. This often involves pushing the management of 
uncertainty, and its costs, onto someone else; for example the applicant may have to ‘buy 
information’ through additional research or better integration of existing knowledge. Other 
ways of reducing uncertainty through knowledge generation are: data gathering and 
experimentation, quantitative simulation modelling, qualitative assessment, and the use of 
expert opinions. However, the reduction of uncertainty can only occur if the uncertainty 
occurs due to a lack of knowledge (epistemic uncertainty); the uncertainty caused by the 
inherent complexity of the environment will persist (Newig et al., 2005; Refsgaard et al., 
2007; Ascough Ii et al., 2008; Brugnach et al., 2008; Hall and Solomatine, 2008; Thissen 
and Agusdinata, 2008; Raadgever et al., 2011).  
 
There is also the possibility that by obtaining more information and doing further research, 
one may actually increase the level of uncertainty. While additional research may be 
undertaken in an attempt to better understand a system, it may reveal unforeseen 
complexities of the system, or uncover other uncertainties. Therefore, from the point of 
view of decision-makers, undertaking more research may not make their task easier in the 
short term (Dovers et al., 1996; Walker et al., 2003; Brugnach et al., 2008). 
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Another method for reducing uncertainty is uncertainty assessment. This is a strategy that 
can be used to better understand the uncertainty which is present in the resource 
management decisions. It increases the understanding of uncertainty and can therefore 
improve the use of more specific target-oriented uncertainty management strategies. 
Uncertainty assessment can involve the identification and classification of uncertainty, the 
quantification or determination of significance of the uncertainty, and the prioritisation of 
different uncertainties. Methods used to undertake this can involve stakeholders, public, 
experts, and by completing a peer review (Walker et al., 2003; Refsgaard et al., 2007; 
Ascough Ii et al., 2008; Brugnach et al., 2008; Raadgever et al., 2011). 
 
The second ‘handling’ strategy is to accept uncertainty, act consciously in its presence and 
be resilient (Larsen et al., 2013). This is an important strategy as often, in certain 
scenarios, uncertainty will be inherent in the problem and irreducible, and will therefore 
need to be thoroughly considered. A number of more specific management options that fall 
under this strategy include preparing for the worst, adopting robust and/or flexible 
solutions, and developing resilience (Brugnach et al., 2008; Thissen and Agusdinata, 2008; 
Raadgever et al., 2011; Larsen et al., 2013). 
 
Preparing for the worst involves identifying the worse case scenario under uncertainty and 
developing contingencies to limit the potential negative consequences under that scenario 
(Brugnach et al., 2008; Raadgever et al., 2011). In contrast, developing resilience in the 
face of uncertainty would see the system affected by the project being changed to ensure it 
has the capacity to adsorb any disturbance or negative impacts (Berkes, 2007). 
 
Robust and/or flexible solutions are those that will perform well under most possible 
scenarios, and are flexible enough that they can be adapted over time as conditions change 
or effects become better understood. This may involve employing different measures to 
ensure that the project will be effective under each of the possible scenarios (Thissen and 
Agusdinata, 2008; Raadgever et al., 2011). The two most recognised examples of robust 
and adaptive solutions that can be used in the face of uncertainty are the precautionary 





2.4.1 The Precautionary Principle 
The precautionary principle originated from the recognition that the reactionary approach 
to resource management is ineffective and that there is a need to anticipate consequences 
of an action (Mitchell, 2002). There are a number of definitions for the precautionary 
principle. One of the earliest was developed at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and stated that: 
“where there are threats of serious irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation” (United Nations, 1992; White, 2015).  
 
In other words, rather than waiting for a complete understanding or certainty, the 
precautionary principle advocates that managers and decision-makers should anticipate 
potentially serious and harmful environmental impacts from actions and take decisions to 
avoid such harm. This counters the notion that an activity should proceed until there is 
definitive evidence that it is harmful (Mitchell, 2002; André et al., 2004; Cooney, 2005; 
Lawrence, 2005). 
 
It has been suggested that the precautionary principle is a framework to be used to manage 
the problem of uncertainty, and avoid the paralysis decision-makers may face when 
confronted with uncertainty. In its simplest form, the principle advocates that uncertainty 
should not be used as an excuse for inaction when potential consequences could be serious 
and damaging (Bodansky, 1991; Gullett, 1997; André et al., 2004; Tannert et al., 2007; 
Lawrence, 2015). 
 
Since the United Nations conference in 1992, the precautionary principle has spread 
rapidly into many areas of international and domestic law and policy, from climate change 
to food safety (Peterson, 2006). However, despite its widespread use, the precautionary 
principle has been extensively criticised on a number of grounds, some of which will be 
briefly discussed.  
 
Firstly, the definition of the precautionary principle is contested by some. The term is 
considered to be somewhat ambiguous, there is considerable confusion about what is 
meant by the concept, and there is no one-way of viewing precaution (Peterson, 2006; 
Gillespie, 2011). However, the real challenge is how to put this abstract definition into 
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practice. While the precautionary principle provides a general approach to environmental 
issues, there is a considerable lack of clarity about what it means to apply the principle or 
take precautionary measures, and there are no criteria to guide its implementation (Gullett, 
1997; Cooney, 2005; Peterson, 2006; Allen and Gunderson, 2011; Gillespie, 2011). 
Furthermore, it is too vague to serve as a regulatory standard because it does not provide 
clear guidance for practice, does not provide guidance as to the appropriate point at which 
precautionary action should be triggered and applied, and does not specify to decision-
makers how much caution should be taken (Bodansky, 1991; Gullett, 1997; Lawrence, 
2005; Jalava et al., 2013). Moreover, there is an argument that, in situations where 
decisions makers are given ‘excessive discretion’ as to when and how to apply the 
principle, the regulatory framework may result in it being applied inconsistently, leading to 
unpredictable and inconsistent environmental management decisions. Conversely, it has 
been argued that, if there were excessive prescription of the principle, it would remove the 
flexibility needed to take into account the circumstances of each case (Cameron, 2006; 
Peterson, 2006). 
 
This leads to an important distinction that has been made between the ‘precautionary 
principle’ and the ‘precautionary approach.’ While controversial, some believe that the 
precautionary principle is the stronger, more restrictive, hard line view while the 
precautionary approach is the weaker, less restrictive, more flexible version. The dividing 
points between strong and weak versions are the nature of the threat, the triggering point 
for the principle and the reversal of the burden of proof (Table 2.3) (Cooney, 2005; 
Peterson, 2006; Gillespie, 2011). 
Finally, the precautionary principle might hinder the application of active adaptive 
management, which seeks to accelerate learning for better outcomes over the long-term. 
While adaptive management calls for risk-taking in order to learn, the precautionary 
principle is evoked to avoid risk. Thus, while managing in a precautionary way can 
minimise risk over the short term, there is potential for it to serve as an excuse for not 
taking the (perhaps risky) steps needed to learn. On the other hand, some authors promote 
adaptive management as an approach that can be used to implement precaution (Gullett, 
1997; Jacobson, 2009). 
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Table 2.3: Comparison of the differences between the precautionary principle and precautionary 
approach (Cooney, 2005; Peterson, 2006; Gillespie, 2011). 
 
 Precautionary Principle Precautionary Approach 
Nature of threat Any harm may trigger its application 
Harm must be ‘serious’, ‘significant’ or 
‘irreversible’ 
Threshold of threat 
(What level of threat or 
potential for harm is 
sufficient to trigger 
application of the 
principle) 
Application is triggered 
by any suspicion of a 
potential risk or 
reasonable grounds for 
concern (based upon 
reliable scientific data) 
Application is only triggered is evidence 
relating to both likelihood of occurrence 
and severity of consequences is available 
(In this case scientific uncertainty alone or 
the possibility of environmental damage 
below the threshold level will not satisfy 
the threshold test for precautionary 
measures) 
Burden of proof 
(Where does the burden 
of proof rest to show 
the existence/absence 
of risk of harm) 
The burden of proof 
that no damage will 
occur is on those who 
wish to undertake an 
activity 
The requirement to justify the need for 
action generally falls on those advocating 
precautionary action. 
Examples of use 
Wingspread Statement 
on the Precautionary 
Principle, 1998; Earth 
Charter, 2000 
Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, 1992; UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 1992; UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 
 
 
2.4.2 Adaptive Management 
Adaptive management is a natural resource management tool for dealing with the 
challenge of the uncertain and unexpected, while allowing management and development 
to proceed despite the presence of uncertainty (Morgan, 1998; Mitchell, 2002; Allen and 
Gunderson, 2011). Rather than ignore uncertainty, or use it to prevent development, 
adaptive management is seen to be able to foster resilient and flexible management 
approaches that acknowledge inevitable changes and surprises (Allen and Gunderson, 
2011). 
 
Adaptive management is an iterative tool which involves rigorous research and planning of 
a project and its effects before implementation, and thorough monitoring and re-
examination of impacts following implementation so that the management strategy can be 
altered to respond to emerging problems (Morgan, 1998; Lawrence, 2005). Holling (1978) 
saw that adaptive management was no more than common sense:  it stems from the 
traditional way of dealing with the unknown – trial and error, where failures are accepted 
and form the basis of new experiments (learning by doing) (Stankey and Allan, 2009). 
However, one of the most important conditions of employing an adaptive approach to 
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resource management is that the ‘experiment’ should not create irreversible changes to the 
environment. 
 
With increasing recognition of the complexity and uncertainty associated with managing 
natural resources, adaptive management has become an interesting and appealing solution. 
However, there is also a number of recognised challenges and risks associated with the 
approach - the implementation of adaptive management does not produce easy answers, it 
is only appropriate to use in some resource management problems and, as a result, some 
believe it has failed more often than not (Stankey and Allan, 2009; Allen and Gunderson, 
2011). 
 
Although Rogers (1998) outlines the success of the use of adaptive management in the 
management of large-scale problems, some suggest that it is most appropriate and 
successful with small and relatively simple applications (e.g. only a few regulatory bodies 
and interest groups involved, minimally severe impacts and low risk to any species) 
(Gregory et al., 2006). Mitchell (2002) goes one step further, warning against using 
adaptive management for large projects (such as a major dam) because the scale and 
implications make reversing the development or effects almost impossible. In addition, 
some systems are extremely sensitive (e.g. estuarine environments) and small changes can 
result in catastrophic collapses (Walters, 1997; Dovers et al., 2008). 
 
In order to learn from and adapt the initial management strategy implemented, monitoring 
must be undertaken (Morgan, 1998). Well-designed monitoring can be costly (for example 
when multiple variables are measured at multiple sites and time scales), therefore there is a 
risk that, if there is inadequate funding or commitment, then monitoring, evaluating and 
reporting will not be done sufficiently (Walters, 1997; Rogers, 1998; Schreiber et al., 
2004; Allen and Gunderson, 2011). For example, Walters (1997) is of the opinion that 
resource managers and decision-makers are generally conservative about such costs and 
risks, and are preferentially choosing to scale back experiments (e.g.limiting the variety of 
treatments, replication, duration, complexity of monitoring set, etc.)  rather than invest in 
innovative monitoring approaches. There are also risks when there are additional costs and 
delays associated with gathering extra information or when there is a need for more 
monitoring than initially thought and extra funding is sought to successfully determine the 
outcomes of the monitoring. As a result it is fundamental that emphasis is placed on 
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designing firm, achievable and pragmatic goals and that their achievement is audited 
(Rogers, 1998; Allen and Gunderson, 2011). 
 
Although adaptive management is predominantly about learning from mistakes, humans 
often have great difficulty in acknowledging failure or mistakes or in learning from such 
experiences. In addition, there is often a danger that, in clearly documenting failures, egos 
will be bruised or reputations tarnished (not to mention political risks) (Mitchell, 2002).  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a theoretical framework of uncertainty in resource management 
and decision-making. It has explained the reasons for uncertainty in the process, the 
different perceptions of uncertainty and the ways in which uncertainty can be managed in 
the process.  
 
There are many causes of uncertainty there may be a lack of information, or conflicting 
information, too much information or the system of interest may just be too complex for a 
full understanding ever to be gained. The level of certainty about an issue can range from 
total certainty, to complete ignorance and it is important to consider the significance of the 
uncertainty that is present. Uncertainty can occur in many areas of the resource 
management process: in the project proposal, in the consultation, or in many different 
areas of the assessment of effects. 
 
Most resource management situations will have a level of uncertainty, and it is therefore 
important that decision-makers are aware of this. Decision-makers’ perceptions of 
uncertainty, the way they understand it, whether or not they accept it, and how much 
importance they place on it can vary for many reasons, including the distance from the 
generation of knowledge and how risk averse an individual is. There is often little to no 
guidance to assist decision-makers in recognising and coping with uncertainty. The 
disclosure and communication of uncertainty is an important factor which affects decision-
makers’ understanding and perceptions. In practice, uncertainty is often poorly disclosed 
and communicated by applicants, and there is a lack of guidance for applicants on how 
best to improve this.  
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There are number of different ways in which uncertainty can be managed in the decision-
making process. Each of the strategies has benefits, but when implemented in a situation 
that is not appropriate, may have negative implications. Therefore it is important that 








Chapter 3: Resource management 




This chapter first provide a brief overview of the Resource Management Act 1991, its key 
purpose and broad approach to resource management. Following this, the resource consent 
process is described, with a particular focus on the role of the impact information and the 
decision-making process. Finally the management of uncertainty under the Act in 
considered. 
 
3.2 The Resource Management Act 1991  
The Resource Management Act 1991 revolutionised resource management in New 
Zealand by streamlining and integrating previous legislation dealing with the management 
of air, water and soil. Today, it is the major statute governing resource management 
decision-making. Under the Act, much of the management of the environment is 
decentralised, placing considerable responsibility onto local government. This 
decentralisation is based on the principle that decision-making is best carried out at the 
level closest to the resources affected and also better enables public participation in 
resource management decision-making (Memon, 1993; Robertson, 1993; Peart, 2008; 
Local Government New Zealand, 2016). 
 
3.2.1 Sustainable management 
The overriding purpose of the RMA is ‘to promote the sustainable management of natural 
and physical resources’ where sustainable management is defined as (Section 5(1)): 
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managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical 
resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to 
provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being and for their health 
and safety while— 
(a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding 
minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future 
generations; and 
(b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and 
ecosystems; and 
(c) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on 
the environment. 
 
It is important to note that sustainable management and sustainable development are not 
the same thing: sustainable management is an element of sustainable development and is 
less comprehensive, being focused on physical resources as opposed to social or economic. 
However, although the purpose of the RMA does not explicitly seek to achieve social or 
economic outcomes, decisions are to take into account the impact of the use of natural 
resources on social, cultural and economic matters (Ericksen et al., 2001; Peart, 2008). 
 
3.2.2 Effects based approach 
Rather than regulating specific activities, the Act takes an effects based approach whereby 
the focus is on managing the effects of activities rather the activities per se and seeks to 
intervene only where activities are likely to result in unacceptable environmental impacts 
(Peart, 2008; Environment Foundation, 2016b). While it gives wider and stronger powers 
to manage environmental impacts, the Act adopts a more enabling approach than previous 
legislation. Although this approach has the advantage of providing room for innovative 
approaches, it can also result in environmental planning being reactive, in plans being 
complex and difficult to understand and in poor management of cumulative and diffuse 
impacts (Memon, 1993; Peart, 2008). 
 
3.2.1 Hierarchy of government  
The Resource Management Act acknowledges the importance of the different levels of 
government in environmental planning and management and as a result there is a 
hierarchical three-tier structure (Figure 3.1). Central government’s primary role is to 
oversee and monitor the Act, set national environmental standards and prepare national 
policy statements (Memon, 1993; Peart, 2008). Regional councils, of which there are 11, 
are primarily responsible for the management of natural resources such as water, air and 
land, and for producing regional policy statements and plans. There are 67 territorial 
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authorities which are responsible for local services such as roads, refuse, libraries, and 
community and economic development, prepare district plans, which must be ‘not 
inconsistent’ with regional plans. Six of the territorial authorities also have the 
responsibilities of regional councils and are referred to as unitary authorities. Each lower 
level policy or plan must be consistent with what has been decided at a higher level of 
decision-making. (Peart, 2009; Department of Internal Affairs, 2011; Local Government 
New Zealand, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Hierarchy of plans under the RMA 1991 (Peart, 2008). 
 
3.3 The Resource Consent Process 
Under the Resource Management Act 1991, certain activities that affect natural or physical 
resources require permission in the form of resource consents.  The Act provides the 
framework for the process by which consents are granted (Figure 3.2). The resource 
consent process allows authorities to determine the effects of an activity on the 
environment and to put measures in place that eliminate or mitigate potentially damaging 
effects of developments (Connell et al., 2009). Resource consents are obtained from 
regional councils or territorial authorities (and in some cases from central government), 
which act as consenting authorities. 
 
Between 1997-2015 the average total number of resource consents processed in 12-month 
period by consenting authorities was 48,096, although since 2008 the number has 
decreased (Table 3.1). Between 1997-2015, almost all consents that were applied for were 
subsequently granted – an average of only 0.60% of consents were declined. Whilst 
territorial authorities processed an average of 62.9% of total consents, regional councils 
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processed 20.9% and unitary authorities processed 16.5% (this number has increased since 
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Table 3.1: Summary of the characteristics and processing of resource consent application in New 
Zealand between 1999-2015. 
 
























































Total number of consents 
processed 58,060 49,152 48,045 49,012 54,658 51,768 51,960 36,154 34,055 40,363 48,096 
Percentage of consents 






























council 16 18 17 24 20 24 24 26 22 18 20.9 
Territorial 
Authority 77 76 75 68 72 69 69 39 41 43 62.9 
Unitary 



























Controlled - - - - - 24 20 16 14 15 17.8 
Restricted 
Discretionary - - - - - 25 23 25 29 33 27.0 
Discretionary - - - - - 49 50 45 42 39 45.0 
Non-complying - - - - - 7 8 9 9 11 8.8 
Other - - - - - - - 6 6 - 6 
Percentage of applications 
with further information 
requests (%) 





Fully 5 5 5 6 5 4 5 4 3 2 4.7 





 Total number of 
prehearing meetings 
held 
679 508 432 546 647 518 379 239 150 528 455 
Total number of 































Officer 90 84 83 84 87 87 85 91 89 96.5 86.7 
Councillors (as 
part of a hearing 
panel) 
6 6 6 5 4 3 5 2 1 <0.5 4.2 
Independent 
Commissioner 1 1 1 1 1 3 6 5 7 3.5 2.9 
Internal 
Commissioner 3 8 10 8 7 5 4 <0.5 2 <0.5 5.9 
Other (mixed 
Panel) (%) <0.5 1 1 2 <1 1 1 1 1 - 1.1 
Percentage of appeals to 
environment court (%) 1 1 1 1.8 1.2 1 1.4 1 0.7 <0.5 0.7 
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3.3.1 Identifying the consent required  
Initially, it needs to be determined whether a resource consent is required. This is achieved 
by establishing which of the six categories of activity (Table 3.2) the proposed activity will 
be classified as. Resource consent is required for controlled, restricted discretionary, 
discretionary and non-complying activities; permitted activities do not need consent and a 
consent cannot be granted for an activity classed as prohibited.  
 
Between 2005-2013 an average of 17.8% of consents were for controlled activities, 27.0% 
for restricted discretionary, 45.0% for discretionary, 8.8% for non complying and 6% other 
activities (activities which require a resource consent but some district or regional plans do 
not have a classification for them) (Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.2: Consenting authorities in New Zealand classify activities into 6 groups and whether or 




activity Description of activity 
Consent 
required 
Permitted The activity must comply with requirements, conditions or permissions specified within RMA and relevant plans No 
Controlled The council can impose conditions (only on matters that it has reserved control in the plan) Yes 
Restricted 
discretionary 
The council can exercise discretion as to whether or not to grant 
consent and what conditions to impose (only in respect to matters 
which is has restricted its discretion in the plan) 
Yes 
Discretionary The council can exercise full discretion as to whether or not to grant consent and as to what conditions to impose Yes 
Non-
complying 
The applicant must establish that the adverse affects of the activity 
will be minor or that the activity will not be contrary to the 
objectives of the relevant plan 
Yes 
Prohibited A prohibited activity may not be carried out. In addition, no resource consent can be sought or granted to authorise the activity - 
 
In addition to determining the classification of activity, it is also important to identify the 
type of consent that is required. There are five different types of resource consent that can 
be granted: land use, subdivision, coastal, water and discharge (Table 3.3). By establishing 
the type of activity and the type of resource consent needed, the applicant can then 




Table 3.3: Types of resource consents and the consent authorities responsible for issuing them 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2015). 
 
Type Example of activity Consent authority responsible 
Land use Erect a building or convert garage into residential neighbourhood shop 
Regional and/or 
territorial Authority 
Subdivision Divide a property into two or more titles Territorial 
Coastal Build a wharf below mean high water spring mark Regional Council 
Water To take water from a stream for an irrigation scheme or to build a dam Regional Council 
Discharge To discharge storm water through a pipe into a lake or to discharge exhaust fumes into the air Regional Council 
 
3.3.2 Application preparation 
The resource consent application must then be prepared, including an assessment of 
environmental effects (AEE). Although not obligatory, applicants are encouraged to 
consult affected parties prior to submitting the application as it can avoid considerable 
costs later in the process and, in some cases, obtaining written consent from ‘affected 
parties’ will allow the consent to be assessed on a non-notified basis (Peart, 2008).  
 
Assessment of Environmental Effects (AEE)  
The Resource Management Act 1991 states that a resource consent application should 
contain an assessment of any actual or potential effects that the activity may have on the 
environment and the ways in which any adverse effects may be mitigated. This is the 
assessment of environmental effects (AEE). The Resource Management Act 1991 
definition of environment (Section 2) is very broad and includes: 
(a) ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people and communities; and 
(b) all natural and physical resources; and 
(c) amenity values; and 
(d) the social, economic, aesthetic, and cultural conditions which affect the matters 
stated in paragraphs (a) to (c) or which are affected by those matters 
 
Similarly the definition of effect is also broad (Section 3): 
(a) any positive or adverse effect; and 
(b) any temporary or permanent effect; and 
(c) any past, present, or future effect; and 
(d) any cumulative effect which arises over time or in combination 
with other effects— 
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regardless of the scale, intensity, duration, or frequency of the effect, 
and also includes 
(e) any potential effect of high probability; and 
(f) any potential effect of low probability which has a high potential 
impact. 
 
Due to the breadth of the definitions, any decision taken about the use of natural resources 
must potentially take into account any impact on any part of the environment (Milne, 
1993; Peart, 2008). However, in practice the detail required for the assessment will depend 
on the scale of significance of the potential impacts. The Act provides guidance on the 
contents of the AEE in the form of the Fourth Schedule (Box 1).  
 
In the 2013 survey of consenting authorities it was found that 87% of consenting 
authorities produce their own written guidance material for applicants in preparing 
assessments of environmental effects (Ministry for the Environment, 2014); however, 
many are often still completed based on the broad frame of reference in the Fourth 
Schedule (Morgan, 2000).   
 
In addition, in 1999 MfE published ‘A Guide to Preparing Basic Assessment of 
Environmental Effects’, but as the title indicates, the guide is not designed to be used for 
complex projects with complex effects. Revised in 2006, the guide has not been updated 
since the changes to the Fourth Schedule in 2013. Some councils have developed consent 
application forms which include checklists to assist with the AEE. While these assist 
people with no experience dealing with AEEs, there are risks associated with them if the 
council has not provided guidance on their use (Morgan, 2000).  
 
Pre-application consultation with council 
Before officially lodging an application for resource consent, an applicant can choose to 
consult the council about their application. This consultation can help in a number of ways, 
from confirming whether a resource consent is needed through to explaining the 
requirements of the AEE and advising on stakeholder consultation (Quality Planning, 
2016d). Processing an application is generally simpler, quicker and less costly if the 
applicant has already sought the council's advice on the relevant plan provisions and 
information requirements before making an application (Quality Planning, 2016d). 
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Box 1: Extracted from the Fourth Schedule of the Resource Management Act 
 
6 Information required in assessment of environmental effects 
1) An assessment of the activity's effects on the environment must include the following 
information: 
(a) if it is likely that the activity will result in any significant adverse effect on the 
environment, a description of any possible alternative locations or methods for 
undertaking the activity: 
(b) an assessment of the actual or potential effect on the environment of the activity: 
(c) if the activity includes the use of hazardous substances and installations, an assessment 
of any risks to the environment that are likely to arise from such use: 
(d) if the activity includes the discharge of any contaminant, a description of— 
i. the nature of the discharge and the sensitivity of the receiving environment to 
adverse effects; and 
ii. any possible alternative methods of discharge, including discharge into any other 
receiving environment: 
(e) a description of the mitigation measures (including safeguards and contingency plans 
where relevant) to be undertaken to help prevent or reduce the actual or potential effect: 
(f) identification of the persons affected by the activity, any consultation undertaken, and 
any response to the views of any person consulted: 
(g) if the scale and significance of the activity's effects are such that monitoring is required, 
a description of how and by whom the effects will be monitored if the activity is 
approved: 
(h) if the activity will, or is likely to, have adverse effects that are more than minor on the 
exercise of a protected customary right, a description of possible alternative locations 
or methods for the exercise of the activity (unless written approval for the activity is 
given by the protected customary rights group). 
2) A requirement to include information in the assessment of environmental effects is subject 
to the provisions of any policy statement or plan. 
3) To avoid doubt, subclause (1)(f) obliges an applicant to report as to the persons identified as 
being affected by the proposal, but does not— 
(a) oblige the applicant to consult any person; or 
(b) create any ground for expecting that the applicant will consult any person. 
 
7 Matters that must be addressed by assessment of environmental effects 
1) An assessment of the activity's effects on the environment must address the following 
matters: 
(a) any effect on those in the neighbourhood and, where relevant, the wider community, 
including any social, economic, or cultural effects: 
(b) any physical effect on the locality, including any landscape and visual effects: 
(c) any effect on ecosystems, including effects on plants or animals and any physical 
disturbance of habitats in the vicinity: 
(d) any effect on natural and physical resources having aesthetic, recreational, scientific, 
historical, spiritual, or cultural value, or other special value, for present or future 
generations: 
(e) any discharge of contaminants into the environment, including any unreasonable 
emission of noise, and options for the treatment and disposal of contaminants: 
a) any risk to the neighbourhood, the wider community, or the environment through 
natural hazards or the use of hazardous substances or hazardous installations. 
2) The requirement to address a matter in the assessment of environmental effects is subject to 




Once the application is complete and lodged with the consent authority, it will be checked 
for completeness. This involves assessing the AEE to ensure that it is in the prescribed 
form and that it meets the requirements of Schedule 4 (Quality Planning, 2016a). In the 
2013 survey of consenting authorities, it was found that 83% of consenting authorities 
followed set procedures to check that environmental effects were adequately identified and 
addressed in assessments of environmental effects (Ministry for the Environment, 2014).  
 
There is a 10 working day timeframe for councils to determine whether an application is 
complete. In cases where an application is deemed incomplete, or the AEE is deemed not 
to contain all the relevant information, the consent authority can refuse to accept the 
application (Quality Planning, 2016a). Once the application has been accepted, councils 
have the right to request further information (s92). This occurs frequently; between 1997 
and 2015 32.8% of all consent applications were deemed incomplete and more information 
was requested (Table 3.1). Once an application is deemed complete, a council officer will 
prepare an officer’s report on the application which usually contain recommendations 
about whether the consent should be granted and if so, what conditions should be placed 
on it (Peart, 2008). 
 
3.3.4 Public notification 
The next step in the process is for council staff to decide whether the application should be 
notified or non-notified. While notification allows public submissions, non-notification 
does not (Morgan, 2000). An application must be publically notified in cases where the 
activity will have or is likely to have adverse effects on the environment that are more than 
minor, or if the applicant requests it or when a rule, or national environmental standard 
requires public notification (Quality Planning, 2016f). An application can be fully notified 
(where anyone can make a submission) or given limited notification (where only those 
served with a notice of the application can submit). Between 1997-2015 an average of 
4.7% of consent applications were fully notified each year and between 2005-2013 an 
average of 1.5% of applications were notified on a limited basis (Table 3.1). In cases 
where the consenting authority deems that the activity will have minor effects, and all the 
affected persons provide agreement, they can proceed without notifying the public. The 




Hearings are held, typically for notified applications, when the council considers it 
necessary when the applicant requests a hearing, or when a submitter wishes to be heard 
(Quality Planning, 2016c). A pre-hearing meeting may be held for the purpose of 
clarifying or facilitating the resolution of the matter or issue. Between 1997-2015 there 
was an average of 455 prehearing meetings held per year (Table 3.1). On average, 3% of 
pre-hearing meetings result in hearings not being necessary. 
 
3.3.5 Decision-making for resource consents 
The consenting authority then makes a decision on the application. Section 104 of the Act 
explains the way in which different activities must be treated in the decision-making 
process and the council’s rights or obligations to grant or deny the application. Section 104 
states that the authority must have regard to:  
(a) any actual and potential effects on the environment of allowing the activity; 
and 
(b) any relevant provisions of—  
i. a national environmental standard: 
ii. other regulations: 
iii. a national policy statement: 
iv. a New Zealand coastal policy statement: 
v. a regional policy statement or proposed regional policy statement: 
vi. a plan or proposed plan; and 
(c) another matter the consent authority considers relevant and reasonably 
necessary to determine the application. 
 
The authority is obliged to grant consents on controlled activities but has the right to 
impose conditions (Section 104A). For both discretionary and non-complying activities the 
authority may choose to grant or refuse the application and may impose conditions 
(Section 104B). When dealing with restricted discretionary activities, the authority has the 
power to grant or refuse the consent but must only consider the activity based on the 
matters to which it has restricted the exercise of its discretion under its plan or proposed 
plan, and in national environmental standards or other regulations. If a council chooses to 
grant consent, then conditions can only be imposed in relation to those matters over which 
discretion has been restricted in the plan or proposed plan, national environmental 
standards or regulations (Section 104C). In order for consent to be granted for non-
complying activities, the authority must be satisfied that either the adverse effects of the 
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activity on the environment will be minor or that the proposed activity will not be contrary 
to the objectives and policies of a proposed plan and/or plan (Section 104D) (Peart, 2008). 
 
Conditions 
The consenting authority has the right to impose conditions on the certain consents (see 
above). Conditions will often limit the activity in some way and can be, for example, 
financial (e.g. a bond), restrict the hours of operation, or the appearance or design, or 
require specific types of monitoring (Section 108). 
 
Consenting authorities - Decision power 
In most cases, decisions on whether to grant resource consents are made by councils. The 
exception is for nationally significant proposals, which are considered by the 
Environmental Protection Authority (section 42C(a) and 145(1a)). However, when 
applications are not considered nationally significant, more often than not the decision will 
be made a Local Authority Officer – between 1997-2015 local authorities made an average 
of 86.7% of the decisions (Table 3.1). 
 
In some situations the council is able to delegate its functions and powers to a 
commissioner who will then carry out decision-making duties on its behalf (Quality 
Planning, 2016b). Commissioners may either be elected councillors or community board 
members (internal commissioners) or non-council members (independent commissioners) 
(Quality Planning, 2016g). 
 
Councils use independent commissioners for a number of reasons; for example, an 
applicant or submitter may request the use of an independent commissioner, or the council 
itself may decide to use an independent commissioner. Or when there is a potential 
conflict of interest or when the case is particularly complex or technical and the specialist 
expertise not available within a council, independent commissioners may well be used 
(Quality Planning, 2016g). The use of independent commissioners has increased in recent 
years; between 1997-2004 they made 1% of decisions on resource consents, however this 
number has steadily increased and in the 2012-2015 financial year they were used 7% of 
the time (Table 3.1). 
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A councillor acting as an internal commissioner may be used in situation such as joint 
hearings. Between 1997-2015 internal commissioners made an average of 5.9% of 
decisions, although in the two most recent financial periods this has fallen (Table 3.1). A 
combination of both independent and internal commissioners may be used and the council 
has the discretion to decide on the number of commissioners appointed. Combinations of 
this kind are less common than any other decision-making scenario, occurring an average 
of 1.1% of the time between 1997 and 2015 (Table 3.1). 
 
Commissioner accreditation 
In order to become an internal or independent commissioner an individual must be 
accredited. The main way to gain accreditation is to hold a ‘Making Good Decisions’ 
Certificate (Quality Planning, 2016e). The Ministry for the Environment introduced the 
‘Making Good Decisions’ Programme in 2004 with the aim of improving the 
implementation of the RMA and making decision-making standards and practices more 
consistent across councils (Hobbs, 2004). There are three courses that are available in the 
programme: the foundation course, the panel recertification and the chair recertification 
courses (Table 3.4). The foundation course provides the initial certification, and anyone 
who passes this must recertify with either of the recertification courses after three years 
and every 5 years after that (Quality Planning, 2016e). 
 







Provide the skills and knowledge needed to guide decision-makers through 
the ethical, legal and practical requirements of decision-making under 
Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA). Covers: 
• Natural justice and ethics 
• Principles of decision-making 
• Considerations Relating to Māori 
• Planning framework  
• Consent Hearings 
• Roles of participants in hearings 
• Hearings procedures 
• Managing Hearings 
• Considering/testing/weighing evidence 




The purpose is to share knowledge and experiences gained, ensure that 
knowledge is up to date with legislative changes and case law decisions and 




The purpose is to enable chairs to gain recertification and new chairs to gain 
endorsement as well as develop skills and behaviours required of a Chair and 




The applicant or any person who has made a submission is able to appeal the consenting 
authority’s decision. The appeal is lodged with the Environment Court, which has the 
power to review and overturn decisions made by consent authorities. Very few consent 
decisions are appealed in the Environment Court; between 1997-2015 an average of 0.7% 
of applications were appealed each year. The decision made by the Environment Court can 
only be contested in the High Court on points of law (Peart, 2008). 
 
3.3.7 Monitoring  
Consenting authorities are obligated to monitor whether or not the conditions of consents 
are being met. The AEE should contain information on monitoring if the likely effects are 
of a scale or significance to warrant monitoring, and the consent holder may be required to 
undertake that monitoring as a consent condition. Authorities are also required to take 
appropriate action where necessary, for example where significant adverse effects occur 
that were not anticipated; the authority can review or modify conditions or revoke the 
consent  
 
3.4 Uncertainty in the resource consent process under the RMA 1991 
The term ‘uncertain’ (or any variation of) is not explicitly used in the Act. As previously 
stated in Chapter 2, there are three main ways in which uncertainty in resource 
management can be actively managed: request more information, implement adaptive 
management, or take a precautionary approach.  As the first of these is explicitly dealt with 
in the Act, as noted above, this section focuses on the other two approaches  
 
3.4.1 Precautionary approach in New Zealand 
While the precautionary principle is explicitly incorporated into some domestic legislation  
(Fisheries Act 1996 and Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996), the 
Resource Management Act 1991 is less progressive and only implicitly applies the 
precautionary approach (Christensen and Jennings, 2013; Magallanes and Severinsen, 
2015). The lack of explicit reference may simply be due to the age of the Act, and that 
precaution was in its infancy when the Act was conceived (Gillespie, 2011; Magallanes 
and Severinsen, 2015). In saying that, the Act as a whole was clearly designed to be 
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protective and pre-emptive, with a precautionary flavour (Magallanes and Severinsen, 
2015).  
 
Despite the omission of the explicit principle from the Act, the courts have been eager to 
read in an element of precaution into the application of legislation (Magallanes and 
Severinsen, 2015; Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015). They have consistently ruled that 
precaution is inherent in the Act (it is said to be reflected in ss3(f), 104(l)(a) and 105) and 
"not extraneous to the legislation", which is already weighted towards being risk averse 
(Cameron, 2006; Gillespie, 2011). While it has been argued that it is implicit, it was 
determined in Mclntyre v Christchurch City Council (1996) that: 
‘[t]he weight to be given to the precautionary principle depends on the circumstances, 
including: the extent of scientific knowledge and the impact on otherwise permitted 
activities, the gravity of the effects and the statutory purpose of promoting sustainable 
management.’ 
The reading in of the precautionary principle by the courts has been done in three key 
ways within the consenting context. Firstly, the courts have considered that, when proving 
or disproving the existence of future effects, the ordinary civil standard of proof is not 
sufficiently precautionary. It is therefore untenable. The RMA expressly requires the 
consideration and weighing not only of those effects that are more likely than not to occur, 
but also those that may be unlikely but of potentially high magnitude. Case law resolving 
this point has followed two divergent paths; the tradition expressed in Mclntyre v 
Christchurch City Council (1996) has seen greater value in recognising a flexible standard 
of proof varying according to the severity of the potential impact, while the line of cases 
beginning with Shirley Primary School v Christchurch City Council (1999) has dispensed 
with the idea of “proof” entirely in favour of an expert exercise of discretion when 
identifying potential effects. Academic scholarship has not reconciled the two traditions. 
Yet the key point is that precaution has been seen as central in establishing the existence of 
future effects (Magallanes and Severinsen, 2015). 
 
Secondly, in some cases, the courts have recognized the existence of a precautionary 
burden of proof. The act ultimately does not contain a strong form of the principle as it 
does not place the evidential burden on the applicant to demonstrate their activity would 
not cause unacceptable environmental harm (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2015). 
Instead there is a greater inclination to recognise an evidential or tactical burden on every 
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party involved to make the existence of potential effects ‘a live issue’. Because it applies 
not only to an applicant, this approach is not overly precautious (Magallanes and 
Severinsen, 2015). 
 
Finally, in some cases, the courts have also accepted that the international law principle of 
precaution is a valid matter than can be considered under s 104(1)(c) of the RMA which 
states that: 
(1) When considering an application for a resource consent and any submissions 
received, the consent authority must, subject to Part 2, have regard to– 
(a) any actual and potential effects on the environment of allowing the activity; 
and 
(b) any relevant provisions of—  
(i) a national environmental standard: 
(ii) other regulations: 
(iii) a national policy statement: 
(iv) a New Zealand coastal policy statement: 
(v) a regional policy statement or proposed regional policy statement:  
(vi) a plan or proposed plan; and 
(c) any other matter the consent authority considers relevant and reasonably 
necessary to determine the application. 
 
While other cases have rejected this view, they have nevertheless accepted that greater 
weight can be given to potential effects according to their likelihood and magnitude (this is 
particularly the case it subsidiary policy instruments; e.g. the New Zealand Coastal Policy 
Statement references the need for precaution specifically).  It has recently been confirmed 
in Sustain Our Sounds v New Zealand King Salmon Company Ltd (2014) that the 
precautionary obligation can, in some circumstances, be discharged through the imposition 
of adaptive management conditions (Magallanes and Severinsen, 2015). 
 
As well as being considered under the RMA, the precautionary principle is also included 
in a number of other plans and policies. The Coastal Policy Statement includes the 
precautionary approach in its 3rd policy. 
Policy 3 Precautionary approach  
(1) Adopt a precautionary approach towards proposed activities whose effects 
on the coastal environment are uncertain, unknown, or little understood, but 
potentially significantly adverse. 
(2) In particular, adopt a precautionary approach to use and management of 
coastal resources potentially vulnerable to effects from climate change, so 
that:  
(a) avoidable social and economic loss and harm to communities does 
not occur;  
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(b) natural adjustments for coastal processes, natural defences, 
ecosystems, habitat and species are allowed to occur; and  
(c) the natural character, public access, amenity and other values of 
the coastal environment meet the needs of future generations. 
 
In addition, some regional and district plans also include the precautionary approach as a 
principle. For example the Marlborough Regional Policy Statement incorporates the 
approach into its principles:  
3.6.1 Principle  
Where insufficient information about actual or potential adverse effects is 
available resource management policies and plans will take a precautionary 
approach to the use and development of resources to ensure there are no 
adverse effects on the environment. 
 
3.4.2 Adaptive management in New Zealand 
 
Despite not being mentioned in the Act, the use of adaptive management has been 
accepted under the Resource Management Act 1991 (examples include the development of 
marine farms, a run-of-river hydro scheme, and a tidal energy project. Where decision-
makers are uncertain of the consequences of a proposed project, rather than forgo the 
proposal altogether, they may use adaptive management as a framework to assist with the 
development of conditions which are implemented, to deal with some of the future 
uncertainties that arise. Adaptive management is particularly useful when the effects of a 
project are uncertain, and the outcomes of the proposed methods used to avoid, remedy, or 
mitigate the effects are also uncertain (Warren et al., 2006; Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment, 2011; Christensen and Jennings, 2013). 
 
The use of adaptive management has been restricted to proposals whereby effects are not 
likely to be serious and are able to be reversed over time. It has also been acknowledged 
that there is a need for strict threshold levels to trigger responses to monitoring results 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2011). It is seen to be important that, if 
adaptive management is to be utilised, the decision-maker must be careful to ensure that its 
objectives are reasonably certain and enforceable. In order to achieve this, a decision-
maker may call for further detail in draft management plans so as to be reasonably 
confident of their success (Christensen and Jennings, 2013). 
 
The applicant must persuade the decision-maker, with enough evidence, to grant consent 
on the basis of allowing the adaptive management processes to be embarked upon. While 
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this does not mean that an applicant must try and anticipate all hypotheses that may occur, 
they must satisfy the decision-maker that the adaptive management plan can operate in a 
way that will serve the purpose of the RMA to promote sustainable management 
(Christensen and Jennings, 2013). 
 
Some see the precautionary principle and adaptive management having conflicting aims 
and therefore cannot be successfully used in conjunction (Jacobson, 2009). In contrast to 
this, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (2011) believes that the two 
can work together and are interdependent, because not only does adaptive management 
encourage caution and prudence (if negative effects occur, the activity will only be 
allowed to continue if they are addressed), it is  focused on environmental effects so the 
applicant can decide how best to manage these effects. Furthermore it also stimulates 
technological innovation, which is particularly important in situations where knowledge 
about an environment, and the effects of potential activities, is so limited. Adaptive 
management is a ‘learn as you go’ way of applying the precautionary approach. As the 
effects become clearer, management techniques are adapted to protect the environment. It 
may be that the effects are sufficiently serious that adaptive management is not appropriate 
and therefore the consent should be revoked (Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment, 2011). While such approaches have been advocated for environmental 
management for some time, adaptive management has only recently been employed more 













  Chapter 4: Research Strategy   
4.1 Introduction and experimental design  
The research methodology adopted for this study was to survey consent decision-makers to 
elicit their understandings of uncertainty in the consent process (especially AEE 
information) and their responses to uncertainty in New Zealand under the Resource 
Management Act 1991. This chapter explains the research strategy employed in this 
investigation and the specific research methods used to collect and analyse data. It begins 
by justifying the use of a questionnaire to collect data, followed by an explanation of the 
sampling strategy and questionnaire design and pretesting, and the way in which the 
survey was administered. The methods of data analysis are then described followed by an 
explanation of ethical and methodological considerations, specifically subjectivity and 
bias. 
 
4.2 Questionnaires as a method of data collection 
Given that there has been little to no research on the issue of uncertainty in resource 
consent decision-making in New Zealand, it was decided that the most valuable way to 
approach the research would be to aim to understand the broad approach to uncertainty, 
rather than focus on a specific case study. Although interviews are capable of yielding 
more in-depth understanding of an issue, they can be time-consuming to undertake and 
analyse, thus limiting the number of participants involved in the study. In contrast, 
questionnaires are capable of gathering information from a larger sample of a broader 
population that may be geographically dispersed. Questionnaires can be used to gain both 
qualitative and quantitative information about behaviours, experiences, attitudes, values, 
interpretations and opinions (McGuirk and O'Neill, 2010; Halperin and Heath, 2012). 
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Therefore, given the time and resources available, as well as the aim of the research, it was 
deemed that the most appropriate form of data collection was to use a questionnaire. It was 
considered to be the most efficient and effective way to obtain broad information about the 
way in which a large number of decision-makers across the country understand and 
manage uncertainty.  
 
4.3 Sampling strategy  
In order to determine the most appropriate participants to take part in the questionnaire, a 
number of steps were taken. Firstly, a list of decision-makers who hold a ‘Making Good 
Decisions’ certificate (both non-local body elected (independent commissioners) and local 
body elected members (internal commissioners)) was obtained from the MfE website 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2014). This was used as the sampling frame, or the target 
population that had the potential to be selected in the sample surveyed (Figure 4.1) 
(Halperin and Heath, 2012). As there are >1000 individuals who have obtained the 
certificate (>300 internal commissioners and >700 independent commissioners) it was 
decided that only a subsample of these would need to be sampled. Rather than take a 
random sample of this large population (some individuals may not have acted as a 
decision-maker or may have very little experience), it was decided that a purposive 
sampling strategy be employed, whereby the sample is selected based on a specific 
characteristic of a population (Figure 4.1) (McGuirk and O'Neill, 2010).  In this case that 
characteristic was experience.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Sampling strategy used to gain a short-list of participants from the population 
 
Independent commissioner 





Internal commissioner  
deemed ‘frequently used’ by  
Authority 




While the list of certificate holders has basic information about the individual (for example 
organisations/council body, field of expertise, geographic location of practice and 
certificate information) there is no information about the decision-making experience of 
the individual. Therefore, in order to establish which commissioners were used most 
frequently and have the most experience, each consenting authority (all city, district, 
unitary and regional councils) was contacted by email (Appendix X). Of the 78 local 
authorities contacted, ~60 replied. Authorities that replied to the initial email were then 
asked whether they were willing to provide contact details (email addresses) for the 
independent commissioners identified (internal commissioner contact information can be 
found on local authority websites). While most authorities provided the names of the 
commissioners most frequently used, not all authorities were able to provide the requested 
information.  
 
From the information gained, a list of regularly used independent and internal 
commissioners with contact details was created. A total of 153 independent commissioners 
and 152 internal commissioners were shortlisted as participants of the study. 
 
While this number could have been reduced further, by refining the sampling frame or 
undertaking random sampling, it was decided that all 305 of these potential participants be 
included in the study. This is an important decision as determining the appropriate sample 
size means also deciding how much error one is willing to tolerate – a large sample is 
likely to increase precision, but it is also likely to be more costly (Bryman, 2012). 
Therefore a number of different factors were taken into consideration when making this 
decision, the first of which is that most surveys are subject to non-response. Although hard 
to predict and highly variable, there are a number of ways to maximise response rates. 
Two examples include purposive sampling, because interest in the topic might be strong, 
and the use of follow-up emails to non-respondents (McGuirk and O'Neill, 2010; Bryman, 
2012). 
 
Another important consideration is also the cost of the sample size. Although online 
questionnaires are relatively financially inexpensive, the larger the sample, the larger the 
cost in the researcher’s time (emailing and processing data) (Bryman, 2012). In this case, 
as there was both quantitative and qualitative information being gathered, a balance 
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between the amount of time needed to process large amounts of qualitative information 
and the number of samples needed to undertake statistics was taken into account. 
 
Finally, the number of participants required in the sample is dependent on the nature of the 
population the sample is drawn from. When a population is homogenous (and all have 
similar characteristics that are of interest rather than heterogeneous where the population is 
broad and varied) it is less important to have a very large sample, as there is less likely to 
be a large amount of variation in response (Bryman, 2012).  
 
4.4 Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire was developed using literature on uncertainty in IA, resource 
management, and decision-making (e.g., Geneletti et al., 2003; Tennøy et al., 2006; 
Brugnach et al., 2007; Jacobson, 2009; Sigel et al., 2010; Duncan, 2013; Larsen et al., 
2013). The questionnaire consisted of three parts, the first of which concentrated on 
participant’s background and decision-making experience. The second part focused on 
understanding decision-makers’ perceptions of the acceptability of uncertainty as well as 
the main reasons for uncertainty in the resource consent process. Finally, the third section 
of the survey aimed to understand the strategies decision-makers used to manage 
uncertainty in the resource consent. 
 
The questionnaire contained a mixture of both open and closed questions, as both have 
associated advantages and disadvantages. Closed questions are quick and easy to answer, 
easy for researchers to process and analyse and easy to compare respondents answers. 
However, there is the danger when using closed questions, in which respondents are asked 
to rank items, select categories, or select a point on a scale, that they can lead ‘satisficing 
behaviour’: that is, they keep reading and ticking until they feel that they have provided a 
satisfactory answer and then stop.  They also rest on the assumption that the words, 
categories and concepts included carry the same meaning for all respondents and require a 
deep understanding of all the possible answers (McGuirk and O'Neill, 2010; Bryman, 
2012; Halperin and Heath, 2012). A large number of questions were structured using the 
Likert scale, which measures the intensity of feeling about a statement. It is beneficial, as it 
does not discriminate against less talkative or articulate participants. Multi-choice 




Open questions were also utilised, and while they offer less structure than closed 
questions, they generally have the potential to elicit more in-depth information. Using 
open questions makes it possible to pose complex questions, and allow respondents to 
recount understandings, experiences or opinions in their own terms rather than restricting 
responses. They are capable of yielding valuable, unanticipated insights into people’s 
experiences, understandings and interpretations as well as their reactions to social 
processes and circumstances. Open questions also lead to unprompted, detailed and 
reasoned responses that can reveal logic and rationale behind answers (Halperin and 
Heath, 2012). However, open questions, while easy to ask, can be difficult to answer and 
even more difficult, and time consuming, to analyse. There is the tendency for answers to 
open questions to lack consistency and therefore be difficult to compare (McGuirk and 
O'Neill, 2010; Bryman, 2012; Halperin and Heath, 2012). 
 
4.5 Pretesting the questionnaire  
It is acknowledged that pre-testing a questionnaire with a subsample of the target 
population can be beneficial. This is not only because pretesting a questionnaire can allow 
the researcher to assess the merits of questionnaire design, its appropriateness to the 
audience and whether it does in fact achieve the research aims, but also because any 
confusion over question wording can be mitigated. This is particularly important when 
using self-completed surveys, as the researcher is not at hand to clarify the intent of the 
questions (McGuirk and O'Neill, 2010; Curtis and Curtis, 2011; Halperin and Heath, 2012; 
Neuman, 2013). Therefore, the questionnaire was pretested with a number of 
council/consultancy employees, as well as individuals who have worked as a 
Commissioner on a hearings panel. This was done to fine-tune the questionnaire, ensure 
that the questions were valid (content and phasing) and reliable.  
 
4.6 Administering the questionnaire  
It was decided that the most appropriate method of administering the questionnaire was via 
the Internet using the survey provider Survey Monkey as not only are the results obtained 
more quickly than a postal questionnaire (often within the first 24 hours), there is less of a 
cost involved as no printing or postage costs are included (Lewis-Beck et al., 2003; 
Halperin and Heath, 2012). Most importantly, it is easier and less time consuming for 
participants to complete, as they do not have to post it back.  
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In order to administer the questionnaire, each potential participant was individually 
contacted via email. The email provided a brief outline of the project and asked whether 
they were willing to participate in the study (Appendix X). Should they be willing, a link 
to the online survey was also included in the email. The email was sent on the 25th 
November 2015 and participants were given until the 20th December 2015 to complete the 
questionnaire. As recommended by McGuirk and O'Neill (2010) a second email was sent 
on the 15th December to remind potential participants that if they wished to participate the 
survey was only open for a few more days.  
 
4.7 Data analysis 
The questionnaire received a 34% response rate and in total 103 individuals participated.  
Following the completion of the questionnaire data analysis was undertaken. In order to 
analyse the data, Microsoft Excel was used to create a spread sheet of participants and 
their responses to the questionnaire.  
 
Quantitative data analysis 
The questions in the survey that were quantitative in nature (the closed questions) were 
analysed by applying pre-established categories to the data. This then allowed frequency 
counts to be determined for each category. In some cases information was graphed to help 
identify key trends in the data. 
 
Qualitative data analysis  
The open-ended questions were analysed by coding the answers provided. This involved 
analysing the participant responses and assigning them to different categories. A three-step 
process was employed to code the information. The first was to employ grounded, or open, 
coding whereby presumptions and previous knowledge of the subject area are put aside 
and the researcher concentrates instead on finding themes in the data. This allows codes 
emerge from the data as the researcher reads it (Halperin and Heath, 2012). Grounded 
coding involves constant comparison, every time a researcher selects a passage of text and 
codes it is compared with all the passages of text that have already been coded. Then, a list 





Following this, axial coding was undertaken whereby codes are organised, reviewed and 
examined. In this process codes can be sorted, broadened, grouped together or deleted, and 
codes checked and rechecked to ensure that they are applied properly. Axial coding also 
involves understanding any linkages between themes, concepts and codes, as well as 
causes and consequences of these linkages.  This can also raise new questions, suggest 
dropping some themes or examining others in more depth. Finally, selective coding was 
employed. Selective coding occurred after key themes were identified, and involved 
examining previous codes to identify and select data that supported these themes. While 
the coding process was used to compare and contrast answers and to detect themes, the 
original statements in completed questionnaires were constantly referred to in order to 
retain the subtlety of information (Halperin and Heath, 2012; Neuman, 2013). 
 
Statistical analysis  
The use of inferential statistical analysis was not appropriate as there was no basis for 
assuming that the sample of participants was representative of the overall population of 
decision makers. Therefore the analysis was largely interpretive, using tables and graphs. 
In order to further analysis the information gathered cluster analysis was used (Wards 
method, using squared Euclidean distance on the similarity measure).  
 
4.8 Ethical considerations and approval   
Ethics are an important consideration of any social research. The most important ethical 
principles that need to be considered in survey research are a) participants’ right to privacy 
b) participants’ voluntary participation c) ensuring no harm is done to participants and d) 
ensuring that there is no deception or exploitation of participants (Bryman, 2012; Neuman, 
2013). 
 
In order to ensure the ethical conduct of this research, before fieldwork and the collection 
of data began, ethics approval was gained from the University of Otago Geography 
Department, through the Head of Department (Appendix). An ethics B application, rather 
than an ethics A, was completed as the investigation did not seek any personal information 
from the participants, involve any physical or psychological stress and did not involve the 
participation of minors or vulnerable individuals or put participants under any risk., 
Participants were asked to provide an email address if they were willing to participate in 
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key informant interviews or would like a copy of summary results – with no obligation to 
do so. Personal anonymity and confidentiality was guaranteed to all participants involved 
in the research meaning that their names would not be attributed to the information 
obtained (Bryman, 2012; Neuman, 2013). Thus, questionnaire answers were not attributed 
to any individuals. Furthermore, it was ensured that participants were provided with 
enough information about the project, its aims and the value of it, before they chose to 
participate, and all participants involved in the study participated voluntarily of their own 
accord. 
 
4.9 Methodological considerations  
4.5.1 Subjectivity 
The data collection and analysis components of this research contained an unavoidable 
degree of subjectivity. Despite most social research containing this inherent degree of 
subjectivity, it is still important to acknowledge it. The subjectivity in this research 
specifically relates to participants’ interpretation of the questionnaire survey and the 
researcher’s interpretations of their answers. As previously stated, using a survey as the 
mode of data collection means that the design and wording must be thoroughly considered 
as the researcher is not present to clarify any of the questions or prompt the participants.  
 
Subjectivity is an important consideration in the design of surveys as both open and closed 
questions can cause problems if not considered well. Open questions, if poorly worded, 
can yield highly inconsistent answers, and closed questions rest on the assumption that the 
words, categories and concepts included, carry the same meaning for all respondents 
(McGuirk and O'Neill, 2010; Halperin and Heath, 2012). The subjective nature of the 
interpretation of the questions in the survey was therefore an important consideration of 
this research. As previously mentioned the survey was pretested, which allowed for some 
issue to be resolved, however, it is likely that some of the participant’s interpretations of 
questions differed slightly.  
 
In addition to this, there is considerable subjectivity involved in analysing the responses to 
the survey. There were a number of ambiguous responses from participants such as “by 
asking myself what is the reasonable position on the evidence”. The use of the term 
‘reasonable’ highlights some of the vagueness of the language that posed problems when 




situations where responses the questions were ambiguous, previous responses were 
examined and often the ambiguity was reduced.  
 
Another consideration that may have increased subjectivity in answers was the 
participant’s ability to recall details from decisions. Some of the participants have been 
acting as a decision-maker for a considerable length of time (>20 years) and therefore their 
ability to recall details from decisions may be hindered, reducing the level of detail or 
accuracy. Despite the importance of acknowledging the subjectivity present, this does not 
reduce the credibility or value of research. 
 
4.5.2 Positionality and bias  
Some researchers argue that scientific research is not based on values, beliefs, opinions or 
attitudes or influenced by personal or political views (Neuman, 2013). However, it is 
acknowledged that the values and personal interests of a researcher can influence a number 
of different aspects of the research process, for example the choice of research area, and 
the analysis and interpretation of data (Holliday, 2007; Bryman, 2012).   
 
Natural resource development can be highly political and controversial. While it is 
concerned with the natural environment, resource development is also entwined with 
social, political and cultural values. This research came about due to the researcher’s 
interest in the EEZ and the two highly political marine consents, which were declined due 
to the considerable uncertainty in the applications and effects information (Chatham Rock 
Phosphate Ltd’s application to mine phosphorite nodules on the Chatham Rise and Trans 
Tasman Resources Ltd’s application to mine iron sand in the South Taranaki Bight). As 
the current research is not focused on a single case study, the positionality of the 
researcher is less of a direct issue. Nevertheless it is essential for the researcher to 
recognise that research cannot be value-free, and for them to act in a self-reflective 
manner. Rather than burying or denying assumptions, view points, values and 
preconceptions, this researcher acknowledged them and became highly sensitive to them 
so that they could be seen past and be put aside (Neuman, 2013). 
 
Therefore, in order to avoid bias, this research was approached in an objective way, and 
data collection was conducted with an open mind and all viewpoints were considered valid 
and acceptable. This was done with the intention of separating the researcher’s values from 
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the findings, as recommended by Neuman (2013). Furthermore, the theoretical framework 
was developed as a neutral analytical tool through which the results could be evaluated 
while minimizing bias or conflict of interest and the researcher also maintained a constant 
self-critical awareness regarding assumptions and values.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has established the broad research strategy employed to undertake this 
research. It explained the use of research methods to collect, process and analyse data. In 
summary, the research involved a predominantly qualitative approach, and a survey was 
used to evaluate decision-maker’s perceptions of uncertainty in resource consents in New 
Zealand. In light of the information presented in this chapter, the following chapters 









Chapter 5: Results 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the primary data collection, namely the questionnaire.  
It first characterises the participant’s experience and professional background, then 
examines their opinions about sources/causes of uncertainty, their perceptions of 
uncertainty generally and then considers management strategies used to cope with 
uncertainty. Finally, the results are analysed further using cluster analysis, as well as 
broken down based on experience and background of decision-makers. 
 
5.2 General characteristics of decision-makers 
This section briefly characterises the participants of the study based upon their decision-
making experience, professional background and education. Participants were selected for 
this study based on the fact that they had been identified by consenting authorities as 
having experience as a decision-making commissioner. Of the 103 respondents, the vast 
majority had gained most of their decision-making experience as an independent 
commissioner (57.1%), while a third had acted mostly as an internal (council) 
commissioner and only 8.6% had acted in both roles in equal capacities (Table 5.1). 
 
When asked about the number of decision processes individuals had participated in, results 
showed that respondent’s level of experience was varied: while more than 50% of 
respondents had made less than 20 decisions and were relatively inexperienced, a small 
number of participants (16.8%) were very experienced having made more than 100 
decisions.  
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Table 5.1: Participants experience making resource consent decisions under the Resource 
Management Act 1991, and their qualifications and professional background/occupations. 
 
Measure of experience/education 
and profession  (n) Categories 
Percentage of 
participants (%) n 
Role in which most  
experience was gained (103) 
Independent commissioner 57.1 59 
Internal commissioner 34.3 35 
Both in equal capacities 8.6 9 
Number of decision processes 
participated in as a  
decision-maker (102) 
<5 20.8 21 
5-10 11.9 12 
10-20 16.8 17 
20-100 33.7 34 
100-500 16.8 18 
Length of time acting as a  
decision-maker (103) 
<5 years 31.4 32 
5-10 years 33.0 34 
10-20 years 27.2 28 
>20 years 8.7 9 
Proportion of decision-makers that 
have made decisions for each type of 
consenting authority (103)* 
Territorial Authorities 69.9 72 
Regional Councils 40.8 42 
Unitary Authorities 19.4 20 
Types of activities most  
frequently dealt with by  
decision-makers (103) 
Controlled 2.9 3 
Restricted Discretionary 7.8 8 
Discretionary 47.6 49 
Non-complying 30.1 31 
Do not know 11.7 12 
Proportion of decision-makers that 
have participated in each types of 
consent (102)* 
Non-notified 42.2 43 
Limited Notified 72.5 74 
Fully Notified 88.2 90 
Types of activities most frequently 
dealt with by  
decision-makers (103) 
A mixture 29.4 29 
Subdivision 18.4 19 
Land use 17.5 18 
Land use and subdivision 5.8 6 
Water 14.6 15 
Traffic and roading 2.9 3 
Energy 5.8 6 
Coastal 2.9 3 
Other 2.9 4 
Occupation/main area of professional 
specialisation (103) 
Planner 28.2 29 
Councillor/commissioner 24.3 25 
RMA lawyer 11.7 12 
Farmer 6.8 7 
Environmental scientist 6.8 7 
Engineer 5.8 6 
RMA consultant 4.9 5 
Landscape architect 2.9 3 
Police force 2.9 3 
Cultural expert 1.9 2 
Other 3.9 4 
Decision-makers who have completed 
the ‘Making Good Decisions’ 
programmes (103)* 
Foundation course 97.1 100 
Recertification for panel members 62.9 65 
Recertification for chairs 47.6 50 
None 2.9 3 
Highest level of education  
(102) 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 4.9 5 
Masters Degree 21.6 22 
Honours Degree 7.8 8 
Other Postgraduate Qualification 7.8 8 
Bachelors Degree 32.4 33 
Certificate/Diploma 10.8 11 
Other 11.8 12 
None 2.9 3 
* Percentages not add to 100 as participants were able to select multiple options 
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The 78 consenting authorities in New Zealand were quite well represented; participants 
had made decisions for a total of 67 different councils including every regional council and 
unitary authority except Chatham Islands Council. Of the 103 participants, 69.9% had 
made decisions for territorial authorities, 40.8% for regional councils and 19.4% for 
unitary authorities. Given the proportion of consenting authorities that are unitary 
authorities and regional councils, the results suggest that these are overrepresented by 
participants.  
 
The vast majority had made decisions on fully notified consents, and limited notified 
consents (88.2% and 72.5% respectively), while less than half had dealt with non-notified 
consents. This suggests that most decisions in which commissioners are used are for 
consents with some level of notification. In addition, almost a third dealt with a large range 
of different types of activities (29.4%) while the rest of respondents make decisions on 
more specific types of activities such as subdivision, land use, energy projects and 
decisions concerning water (Table 5.1). 
 
While the respondents were dominated by planners (28.2%) and career councillors/ 
commissioners (24.3%), the rest of the participants were from very diverse backgrounds 
such as environmental science, landscape architecture, farming, the police force, etc. 
(Table 5.2). Participants were well educated, with three quarters holding a Bachelor 
Degree or postgraduate qualification.  
 
The vast majority (97.1%) have been accredited through the ‘Making Good Decisions’ 
programmes, particularly the foundation course. More than half have completed the 
recertification, while just under half hold the chair certification (62.9% and 47.6% 
respectively). 
 
5.3 Sources and causes of uncertainty in resource consents 
In order to cope with and manage uncertainty, it is first important that decision-makers 
understand where the uncertainty within a resource consent is coming from, what is 
causing it, whether it is reducible, and where it is located. Therefore participants were 
asked a series of questions to understand the types and locations of uncertainty that they 
believe are present in the resource consent applications. 
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5.3.1 Types of uncertainty  
When asked whether they agree that uncertainty is inherent in resource management, there 
was a general trend of agreement: almost 72% either agreed or strongly agreed, with only 
17% holding the opposite views (Figure 5.1). In contrast there was a more varied response 
when participants were asked whether they thought that the process itself manufactured 
uncertainty, with less than 25% agreeing or strongly agreeing, but almost half disagreeing 
or strongly disagreeing. However, over 25% were also neutral to the question (Figure 5.1).  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Degree to which decision-makers agree that uncertainty is inherent in resource 
management and that uncertainty in resource management applications is manufactured by the 
process (n).  
 
Results show that the most commonly identified main causes of uncertainty were the 
inherent complexity of a system (43.6% of participants ranked it first and 28.2% second), 
and a lack of information (33.0% and 31.3% ranked it first and second respectively). Both 
conflicting information and too much information were identified as lesser causes of 
uncertainty, with very little emphasis being placed on too much information as primary 
cause of uncertainty.  
Figure 5.2: Decision-maker views of the main causes of uncertainty (inherent complexity of a 
system, lack of information, too much information and conflicting information) in resource 
management applications under the RMA 1991 (n = 94).  
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5.3.2 Location of uncertainty 
Not only is it important that decision-makers understand the cause of uncertainty, it is also 
important that they are aware of the location of the uncertainty within the resource 
management problem. When asked about types of information present in resource 
consents, which have the most potential for uncertainty to arise, participants identified 
information in the AEE to be the main area where uncertainty is likely to occur (56% of 
participants ranked it first) (Figure 5.3).  
Figure 5.3: Decision-maker views of the types of information with the greatest potential for 
uncertainty to arise in resource management applications under the RMA 1991 (n = 91).  
 
Uncertainty in the proposal was also believed to be important with 14.3% and 38.8% 
ranking it first and second respectively. While information in the consultation was also an 
important cause for uncertainty being ranked first by 22.0%, it was only ranked second by 
14.3%. While 7.7% of participants ranked information generated by the hearing as having 
the most potential for uncertainty, no participants believed that other information was the 
most likely to have uncertainty arise.  
 
When asked in an open question to identify the most common sources of uncertainty in the 
resource consent process, Table 5.2 shows that the main source identified was the AEE 
(39.1%), which supports the findings of the previous question (Figure 5.3). Furthermore, 
other more specific types of effects information were also identified (such as cumulative 
effects, amenity/heritage/aesthetic effects), suggesting that almost 60% of participants 
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Table 5.2: The most common sources of uncertainty in the resource consent process identified by 
decision-makers (n = 87). 
 
Most common source of uncertainty in resource consent process Percentage of participants (%)  n 
The AEE (e.g. prediction of actual effects) 39.1 34 
Lack of robust information/evidence/knowledge (e.g. technical 
information) 
17.2 15 
Interpretation of the RMA 16.1 14 
Cumulative effects 10.3 7 
Notification process/effects on submitters 9.2 9 
Conflicting evidence presented by different parties 8.0 7 
Uncertainty in outcome of resource consent application 6.9 6 
Poor preparation/deliberate omission of info/bias 8.0 7 
Lack of quantitative effects information 4.6 4 
Amenity/heritage/aesthetic values and effects 3.4 3 
Lack of resources available to applicants (e.g. time/costs to applicant) 3.4 3 
Other 4.6 4 
*Numbers do not add to 100 as participants provided multiple answers 
 
The lack of robust information/evidence or knowledge, as well as conflicting evidence 
presented by different parties, were also major causes of uncertainty (identified by      
17.2% and 8.0% respectively). Again, this is consistent with a previous question in which a 
lack of information was identified as a common source of uncertainty in resource consents 
(Figure 5.2). 
 
A number of specific reasons were identified for the lack of information being presented to 
the decision panels, including a lack of resources available to applicants/the time and costs 
associated with a large application (3.4%). One participant elaborated, asserting that: 
“Applicants do not want to commit to detailed designs until they are certain an 
application will be approved and they can obtain funding.  Lack of detailed design 
at the consent application stage makes it difficult to determine the level of effects 
and often leads to project modifications further down the line.”  
 
The way applicants and consultants behave can also contribute to uncertainty. An example 
is the poor preparation of applications/applicants deliberately hiding (or being vague 
about) information and bias (8.0%). One respondent explained that the reasoning for this 
was that applicants do not want affected parties to know what is going to be applied for: 
“Having presented evidence (rather than been a decision-maker) at several 
hearings uncertainty can be introduced by the applicants team as a way to hide 
facts that go against their case.  Decisions are also made on preconceived ideas 
held by the decision-makers so by having an understanding of the make-up of the 
hearing panel, the applicants team can tailor their presentation to sway things their 
way” 
 
While there were many uncertainties related to the resource consent process identified, 
there were also a number of legislative uncertainties that a small number of decision-
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makers were concerned about. For example, uncertainty in the resource consent process 
because of the RMA was identified by 16.1% of respondents, in particular the issue of the 
subjective wording of the RMA, and the different interpretations of parts of the legislation. 
While participants explained that the broad definition of ‘environment’ causes them 
problems, the purpose of the RMA and the interpretation and implementation of 
‘sustainable management’ was more commonly reported. While it was argued that “the 
objective is too broad and often subjective”, another participant held a contrasting view 
that “a more prescriptive approach would remove uncertainty, but reduce the flexibility 
available to decision-makers to tailor decisions to suit the circumstances of individual 
applications”. 
 
Finally, 4.6% of applicants identified various other source of uncertainty, such as “the 
difference between Matauranga (the knowledge, comprehension, or understanding of 
everything visible and invisible existing in the universe) versus western science” and the 
interpretation of data presented by expert consultants. One participant explained a number 
of very interesting sources of uncertainty: 
“Inexperience of planners and other professionals, mainly those advising the 
Council, resulting in poor overall judgment and advice; lack of certainty that 
consent conditions will be adhered to and that adequate enforcement action will be 
taken; ability of applicants to obtain incremental consents (the 'foot in the door' 
strategy); multiple layers of consents (e.g. subdivision, land use, regional consents, 
Special Housing Area overlays); public notification decisions constrained by s95 of 
the RMA” 
 
These ‘other’ sources of uncertainty that were identified indicate that uncertainty is being 
caused by a large number of different aspects of the process and occurring in a large 
number of different areas of resource consents. However, the AEE was seen as the main 
source of uncertainty. 
 
Uncertainty in effects information  
More than 70% agreed or strongly agreed that the process of assessing effects is complex 
and difficult and therefore effects information often has associated uncertainty (Figure 
5.4). However the respondents differed over which aspect of the AEE was most 
responsible for the uncertainty (Table 5.3). 
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Figure 5.4: Degree to which decision-makers agree the process of assessing effects is complex and 
difficult and therefore effects information often has associated uncertainty (n = 96). 
 
Participants were particularly focused on having sufficient and reliable information 
presented in the AEE. The main sources of uncertainty identified by respondents were 
conflicting information from experts or submitters and inadequate AEEs produced by 
applicants (lack of robust information, poor research, limited data, etc.) (19.1% and 18.0% 
respectively). One participant stressed that: 
“Applicants do not want to commit to detailed designed until they are certain an 
application will be approved and they can obtain funding.  Lack of detailed design at 
the consent application stage makes it difficult to determine the level of effects and 
often leads to project modifications further down the line.”  
 
The subjectivity of effects information (and the difficulty interpreting it) was identified by 
9.0% (examples include the analysis of acoustic, visual, social or air quality effects).  
 
Table 5.3: The most common sources of uncertainty in AEE’s as identified by decision-makers 
 (n = 89). 
 
Responses Percentage of participants (%) n 
Difficulty in predicting impacts  21.4 19 
Conflicting information from experts or submitters 19.1 17 
Inadequate assessment of effects  18.0 16 
Determining level/significance of effect 12.4 11 
Social/cultural/qualitative effects 12.4 11 
Subjectivity of effects information 9.0 8 
Deliberate omission (or exaggeration) of information / bias 9.0 8 
Impacts relating to aesthetic/amenity/heritage values 6.7 6 
Lack of robust baseline information 5.6 5 
Cumulative effects 4.5 4 
Complexity of a the systems being affected 4.5 4 
Assumptions 3.4 3 
Mitigation 2.2 2 
Consultation 2.2 2 
Other 13.5 12 
    * Numbers do not add to 100 as participants provided multiple answers 
 
Furthermore, 9.0% mentioned the deliberate omission (or exaggeration) of information or 
bias, including “the deliberately stilted information presented by the applicants”, “the 
deliberate underestimation of the level of adverse effects so that conditions imposed are 
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acceptable”, and “submitters deliberately exaggerating adverse effects in an attempt to 
sabotage the application”. Unidentified, erroneous, unreliable or invalid assumptions were 
also identified (3.4%). 
 
Participants also mentioned a number of specific elements of the AEE process which cause 
uncertainty, predominantly the prediction of impacts (21.4%), which is often not 
completed to a high enough standard (particularly when inconsistent/crude modelling 
techniques are used and the quality of input data is poor). Similarly, a lack of robust 
baseline information was also cited as a cause for uncertainty (5.6%). One respondent felt 
that uncertainty would be reduced if there were a requirement for: “more detailed baseline 
info and modelling predictions instead of reluctance to invest in the required information”. 
Furthermore, 12.4% of participants identified that determining the level or significance of 
effects is the most common source of uncertainty (which is a particular concern when 
determining whether the effects are more than minor). In saying this, one participant stated 
that there is “too much of a preoccupation with determining whether effects are minor as 
opposed to acceptable”. Two individuals (2.2%) felt that uncertainty was mainly caused 
by proposed mitigation measures to deal with adverse effects; one of them saying:  
“The ability to adequately mitigate or manage adverse effects to the satisfaction of 
affected parties, also an inherent assumption that it is ok to mitigate or manage 
adverse effects rather than accept that environmental adverse effects are a no-go 
area (so a pro-development bias within the consenting system)” 
 
Specific types of impacts were also mentioned as key sources for uncertainty. 
Social/cultural/qualitative effects were identified by 12.4%, while 6.7% of individuals 
believed that the most common source of uncertainty was assessing the impacts on 
aesthetic/amenity/heritage values. Cumulative effects were also mentioned (4.5%), 
particularly the difficulty predicting long term/future impacts of proposal, in particular the 
impacts on future generations under global change. Finally, 13.5% of respondents believe 
that the main source of uncertainty came from somewhere else; such examples include: 
“The weighing of effects - getting the appropriate balance” 
 
 
“Lack of experience in recognising an effect and lack of confidence by professional 
planners in asserting their evaluative (and therefore holistic) expertise against a 
more readily evidenced technical assessment” 
 
“Also, different levels of ‘risk’ appetite from some different bodies - e.g. regional 
versus local council on level to which things like possible liquefaction/historic 
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alluvial fans should be totally avoided (Regional Council perspective often) versus 
can be adequately mitigated (more often Local Council perspective). Without a 
crystal ball, difficult to know where the right balance lays between these two” 
 
5.4 Perceptions of the acceptability and disclosure of uncertainty  
Participants were asked a series of questions that aimed to understand how they perceive 
uncertainty in resource consents, particularly how acceptable it is and the importance of 
disclosing it (Figure 5.5). While there was variation in the answers provided, more than 50% of 
participants agreed or strongly agreed that it was acceptable for resource consent applications to be 
uncertain. On the other hand, a surprisingly large number do not believe it acceptable (just over 
30% disagreed or strongly disagreed).  
  
 
Figure 5.5: Decision-maker perceptions of the presence, acceptability and disclosure of 
uncertainty in resource consents under the RMA 1991 (n). 
 
Results suggest that when it comes to the level of uncertainty present in resource consents, 
participants are generally believe the current level of uncertainty is acceptable, and only 
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30% held the view that the level is too great (Figure 5.5). Overall, most think that 
uncertainty is acceptable and a large number are comfortable with the existing levels of 
uncertainty in the consent process. 
 
More than 70% agreed/strongly agreed that applicants should disclose any uncertainty 
present in the resource consent application, and a similar proportion are happy with, or 
neutral on the existing levels of disclosure in consent documents. Only one third felt there 
were some grounds for improvement. 
 
There was broad agreement that decision-makers must accept that uncertainty is present in 
resource consents and should take it into account and disclose how it was managed). 
Overall, it seems that there is greater agreement among the respondents about the need for 
the process to acknowledge and deal with uncertainty, but less agreement on the 
inevitability and current levels of uncertainty in resource consent processes. 
 
5.5 Management of uncertainty in decision-making process 
While it is important that decision-makers recognise the presence of uncertainty in 
resource consents, it is equally important that they manage, and cope with, uncertainty with 
which they are faced. Participants were therefore asked a series of questions about different 
management strategies. When asked whether they take steps to manage uncertainty, almost 
95% of participants believe that they do (Figure 5.6). 
 
Figure 5.6: Proportion of participants who consider that they take steps to manage uncertainty in 
the resource consent process (n = 84). 
 
5.5.1 Level of uncertainty  
An important facet of managing uncertainty is determining when the level of uncertainty is 
large/significant enough for it to warrant serious consideration. Therefore participants were 
asked to explain how they determine whether the level of uncertainty in a consent 
application is significant enough to affect the final outcome of the decision (Table 5.4). 
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Overall, there was quite a range of answers, and broadly decision-makers did not have 
robust strategies, techniques, or methods of analysing evidence, to make the determination.  
 
Table 5.4: The ways in which decision-makers determine whether the level of uncertainty present 
in a consent is significant enough to affect the final outcome of the decision (n = 79). 
 
Responses Percentage of participants (%) n 
It depends on the robustness of the evidence 16.5 13 
It depends in the significance and/or magnitude of the adverse effect 13.9 11 
Use judgement to decide 13.9 11 
Use experience to decide 11.4 9 
By examining the evidence and questioning at the hearing 8.6 7 
Request more information /adjourn hearing 8.6 7 
Discuss with other decision-makers on decision panel 7.6 6 
By weighing evidence 7.6 6 
By looking at case law and/or if the proposal meets aim of RMA 6.3 5 
Use morals and gut feelings 3.8 3 
Seek other advice 3.8 3 
Other 16.5 13 
    * Numbers do not add to 100% as participants provided multiple answers 
Many of the answers that were provided were simply explaining the process and intuition 
by which decision-makers made the determination: for example, using judgement or 
experience (13.9% and 11.4% respectively) or morals and gut feelings (3.8%). Others were 
influenced solely by the quality, and completeness, of information presented to the 
decision-maker; for example, 16.5% of participants stated that determining whether or not 
the level of uncertainty is significant enough to affect the final outcome depends on the 
robustness of the evidence. Other participants described approaches which sought to 
reduce uncertainty or better understand it, such as examine the evidence and asking 
questions at hearing (8.6%) or request more information/ adjourn hearing (8.6%).  
 
5.5.2 Strategies used to manage uncertainty 
When asked to identify up to six strategies they use to manage uncertainty in the 
consenting process, respondents provided a very broad range (Table 5.5). There were, 
however, a number of strategies that are identified by a large proportion of participants. 
The most commonly reported strategy was to ask questions at the hearing (68.9%). For 
example, participants explained the need to identify issues of concern early on and ask 
direct/open questions at hearing to clarify issues until satisfied. In addition, some decision-
makers identify the areas that are uncertain and formally request more information from 
applicant (55.4%). Despite the large number of decision-makers relying on this strategy, 
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and that it is “the most useful tool available to narrow uncertainty”; one participant stated 
“the legislation is intent on minimising the options for requesting additional information”. 
 
Furthermore, 31.1% of respondents also mentioned consideration of management 
options/consent conditions. Specific examples included designing robust monitoring and 
reporting conditions which address the adverse effects, granting consents for a shorter 
period if there are significant risks, and utilizing review provisions of the RMA (section 
128). Another commonly identified strategy that was identified was to clarify evidence 
before making a decision (29.7%), a specific example of which was to ensure that 
information is robust, based on sound research and not biased. 
 
Table 5.5: Strategies decision-makers identified that are used to manage uncertainty in the consent 
process (n = 74). 
Strategy to manage uncertainty Percentage of participants (%) n 
Ask questions of experts at hearing 68.9 51 
Formally request further information 55.4 41 
Consider management options/consent conditions 31.1 23 
Clarify evidence 29.7 22 
Read information and do best to understand (before hearing) 20.3 15 
Look at case law/ seek legal advice/ consider RMA 17.6 13 
Discuss with others decision-makers (and use their experience) 17.6 13 
Talk to planner/ author of planners report 12.2 9 
Adjourn hearing 12.2 9 
Caucusing 10.8 8 
Determine significance of impacts 8.1 6 
Conduct a site visit 8.1 6 
Conduct own research 8.1 6 
Undertake more consultation 8.1 6 
Consider experience/credibility of experts 6.8 5 
Hot tubbing experts - reduces areas of difference 6.8 5 
Ranking/prioritising issues 6.8 5 
Decline consent 6.8 5 
Look at method used in AEE 5.4 4 
Use past experience 5.4 4 
Be open minded 2.7 2 
Other 36.5 27 
 Numbers do not add to 100 as participants provided multiple answers 
 
Lesser-used strategies included hot-tubbing witnesses (where multiple witnesses are 
questioned at the same time to reduce areas of difference); ranking/prioritising issues of 
contention and uncertainty to establish their importance (both 6.8%), and conducting their 
own research to further understand the issues (8.1%). Furthermore, 8.1% also mentioned 
the importance of ensuring that the consultation was undertaken properly and in some 
cases undertaking more, to gain local knowledge of the issues. One participant explains, 
often submitters will uncover important issues not included in the AEE. Another 
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participant said “I assume that for many people who submit, there are others that do not 
because the submission system is unapproachable for many people”. Moreover, 6.8% of 
participants saw that, when contradictory evidence was being presented, it was important 
to consider the credibility, validity, qualifications and experience. Finally, 36.5% of 
respondents mentioned ‘other’ strategies which they use to manage uncertainty; some 
examples include: using rules of natural justice, focusing on issues and not emotive 
baggage, imagining what the decision will look like in years to come, being as fair as 
possible, having a logical structure for decision-making, attempting to resolve issues at 
prehearing and getting parties to present evidence as well as possible. 
 
While some strategies, such as formally requesting information, conducting one’s own 
research, undertaking more consultation, caucusing and hot tubbing, were used to reduce 
uncertainty, other approaches seem to be used to help decision-makers to better understand 
uncertainty (such as discussing with other decision-makers, talking to the author of the 
planning report and being open minded). Very few strategies that were identified by 
decision-makers were strategies used in the face of uncertainty once the presence of 
uncertainty has been accepted. Considering management options/consent conditions, 
declining the consent, looking at case law and considering how/whether the proposal meets 
the aim of the RMA are all strategies which broadly accept uncertainty and are used to help 
make a decision in the face of it.  
 
Surprisingly, participants mentioned neither the precautionary principle nor adaptive 
management. While considering management options/consent conditions and declining the 
consent are strategies that are broadly adaptive and precautionary respectively, it would be 
presumptuous to suggest that decision-makers were actually using adaptive management 
and the precautionary principle to manage uncertainty.  
 
5.5.3 Decision-maker perspectives on recognised management strategies  
Participants were asked about their views on a number of recognised strategies that can be 
used to cope with uncertainty in resource consent decision-making.  
 
Reducing uncertainty  
There was a general trend of agreement that the most effective way to manage uncertainty 
is to have more information (~80% agreed/strongly agreed) (Figure 5.7). The large number 
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of specific strategies that were identified were strategies to gain more information and 
reduce uncertainty supports this. Participants were also asked about the methods they most 
frequently used to reduce uncertainty (Figure 5.8). The strategies that were most 
commonly used to gain more information and reduce uncertainty were to formally request 
information and consult experts (ranked first or second by ~50% of participants). Talking 
to applicants or council staff or relying on the documentation provided was moderately 
used; the least use strategies were to conduct one’s own research and ‘other’. 
 
Figure 5.7: Degree to which participants agree that the most effective way to manage uncertainty 
is to have more information about the proposed project (n)  
 
 
Figure 5.8: Strategies which decision-makers most commonly used to help to reduce uncertainty in 
resource consent applications under the RMA 1991 (n=78)  
 
Precautionary principle 
When participants were asked what they understood by the term precautionary principle, 
55.3% of participants gave answers that could be grouped together as “err on the side of 
caution” (Table 5.6). For those respondents who believed that caution should be exercised, 
many reasons were given to justify caution, including: uncertainty or lack of scientific 
consensus, or potential for significantly adverse (or irreversible) effects.  
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Although only 5.3% of individuals openly admitted that they did not know what the 
precautionary principle was (or had never heard of it), a number of definitions provided 
suggest that a larger proportion of participants lacked an understanding of the principle. 
For example, a small number provided definitions that were more linked to adaptive 
management than the precautionary principle, mentioning the need for projects to be 
adjustable and strictly monitored and if adverse effects arise the project must be altered. 
Moreover, 7.9% of participants gave definitions that were clearly taken from the Internet 
(predominantly Wikipedia). For example: 
“if an action or policy has a suspected risk of causing harm to the public or to the 
environment, in the absence of scientific consensus that the action or policy is not 
harmful, the burden of proof that it is not harmful falls on those taking an action”. 
 
Table 5.6: Definitions of the precautionary principle as provided by participants (n = 75). 
Definition Percentage of participants (%) n 
Err on the side of caution 55.3 43 
Burden of proof 7.9 6 
If unsure make an effort to understand/do not prejudge the application 6.6 5 
An approach to be used when there is uncertainty or a lack of info 5.3 4 
Adaptive management 3.9 2 
Other 15.8 12 
Do not know/have not heard of it 5.3 4 




Finally, 15.8% of respondents provided another definition, for example “academic term 
for common sense” and “precautionary principle is based on anticipating effects on a 
worst case on their possible spectrum, and considering it or devising conditions 
accordingly.” Two participants touched on the fact that, while the precautionary principle 
is inherent in the RMA, it is not defined, meaning that it can be interpreted in a large 
number of ways.  
“…The absence of, or any uncertainty in, any information should not be used as a 
reason for postponing or failing to take any measure to achieve the purpose of this 
Act. It is implicit in the application of the Resource Management Act 1991 however 
application of the precautionary principle is therefore open to wide interpretation, 
with similar risks being treated differently by decision-makers…Importantly there 
was no consensus on the meaning of the term. The meaning of precaution often 
rests on the values of the individual.” 
 
“The RMA leaves society’s risk tolerance and risk aversion to the decision-makers 
to decide. Application of the precautionary principle is open to wide interpretation 
and can result in similar risks being treated differently with different litigation 
consequences. Although the RMA does not actually prefer precaution, it is implicit 
in the way the Act is implemented and defined by case law…Application of a 
general precautionary principle is within the decision-maker's discretion…’ 
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Given the range of understandings of the precautionary principle, it is no surprise that there 
was a variety of circumstances in which participants believed that it is an appropriate 
decision-making option (Table 5.7). The two most commonly mentioned situations were 
when there are significantly adverse effects associated with a proposal and when there are 
high levels of uncertainty/little confidence in the evidence (31.4% and 17.1% respectively). 
Furthermore, 17.1% of individuals provided a specific example of situations in which the 
use of the precautionary principle is appropriate. Examples include consents relating to 
climate change, sea-level rise, coastal processes, areas of new technology, the introduction 
of species, minimum flows on rivers where the data frame is not long, elite soils, natural 
hazards, salmon farming in Marlborough, the CRL link in Auckland, wastewater 
management and the first consent under a new plan. 
 
Table 5.7: Situations where use of the precautionary principle is appropriate/not appropriate as 
identified by decision-makers. 













Significantly adverse effects 31.4 22 
High uncertainty/little confidence in evidence 17.1 12 
Provided a specific example 17.1 12 
Only as a last resort 5.7 4 
Where effects can be managed 5.7 4 
In all situations 2.9 2 
Do not know 11.4 8 















Where adverse impacts are insignificant or can be easily 
mitigated 
33.3 21 
When applications are very detailed and have little uncertainty 23.0 15 
When benefits are significant 4.6 3 
Use is very rarely/never justified 4.6 3 
When applications are very poor 3.1 2 
When effects cannot be mitigated 3.1 2 
Similar previous consents 3.1 2 
Do not know 9.2 6 
Other (e.g. economic uncertainty/ plan changes) 16.9 11 
Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding 
 
Participants were also asked to identify situations in which they saw the use of the 
precautionary principle not appropriate. A third of participants believed that it was not 
appropriate when adverse impacts are insignificant or can be easily mitigated. Many 
participants also believed its use should be linked to the quality of the application: a large 
number of individuals thought it not appropriate when applications are very detailed and 
there is little uncertainty (23.0%).   
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Adaptive management 
When asked to explain what adaptive management meant, again the results were highly 
variable (Table 5.8). While 19.4% of participants explained that adaptive management 
meant allowing an activity to proceed but imposing conditions and strict monitoring and 
adaptation, some saw adaptive management to mean that a project has a flexible 
management plan or that it was a strategy that involved baseline information, monitoring 
and review (7.5% and 3.0% respectively) (Table 5.8). Some admitted that they did not 
know what it meant or had not heard of it (14.9%), and 7.5% of participants chose to 
provide the Wikipedia definition of adaptive management: 
“Adaptive management (AM), also known as adaptive resource management 
(ARM), is a structured, iterative process of robust decision-making in the face of 
uncertainty, with an aim to reducing uncertainty over time via system monitoring.” 
 
Table 5.8: Definitions of adaptive management as provided by participants (n = 67). 
Definition Percentage of participants (%) n 
Allowing an activity to proceed but imposing conditions and strict 
monitoring and adaptation 19.4 13 
Adapting an activity to reduce adverse effects 16.4 11 
Staged project that is only able to move on if affects are acceptable 10.4 7 
Provided the ‘Wikipedia’ definition 7.5 5 
Flexible management plan 7.5 5 
Learning by doing 3.0 2 
Baseline information, monitoring and review 3.0 2 
Be very careful using it 3.0 2 
Do not know/have not heard of it 14.9 10 
Other (e.g. “change when change is required”) 14.9 10 
        Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding  
 
Participants were asked to indicate situations in which the use of adaptive management 
would be appropriate (Table 5.9). The most common response to the question was that they 
were unsure and did not know when it was appropriate (16.1%). Although participants did 
consider uncertainty when determining when the use of adaptive management is 
appropriate, their opinions were not consistent: 12.9% of participants stated that they 
thought that it was appropriate when there is uncertainty, however some participants were 
more specific, stating that they thought that it was only appropriate when risks and 
uncertainty are low (11.3%).  
 
A number of participants (11.3%) gave a specific example of a situation suited to adaptive 
management including Marlborough Salmon farming and geothermal energy extraction. 
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Finally, 14.5% of participant’s responses were categorised as ‘Other’. Examples include 
situations where submitters are nervous and are appearing on a ‘once only’ basis on an 
issue which is vital to them, and projects involving ecological enhancement.  
 
Table 5.9: Situations where use of adaptive management is appropriate/not appropriate as 
identified by decision-makers. 

















When there is uncertainty (or when effects are unknown or 
there is a lack of robust information) 12.9 8 
When risks/uncertainty is low 11.3 7 
Specific example 11.3 7 
Where there is a robust monitoring programme 8.1 5 
All situations 6.5 4 
Where it will achieve its goals and achieve a positive outcome 6.5 4 
When project is staged and effects can be reduced 6.5 4 
Technological advancement 3.2 2 
When effects will change over time 3.2 2 
Do not know 16.1 10 
















Significant adverse impacts 31.0 18 
High levels of certainty 22.4 13 
Should be used in all situations 5.2 3 
Do not know 17.2 10 
Other 24.1 14 
  Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding  
 
Participants were also asked when the use of adaptive management would not be 
appropriate. A third of participants stated that adaptive management was not appropriate 
when adverse effects are significant, while just under a quarter believed it inappropriate 
that when there are high levels of certainty about the project and its impacts. There were 
many other suggestions, but these two categories accounted for half of the total responses. 
 
5.5.4 Guidance and support for decision-makers managing uncertainty 
Just under two thirds of respondents held the view that they were given no guidance about 
how to manage uncertainty arising in the consent process (Figure 5.9). Of those who 
believe that they had been given guidance, most said it mainly came from the Making 
Good Decisions course, and as advice from planners or the planning report (42.3% and 
34.6% respectively) (Table 5.10).  While case law was mentioned, decision-makers 
indicated that they relied on more informal guidance (such as discussions with other 
decision-makers and information on the Quality Planning website). 
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Figure 5.9: Proportion of participants who consider that they are provided with guidance (formal 
or informal) on how to manage uncertainty (n = 84). 
 
 
Table 5.10: Explanation of the specific guidance that participants believe that they are given 
 (n = 30). 
 
Type of guidance Percentage of participants (%) n 
Making good decision course 36.7 11 
Advice from planners/planning report 30.0 9 
Case law 13.3 4 
Other 16.7 5 
Not specified 3.3 1 
       Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding  
 
Those who felt that they were not provided with guidance were asked whether they thought 
there was a need for more guidance (Table 5.11). A large proportion believed it would be 
useful (40.0%), and felt that MfE needed to provide better guidance through the ‘Making 
Good Decisions’ programme and that decision-makers should be provided with guidelines, 
checklists or ongoing updates. One individual asserted that “Yes, there is a need for 
guidance because uncertainty does not need to be a cause for paralysis”. 
 
Table 5.11:  Views of participants who believe that they are not given guidance, on whether 
guidance is needed (n = 44). 
Is guidance needed? Percentage of participants (%) n 
Yes 40.0 22 
No 18.2 10 
Not specified 41.8 23 
Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding  
 
Those who did not believe that guidance was necessary (18.2%) explained that as every 
case is different, it is difficult/risky to provide guidance or that the management of 
uncertainty was the responsibility of the decision-maker and required their judgement. 
Despite that, overall participants were open to the idea of having guidance with more than 
50% of participants either believing that they are given guidance, or stating that they would 
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find guidance useful. Another theme that emerged was the importance of experience. 
16.5% of respondents either relied on their own experience, or thought that experience was 
vital in order to be able to manage uncertainty well.  
 
Participants were asked to rank factors that have helped decision-makers to cope with 
uncertainty (Figure 5.10). Background/area of expertise and personal experience in 
decision-making were the most influential factors in helping decision-makers understand 
and manage uncertainty (both ranked either first or second by ~60% of participants). While 
an individual’s qualifications and advice from council staff were less relied on, the 
‘Making Good Decisions’ programme as well as advice from other decision-makers were 
reported as an important secondary sources of assistance, especially the latter. 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Factors that have helped decision-makers to be able to understand and manage 
uncertainty in the decision-making process (with 1 being the most and 7 least) (n = 80).  
 
5.6 Further analysis of results  
In order to understand better how decision-makers perceive, understand, and manage 
uncertainty further analysis of the results was undertaken. Cluster analysis was used to 
explore whether there were observable groupings among respondents based on their 
answers to certain indicator questions. Second, the link between attitudes to uncertainty 
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5.6.1 Perceptions of uncertainty  
It is acknowledged within the literature that different individuals will have different 
perceptions about the acceptability and importance of uncertainty, and that there are many 
different factors that can influence one’s perceptions. Therefore, rather than analyse 
decision-makers’ perceptions based upon the broad characteristics of participants, a cluster 
analysis was undertaken with the aim of understanding whether there were in fact clear 
differences in the decision-makers perceptions about the acceptability and importance of 
disclosure of uncertainty. The questions used are shown in Table 5.12. The cluster analysis 
(Ward’s method, using squared Euclidean distance for the similarity measure) produced six 
groups, each of which had a distinct perception of uncertainty (Figure 5.11 and Table 
5.12). Characteristics of the groups (such as education, background, decision-making 
expertise) were examined, to explore possible reasons for shared attitudes. 
 
The cluster analysis suggests that decision-makers are far from unanimous in their views of 
uncertainty; in fact there are some fundamental differences in the perceptions of 
uncertainty. As the dendrogram shows (Figure 5.11) groups one to four are distinct from 
groups five and six. Groups one through four are distinguished by their general acceptance 
of uncertainty, its level and the way in which it is communicated; groups 5 and 6 are less 
accepting of uncertainty. Looking more closely at groups one to four, group one is the 
largest grouping in the analysis so represents a more widespread set of views; groups two 
and three are considerably smaller, representing sub-groups of respondents with subtly 
different perspectives. All three groups are accepting of uncertainty in resource consents, 
but have varied attitudes about the level of uncertainty, applicant disclosure and the role of 
the decision- maker. Group four is rather distinct in a number of ways. As a group they are 
relatively dismissive of uncertainty. For example, although they do not believe the 
presence of uncertainty is acceptable, they believe the level of uncertainty is fine, which 
may indicate that the do not believe that there is uncertainty in the consents process. 
Furthermore, for the most part they do not agree that decision-makers need to accept and 
take into account uncertainty. Interestingly, the group is quite experienced with all 
participants having more than 20 decisions experience (with all but one individuals having 
more than 100). Also, of the five group members, three hold no qualifications other than 
the ‘Making Good Decisions’ certificate. They also consider that the majority of the 
uncertainty in the resource consent process comes from the interpretation of the RMA and 
whether or not the consent application will be granted. 
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Table 5.12: Summary statistics for cluster analysis, showing the most common response to 
questions about the presence and disclosure of uncertainty (mode) and the percentage of 
































































































































































































































































































































































answer Agree Disagree Agree Neutral Agree Agree 
37 
70% Independent Commissioner 
Mixture of experience, >50% with 
more than 20 decisions 
Nearly 60% hold MGD chair 
certificate % 73.0 70.3 70.3 51.4 75.7 75.7 
2  
Mode 
answer Agree Disagree Disagree Neutral Neutral Disagree 
10 
80% Independent Commissioners 
 4 made >100 decisions (only 3 < 20) 
All highly educated 
 % 100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0 40.0 80.0 
3  
Mode 
answer Agree Agree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
11 
70% Independent Commissioner 
45% hold MGD chair certificate 
60% with > 20 decisions 
>50% planners % 63.6 54.5 36.4 45.5 81.8 45.5 
4 
Mode 
answer Disagree Disagree Neutral Neutral Disagree Neutral 
5 
50% Independent Commissioner 
3 without any qualifications other 
than the MGD (2 Police Officers & a 
farmer) 
All made > 20 decisions (most >100) 
Mostly believe that uncertainty 
comes from RMA and outcome of 
consent 
% 80.0 60.0 40.0 40.0 80.0 40.0 
5 
Mode 
answer Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree 
15 
60% Independent Commissioner 
>50% with < 20 decisions (only 1 
with  >100) 
50% hold MGD chair certificate % 80.0 66.7 60.0 73.3 73.3 53.3 
6 
Mode 
answer Disagree Agree Agree Neutral Agree Agree 
21 
50% Independent Commissioner 
>50% with < 20 decisions (only 1 
with >100) 
Many think that uncertainty is from 
lack of information & the AEE 
50% hold MGD chair certificate 

























































































Groups five and six, together making up a third of the total number of participants, are the 
more concerned about uncertainty. While group five are accepting of uncertainty, group six 
can be characterised as the most apprehensive/averse to uncertainty: they do not agree that 
it is acceptable for applications to be uncertain. Both groups agree that the current level of 
uncertainty needs to be reduced and that applicants must disclose uncertainty. Group five 
agree that applicants are not adequately communicating uncertainty, however group six are 
neutral. Both groups place a high importance on decision-makers accepting uncertainty, 
taking it into account and disclosing it in the decision documents. In both groups, more 
than 50% of the decision-makers had made less than 20 decisions with only one individual 
in each group having more than 100 decision experiences.  
 
Overall, the analysis shows some fundamental differences amongst the decision-makers, 
not clear unanimity. There are a number of factors which may play a part in these 
differences. For example, groups five and six, being the two groups which are most 
concerned about uncertainty, appear to be the two least experienced groups. Not only that, 
they are also made up of a larger proportion of decision-makers who predominantly gained 
their experience as internal commissioners. In contrast, groups two and four, which seem 
broadly to be least concerned with uncertainty (almost dismissive of it) seem to be more 
predominantly made up of experienced decision-makers and independent commissioners.  
 
5.6.2 Understanding and managing uncertainty  
Decision-makers believed that the most important factors that helped them to understand 
and manage uncertainty were background/area of expertise and experience as decision-
makers (Figure 5.10). To investigate this further, decision-makers’ understanding of 
uncertainty and management strategies used to cope with uncertainty were analysed on the 
basis of background and experience. The participants were divided according to their 
experience (one group with >20 decisions and one with <20 decisions), their commissioner 
status (internal and independent commissioners) and their professional background 
(Councillors/career commissioners, environmental scientists/ engineers, planners/RMA 
consultants, RMA lawyers and other). Responses to different questions were analysed 
based upon the different groups. The use of chi-square tests on the frequency tables was 
considered, however there were too many categories and not enough responses to make the 
test viable, especially for the analysis of background/discipline, so the following 
interpretation is qualitative. 
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Although the behaviour of the groups is similar in many ways, there are subtle differences 
in the way in which the different groups understand and manage uncertainty, and certain 
groups have tendencies to behave in certain ways. 
 
Understanding sources and causes of uncertainty  
The results suggest that those with less experience placed more emphasis on uncertainty in 
information generated by the consultation and submissions process, and less on 
information in the AEE, than those with more experience. Internal commissioners were 
also more concerned with public involvement and less with the AEE than independent 
commissioners. Both Environmental Scientists/Engineers and RMA Lawyers placed more 
emphasis on uncertainty arising in the AEE the other groups and those decision-makers 
with a background that was classified as ‘other’ presented quite unique opinions, believing 
uncertainty was more likely to arise in the hearing and proposal than other groups.  
 
Figure 5.12: Decision-maker views of the types of information with the greatest potential for 
uncertainty to arise in resource management applications (ranked 1st), by experience (number of 
decisions made and type of commissioner) and background/ professional specialisation (n). 
 
Decision-makers’ views about the main causes of uncertainty were also broken down 
based on the same professional groups and experience attributes (Figure 5.13). When 
classified according to experience, the responses show little difference; however, on the 
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on the inherent complexity of a system and more on a lack of information than internal 
commissioners, although the differences are subtle. However, there is considerably more 
variation in the results when looking at the decisions-makers in terms of their background. 
Planners/consultants and Environmental Scientists/Engineers hold broadly similar views, 
while Lawyers (and to a lesser extent Councillors/career commissioners) consider that too 
much information is a greater cause of uncertainty than other groups. Again, the 
participants with ‘other’ backgrounds (e.g. cultural experts, farmers and police officers) 
presented quite distinct results, considering uncertainty to be predominantly caused by the 
inherent complexity of a system and conflicting information. Many of the individuals who 
make up this group are also represented the cluster analysis group four, which was also a 
very distinct group with unique views (Section 5.6.1). 
 
Figure 5.13: Decision-maker views of the main causes of uncertainty in resource management 
applications (ranked 1st), by experience (number of decisions made and type of commissioner) and 
background/ professional specialisation (n). 
 
The responses to questions about the specific reason for, and location of, uncertainty in 
resource consents and AEEs were analysed in the same way (Table 5.13). Decision-makers 
with >20 decisions experience gave a wider range of reasons for uncertainty in the resource 
consent and the AEE than those with less experience. Independent commissioners placed 
more emphasis on the AEE and the difficulty in predicting impacts as sources of 
uncertainty than internal commissioners, who strongly highlighted bias and the deliberate 
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When looking at the decisions-makers background there is also considerable variation in 
the sources of uncertainty that were identified. Councillors/career commissioner identified 
uncertainty caused by conflicting information and the inadequate assessment by applicants, 
and being fairly ambivalent to specific source of uncertainty related to the AEE.  
 
Table 5.13: Decision-makers views about the most common sources of uncertainty in the resource 
consent process and AEE, by experience (number of decisions made and type of commissioner) as 
well as background/ professional specialisation. 
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The AEE (e.g. prediction of actual effects) 39.1 35.6 46.4 48.1 22.2 25.0 15.4 48.3 58.3 40.0 
Lack of robust information/evidence 17.2 11.9 28.6 16.2 14.8 10.0 15.4 27.6 8.3 13.3 
Interpretation of the RMA 16.1 11.9 25.0 11.1 22.2 25.0 15.4 3.4 25.0 20.0 
Cumulative effects 10.3 6.8 17.9 9.3 14.8 10.0 - 13.7 8.3 6.7 
Notification process/effects on submitters 9.2 10.2 7.1 9.3 11.1 15.0 7.7 13.8 - - 
Conflicting evidence 8.0 6.8 10.7 9.3 7.4 15.0 7.7 3.4 8.3 6.7 
Uncertainty in outcome of application 6.9 8.5 3.6 7.4 8.5 5.0 7.7 10.3 - 6.7 
Poor preparation/deliberately hiding info/bias 8.0 8.5 7.1 5.6 14.8 10.0 23.1 - 16.7 - 
Other 4.6 6.8 - 1.9 7.4 10.0 - 3.4 - 6.7 
Lack of quantitative effects information 4.6 3.4 7.1 7.4 - - - 6.9 16.7 - 
Amenity/heritage/aesthetic values and effects 3.4 5.1 - 3.7 3.7 5.0 7.7 - - 6.7 
Lack of resources available to applicants 3.4 5.1 - 3.7 3.7 - - 6.9 - 6.7 

















Difficulty in predicting impacts 21.4 22.6 20.7 30.4 3.8 - 54.6 24.1 41.6 6.7 
Conflicting information 19.1 12.9 22.4 16.1 26.9 44.4 25.0 10.0 15.4 6.3 
Inadequate assessment by applicants 18.0 29.0 12.1 19.6 19.2 20.0 18.2 20.7 33.3 - 
Other 13.5 12.9 13.8 10.7 11.5 21.7 7.7 6.7 7.7 16.7 
Determining level/significance of effect 12.4 6.5 15.5 10.7 11.5 5.0 9.1 6.9 25.0 26.7 
Social/cultural/qualitative effects 12.4 16.1 10.3 16.1 3.8 - - 24.1 8.3 20.0 
Subjectivity of effects information 9.0 9.7 8.6 12.5 3.8 - 9.1 13.8 25.0 - 
Aesthetic/amenity/heritage values/impacts 6.7 9.7 5.2 8.9 3.8 10.0 - 6.9 8.3 6.7 
Lack of robust baseline information 5.6 3.2 6.9 8.9 - - 9.1 6.9 8.3 6.7 
Deliberate omission of information 5.6 6.5 5.2 7.1 3.8 5.0 9.1 10.3 - - 
Cumulative effects 4.5 12.9 - 5.4 - 5.0 - 6.9 - 6.7 
Complexity of a the systems being affected 4.5 6.5 3.4 5.4 3.8 5.0 18.2 3.4 - - 
Assumptions 3.4 9.7 - 5.4 - - - 6.9 8.3 - 
Expert bias 3.4 6.5 1.7 - 11.5 5.0 9.1 - - 6.7 
Mitigation 2.2 3.2 1.7 - 7.7 4.3 - - - 5.6 
n 89 58 31 56 26 20 13 29 12 15 
*Numbers do not add to 100 as participants provided multiple answers 
 
Environmental scientists/ Engineers placed a lot of importance on the difficulty in 
predicting impacts and the complexity of the system being affected, and interestingly the 
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deliberate omission of information and bias. Planners and RMA consultants described a 
large range of different reasons for uncertainty. They highlight the uncertainty around the 
notification and consultation, as well as in the social/cultural/qualitative effects 
information and the difficulty interpreting subjective effects information 
 
Not surprisingly, Lawyers emphasised the uncertainty that comes from the subjectivity of 
interpreting the RMA. More interestingly they also highlighted the importance in 
determining level/significance of effect, however this may be that an important part of the 
decision-making process is to determine whether the effects are more/ less than minor. The 
group of lawyers also expressed concern for the uncertainty caused by not having enough 
quantitative effects information and the subjectivity of interpreting effects information 
suggesting that they prefer the evidence to be certain.  
 
Again, the group of decision-makers with ‘other’ backgrounds presents a unique set of 
results.  Not only did the group not present a very wider range of results, they also 
identified determining level/significance of effect and social/cultural/qualitative effects as 
the main reasons for uncertainty (which no other group did). 
 
Management of uncertainty  
When looking at the strategies that were used by decision-makers to manage uncertainty, a 
number of interesting patterns that emerge (Table 5.14). Regardless of group, two 
strategies that were more commonly relied on to cope with uncertainty were asking 
questions of experts at hearings and formally request further information. The use of 
‘other’ strategies was also common, with the exception of Planners/RMA consultants. 
 
While the most commonly used strategies for both groups were to ask questions of experts 
at hearing and to formally request further information, when compared to those with less 
experience, those with more experience used a slightly wider range of strategies to cope 
with uncertainty. Not only that, they also relied on more direct procedural strategies: 
considering management options/consent conditions; adjourning the hearing; talk to 
planner/ author of planners report; caucusing; undertaking more consultation; hot tubbing 
experts; declining consents. 
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Table 5.14: Strategies decision-makers identified that are used to manage uncertainty in the 
consent process by experience (number of decisions made and type of commissioner) as well as 














































































































































Ask questions of experts at hearing 68.9 74.3 65.8 97.3 66.7 66.7 70.0 82.8 50.0 50.0 
Formally request further information 55.4 54.3 57.9 75.7 61.9 46.7 80.0 62.1 40.0 40.0 
Other 36.5 37.1 36.8 40.5 47.6 40.0 50.0 17.2 60.0 50.0 
Consider management options/conditions 31.1 42.9 21.1 56.8 4.8 - 20.0 44.8 70.0 10.0 
Clarify evidence 29.7 20.0 39.5 37.8 33.3 46.7 40.0 20.7 10.0 40.0 
Read information & do best to understand 20.3 17.1 23.7 29.7 19.0 20.0 30.0 17.2 20.0 20.0 
Case law/ seek legal advice/ consider RMA 17.6 20.0 15.8 5.4 21.6 20.0 10.0 6.9 30.0 40.0 
Discuss with others decision-makers 17.6 17.1 18.4 21.6 14.3 20.0 30.0 10.3 - 40.0 
Talk to planner/ author of planners report 12.2 17.1 7.9 16.2 14.3 13.3 10.0 13.8 10.0 10.0 
Adjourn hearing 12.2 17.1 7.9 10.8 19.0 20.0 10.0 13.8 10.0 - 
Caucusing 10.8 20.0 2.6 18.9 4.8 13.3 - 13.8 20.0 - 
Determine significance of impacts 8.1 11.4 5.3 16.2 - 26.7 - 3.4 - 10.0 
Conduct a site visit 8.1 8.6 7.9 2.7 19.0 6.7 10.0 10.3 10.0 10.0 
Conduct own research 8.1 8.6 10.5 10.8 19.0 26.7 10.0 3.4 - 10.0 
Undertake more consultation 8.1 11.4 5.3 5.4 14.3 6.7 - 6.9 - 40.0 
Consider experience/credibility of experts 6.8 8.6 2.6 5.4 14.3 6.7 10.0 6.9 - 10.0 
Hot tubbing experts 6.8 8.6 2.6 10.8 - - 10.0 10.3 - - 
Ranking/prioritising issues 6.8 8.6 5.3 5.4 9.5 6.7 - 6.9 10.0 10.0 
Decline consent 6.8 8.6 2.6 8.1 4.8 - 10.0 3.4 20.0 10.0 
Look at method used in AEE 5.4 - 5.3 5.4 - - - - - 20.0 
Use past experience 5.4 2.9 7.9 10.8 - 6.7 - 6.9 - 10.0 
Be open minded 2.7 - 5.3 2.7 4.8 - - 3.4 - 10.0 
n 74 48 21 36 38 15 10 29 10 10 
*Numbers do not add to 100 as participants provided multiple answers 
 
In addition, there seems to be a difference in the strategies used, based on whether or not a 
decision-maker has primarily acted as an internal or independent commissioner. A large 
proportion of independent commissioners reported that they ask questions at the hearing 
and formally request information. When compared to independent commissioners, very 
few internal commissioners mentioned considering consent conditions, determining the 
significance of impacts, caucusing or declining consent. 
 
When looking at the occupation/ main area of specialisation of participants, there are a 
number of interesting findings. Councillors/career commissioners placed emphasis on the 
determination of the significance of impacts and conducting their own research, but did not 
mention using consent conditions or declining the consent. Scientists predominantly used 
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strategies that reduce uncertainty or allow them to better understand uncertainty (asking 
questions of experts at hearing, formally requesting further information, clarifying 
evidence and reading information and doing their to best to understand). 
 
Planners and RMA consultants predominantly ask questions of experts at hearings and 
formally request further information, and were the least reliant on ‘other’ strategies. They 
also placed considerable emphasis on the use of consent conditions and management 
options. Lawyers relied more on the consideration of management options/consent 
conditions, looking at case law/ seek legal advice/ considering whether the proposal meets 
the purpose of the RMA, caucusing, declining consents and ‘other’ strategies than other 
groups. They were also the group that provided the fewest number of strategies, not 
mentioning many strategies that were identified by other groups. 
 
Recognised management strategies 
It is clear from the results that decision-makers are primarily using strategies to understand 
and reduce uncertainty, rather than approaches which are used once the level of uncertainty 
is accepted. Therefore, the decision-makers’ understanding of the precautionary principle 
and adaptive management were not analysed further 
 
Support for understanding and managing uncertainty  
It comes as no surprise that those with >20 decisions experience considered that their 
experience was the most helpful factor, while those with less experience relied more on 
their background and area of expertise (Figure 5.14). Those who had primarily gained their 
experience as internal commissioners relied less on their background/ area of expertise, 
and more on the ‘Making Good Decisions’ programme and advice from council staff 
compared to independent commissioners. Environmental scientists and lawyers relied 
primarily on their background and area of specialisation compared to other professional 
groups, lawyers and planners relied the least on the ‘Making Good Decisions’ programme. 
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Figure 5.14: Factors that have primarily (ranked first) helped decision-makers to be able to 
understand and manage uncertainty in the decision-making process by experience (number of 
decisions made and type of commissioner) as well as background/ professional specialisation (n) 
 
5.7 Overview of findings 
The results of this investigation show that decision-makers perceive there to be a wide 
range of reasons for uncertainty in the resource consent process. The most widely reported 
reasons for uncertainty were the lack of effects information, conflicting information and 
the inherent uncertainties associated with particular types of information. In addition, there 
was variability in participant’s views about acceptability of uncertainty, as well as whether 
or not the current level of uncertainty is too large. In saying this, the majority agree that 
applicants and decision-makers have a responsibility to acknowledge and communicate 
uncertainty.  
 
When it comes to the management of uncertainty, the approaches used are many, and 
highly variable. However the majority of strategies are used with the aim of better 
understanding or reducing uncertainty. No participants mentioned that they use the 
precautionary principle or adaptive management to manage uncertainty. When asked about 
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deemed appropriate for their use. In saying this, although some participants were unsure of 
the strategies or their use, many made links to uncertainty.  
Despite decision-makers being divided when it came to whether or not they were given 
guidance, they were predominantly relying on their experience in decision-making and 
professional background to assist them in understanding and managing uncertainty. The 
majority of participants were open to the idea of being provided guidance to manage 
uncertainty. 
 
The analysis of the link between a decision-maker’s background and experience and their 
views of, and approaches, to uncertainty suggest that indeed different groups do tend to 
behave differently. Those with more experience provided a larger range of reasons for 
uncertainty, but predominantly were concerned with uncertainty related to the AEE, while 
those with less experience were also concerned with the interpretation of the RMA and of 
terms such as cumulative effects. Those with more experience also relied more heavily on 
direct procedural strategies. Independent commissioners placed more emphasis on effects 
information, and provided a wider range of management strategies, but relied most heavily 
on asking questions at the hearing, formally requesting information, and considering 
consent conditions than internal commissioners. The groups with different professional 
specialisations also seem to behave differently. Lawyers were one of the most distinct 
groups, particularly when it came to the management of uncertainty, identifying the use of 
consent conditions as the primary way to manage uncertainty, an approach that other 
groups placed considerably less importance on. Planners and RMA consultants relied more 
heavily on specific steps in the consent process to manage uncertainty, while scientists 












The primary aim of this research is to understand the role of uncertainty in resource 
consent decision-making in New Zealand, particularly within the effects information. This 
chapter discusses the key findings outlined in chapter five in relation to the theoretical 
concepts in chapter two. Decision-makers’ views of uncertainty are addressed first, then 
the uncertainty that occurs in the resource consent process is characterised.  Following this, 
the management strategies employed by decision-makers are considered and evaluated, 
and the wider implications of findings are considered. The chapter closes with some 
reflections on the study as a whole.  
 
6.2 Decision-makers’ views of uncertainty in resource consents  
Participants in this investigation provided a wide range of different reasons for uncertainty 
arising in the resource consent process. While this may suggest that uncertainty is 
widespread, the participants largely agreed that it is acceptable for resource consent 
applications to contain uncertainty, and that it is important that decision-makers take that 
into consideration and where necessary disclose it in decision documentation. This 
suggests that they recognise that there will be situations in which they have to make 
decisions based on uncertain evidence This is an important finding, because if decision-
makers are not accepting of uncertainty, they can end up acting in a short-sighted manner, 
denying that the uncertainty exists and proceeding without caution, or, in contrast, they 
may be defensive and hypervigilent, delay decisions unduly, or obsessively collect more 
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information in an attempt to reduce the uncertainty (Janis, 1977; Etzioni, 2001; Vlek, 2004; 
Larsen et al., 2013).  
 
There was considerably more variation in decision-maker views about whether the level of 
uncertainty present in resource consent applications is too great and needs to be reduced. 
The literature suggests a number of possible reasons for this.. For example their attitude 
towards risk: while some decision-makers feel uncomfortable and anxious about 
uncertainty, which limits their ability to problem solve, others may be more relaxed about 
uncertainty and are able to function as usual. The level of uncertainty individuals are 
willing to accept also depends on the magnitude of damage that is likely to occur. 
Uncertainty is often more easily accepted if the benefits of the proposal are large, the 
effects are not severe, and the consequences are familiar and to some extent controllable 
(Vlek, 2004).  
 
The decision-makers who participated in this study have different experiences of the 
process, in terms of numbers of decisions made, differing degrees of complexity and 
controversy, and different levels of uncertainty in the applications. Therefore, it is likely 
that those experiences will have shaped how they view the need to reduce uncertainty. 
Finally, as explained in section 2.3.2, decision-makers’ perceptions of uncertainty can be 
affected by their experience with the generation of effects information: those with more 
experience may perceive higher levels of uncertainty than those who have not been 
involved (MacKenzie, 1993; Duncan, 2008, 2013)(Figure 6.1). 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Individuals possible perceptions of uncertainty based upon their experience and 






















Decision-makers in this investigation mostly agreed that it is essential for applicants to 
communicate uncertainty but had varied views about the adequacy of current practices. 
This may be because some individuals are happy to read between the lines, while others 
may need it explicitly explained. On the other hand it may simply be due to the variable 
quality of the applications (Arts et al., 2001; Geneletti et al., 2003; Tennøy et al., 2006; 
Duncan, 2008; Wardekker et al., 2008; Leung et al., 2015; Lees et al., 2016; Leung et al., 
2016). This is discussed further in section 6.3.1. 
 
6.3 Causes of uncertainty in the resource consent process 
The results suggest that there are many possible causes of uncertainty in the resource 
consent process, a finding that is supported by the research literature. However, the causes 
can be grouped into four broad categories (Figure 6.2): uncertainty caused by the quality of 
the effects information; inherent uncertainty; uncertainty caused by conflicting 
information; and uncertainty caused by the consent process itself. Each of these categories 
is by no means discrete; many of the uncertainties explained could be characterised in 
different ways, and fit into multiple categories. Despite this, the four categories are a 
convenient way of simplifying a complex and interconnected characteristic of resource 
management. The following sections discuss each of these broad categories of uncertainty 
in more detail, with particular emphasis on the quality of effects information.  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Four broad classifications of uncertainty identified by decision-makers. 
 
6.3.1 Quality of effects information  
Poor quality effects information can cause uncertainty in a number of ways. Firstly, a large 
number of decision-makers identified the lack of effects information as a main cause 
uncertainty, which is not surprising as a lack of knowledge is one of the most common 
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and Rotmans, 2002; Ascough Ii et al., 2008). Specific reasons reported by participants for 
the lack of information include lack of robust information or technical information, poor 
research methods, lack of proper analysis, insufficient use of experts, insufficient attention 
given to contentious issues and limited data collection, etc.  
 
Applicants not dedicating enough resources to the applications also caused uncertainty for 
participants. The quality of the effects information can be directly affected by the 
proponent’s commitment to the project (Morgan, 2012). More specifically, Morrison-
Saunders et al. (2001) found that one of the main reasons for poor quality of effects 
information was insufficient financial resources and time dedicated to the application 
(particularly to baseline data collection, prediction of impacts and EIS preparation).  
 
The deliberate omission (or exaggeration) of information by biased applicants or experts 
also created uncertainty for decision-makers in this study. While the use of expert opinions 
is indispensable in resource management, they cannot be viewed unquestioningly as 
objective and unbiased (Beder, 1993; Morgan, 1998; Kontic, 2000; Wang et al., 2006; 
Noble, 2010; van Bree and van der Sluijs, 2014). Tennøy et al. (2006) found that one of 
the reasons for uncertainty in effects information was due to bias. Schijf (2003) suggested 
that while some consent applications in her study were very objective, others were far from 
it - applications were slanted, advocating for the proposed development, or contained 
specific problems that reduced the objectivity of the information such as suggestive 
language or lack of support for predictions. Although a number decision-makers in this 
investigation recognised that experts may exhibit bias that view may not be shared by all 
decision-makers, and it is interesting that Fougère (2013) found that the decision-makers 
for the Escarpment Mine on the Denniston Plateau application in Westland, New Zealand, 
treated the experts as unquestionably objective.  
 
Improving the quality of effects information  
The quality of effects information, and the uncertainty it causes, is an important factor that 
has the potential to influence the quality of decision-making. Although many sources of 
uncertainty in resource management are inherent, or very difficult to reduce, there are 
several ways in which the quality of effects information can be improved. First, applicants 
could be provided with guidance about the importance of disclosing and communicating 
uncertainty, and ways in which to do that (Arts et al., 2001; Geneletti et al., 2003; Tennøy 
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et al., 2006; Duncan, 2008; Wardekker et al., 2008; Leung et al., 2015; Lees et al., 2016; 
Leung et al., 2016). While there are difficulties with the development of guidance, there 
are examples of guidance material which could be drawn on, particularly from the 
Netherland’s Environmental Assessment Agency (Janssen et al., 2003; Petersen et al., 
2003; van der Sluijs et al., 2003; Dessai and van der Sluijs, 2007; Kloprogge et al., 2007; 
Petersen et al., 2010; Petersen et al., 2013).  
 
It is worth mentioning that although there are many techniques which can be used to 
reduce uncertainty in effects information (including, but by no means limited to, sensitivity 
analysis, scenario analysis, fuzzy logic and increased data collection), if applicants can 
reduce it, or even remove it, then there is less need to disclose and communicate it. 
However, it is still important that applicants understand the importance of disclosing and 
communicating uncertainty (Phillips, 2005; Stenton, 2006; Cardenas and Halman, 2016).  
It is also important that decision-makers are aware that applicants often have a vested 
interest in making proposals and effects information defensible, and therefore some may 
systematically seek to minimize uncertainty disclosure (Duncan, 2008; Allen and 
Gunderson, 2011; Leung et al., 2015). Therefore, even in situations where uncertainty is 
disclosed, decision-makers should not solely rely upon what is disclosed, they should 
undertake a deeper consideration of an applicant’s narrative and see through the 
smokescreen of applicants’ certainty about what was actually uncertain (Duncan, 2008; 
Allen and Gunderson, 2011; Duncan, 2013; Leung et al., 2015). 
 
Another option that could be considered to reduce expert bias and improve the quality of 
effects information is to use independent consultants to produce the AEE. Rather than have 
proponents hire and pay impact assessors, applicants would be charged for the IA and the 
relevant authority (or an independent body) would contract out the work to independent 
consultants (Beder, 1993; Morgan, 2000; Wood et al., 2000). However, Morgan (1998) 
believes that it is unlikely that there would be a shift away from the status quo in New 
Zealand as it would require significant changes to institutional arrangements. Therefore, a 
more practical and reasonable suggestion is to introduce a formal accreditation process for 
consultants, as it would help lift the quality of the effects information by ensuring that it is 
undertaken by appropriately qualified and experienced practitioners (Fuller, 1999; Wood, 
2003). Although there is no government led initiative for an accreditation process in New 
Zealand, the Environmental Institute of Australia and New Zealand (EIANZ) has 
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established a number of endorsements and certifications which aim to ensure that 
practitioners meet high standards of professional and ethical conduct, as well as 
acknowledge highly qualified, specialised and experienced individuals (Environmental 
Institute of Australia and New Zealand, 2012; Certified Environmental Practitioner 
Scheme, 2016a, 2016c, 2016b). 
 
Finally, the quality of effects information is likely to improve if the expectations are raised. 
The reviewing procedure in the New Zealand resource consent process is intended to 
assess the ‘completeness’ of applications prior to them being considered by decision-
makers. There are a number of issues with this process. Although there have been 
observations of inconsistent reviewing practices (Barnes, 2000; Morgan, 2000; Ministry 
for the Environment, 2014), it is more important that the system recognises that the 
reviewing process is not just a matter of simply checking that effects information has all 
the required and relevant content. According to impact assessment theory, a review should 
also consider the quality and success of the whole IA process, the experience of 
practitioners, the project type, the communication of information and public participation 
(Barker and Wood, 1999; Weston, 2000; Morrison-Saunders et al., 2001; Jalava et al., 
2010). The reviewing process in New Zealand is not as rigorous as this: while there are 
provisions for specialists to audit the consent (RMA Section 41C(4) and 92(2)), there is no 
mention of an assessment of the quality of information, or of the process by which it was 
gained. 
 
6.3.2 Inherent uncertainty 
Inherent uncertainties were mentioned by a number of the decision-makers in the 
questionnaire. The literature suggests that no matter the issue, there will always be 
uncertainty due to natural variability and complexity of systems (Walker et al., 2003; 
Lawrence, 2004; Mesa-Frias et al., 2013). Decision-makers in this study identified a 
number of inherent uncertainties, one of which was the prediction of impacts (and the 
determination of their level/significance). Leung et al. (2016) found similar results in her 
study of decision-makers in Canada. Although there is usually considerable room for the 
improvement of prediction (especially when it comes to determining the significance of 
impacts), there is often also considerable and unavoidable inherent uncertainty associated 
with the prediction and determination of the significance of impacts, as the process is very 
subjective (De Jongh, 1988; Morris and Therivel, 2001; Benson, 2003; Tennøy et al., 
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2006; Jay et al., 2007; Noble, 2010). For example, Noble (2010) argues that the process of 
determining significance is highly subjective and is essentially making an informed 
judgement about the importance of effects. Furthermore, while there are often thresholds 
for effects on the biophysical environment, there are no recognised standards for socio-
economic impacts; therefore, often the line between being significant or not extends over a 
range of values that are built on perceptions, as much as facts (Glasson et al., 2013).   
 
Cumulative effects (the impacts of a project that interact with past, present, and reasonably 
foreseeable actions that collectively generate significant environmental change) are 
important considerations in IA, and are required to be considered in the resource consent 
process. In practice they are often not addressed or handled adequately, and can be a major 
cause for uncertainty (Morgan, 1998; Duinker and Greig, 2006; Noble, 2010). Leung et al. 
(2016) found that the identification and assessment of cumulative impacts was the most 
commonly reported sources of uncertainty in IA; in contrast, this study found that they 
were only identified by a small number of decision-makers. Since the inception of the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 1995, cumulative effects have been a major 
focus in both theory and practice, and Canadian decision-makers may be more sensitised to 
the way in which cumulative effects are assessed and communicated, meaning that they 
very aware when assessments are insufficient and uncertainty is present. In addition the 
scope of the Canadian IA system differs to that of NZ meaning that only large projects 
require an EIA, which may be more likely to have complex cumulative impacts (Wood, 
2003; Duinker and Greig, 2006). 
 
Another source of uncertainty that was identified by decision-makers was the qualitative 
and subjective effects information (such as social or cultural effects and amenity values). 
Because of the broad definition of ‘environment’ in the RMA, there are many different 
components of the environment that need to be considered in the IA process, meaning that 
the way in which impacts are measured, and the type of information gained, can vary. 
Therefore, decision-makers will often be presented with both qualitative and quantitative 
information. There has been a long running debate in the literature concerning whether 
decision-makers’ needs are met most efficiently and effectively by quantitative or 
qualitative impact predictions (Cashmore et al., 2004). Some argue that where possible, all 
impact predictions should be quantified. However, in practice, decision-makers will be 
confronted with qualitative information about societal systems, their values and the 
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possible impacts on them; it is an intrinsic aspect of resource management. Societal 
systems are ever changing and variable, extremely complex, driven by differing attitudes 
and behaviours, and thus inherently uncertain (Wilson and Bryant, 1997; Vanclay, 2003; 
Walker et al., 2003; Brugnach et al., 2007; Ascough Ii et al., 2008). Although participants 
in this study feel that qualitative impact information can cause uncertainty in consent 
process, the decision-making process does involve weighing facts and values and making 
trade offs (Wood, 2003; Morrison-Saunders and Pope, 2013).  Uncertainty associated with 
qualitative information is one component that decision-makers have to learn to manage; it 
is not likely to go away. 
 
Implications of inherent uncertainty  
It is important to acknowledge that, of course, the prediction, determination of 
significance, and the assessment of qualitative and cumulative effects can be poorly 
completed, resulting in poor quality effects information. However, decision-makers should 
be aware of the inherently complex and difficult nature of these processes, and that there 
will always be some uncertainty associated with them. If one attempts to reduce inherent 
uncertainty, financial resources and time will usually be wasted; therefore, decision-makers 
must consider the nature, cause and reducibility of uncertainty before making a judgement 
as to whether there is a need to reduce that uncertainty (Walker et al., 2003; Berkes, 2007; 
Ascough Ii et al., 2008; Mesa-Frias et al., 2013; van Bree and van der Sluijs, 2014). 
Decision-makers in this investigation placed more emphasis on uncertainty associated with 
the quality of effects information than the inherent nature of other factors causing 
uncertainty. While they may believe that the effects information they are provided with is 
insufficient in amount and quality, it may also be possible that they are not distinguishing 
between inherent uncertainty, and an applicant’s failure to provide adequate information.  
This is an important consideration, as it will directly affect the choice of management 
strategy. 
 
6.3.3 Conflicting information  
Another source of uncertainty that was mentioned many times throughout the 
questionnaire was the presence of conflicting information and the associated uncertainty. 
Resource management often involves differing interests, and decision-makers are 
frequently presented with evidence and effects information from parties with conflicting 
values or opinions. Participants commented that conflicting evidence came about due to 
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differing opinions of applicants, opponents, experts, and submitters, and often came to 
light in the preparation for the hearing and at the hearing itself.  
 
In a study of a New Zealand wind farm development (Phillips, 2005), there was little 
agreement between experts about the visual impacts of the proposal, and the decision-
makers reported that it was not possible to determine which expert was right or wrong, 
making the decision particularly difficult considering that there was little way of 
remedying or mitigating the impacts. Similarly, Schijf (2003), studying effects information 
in New Zealand consent processes, found that disagreement between experts often resulted 
in conflicting information. When working through this, decision-makers were more likely 
to place increased importance on the source of the information, relying on the reputation of 
an expert, rather than thoroughly scrutinising the information provided.  
 
6.3.4 Uncertainty about resource consent decision-making  
Some decision-makers expressed concern about uncertainty caused by the resource consent 
process, and in particular the subjectivity and interpretation of the term ‘sustainable 
management’ in the RMA, which has long been recognised as fraught with difficulties 
(Harris, 1993; Dormer, 1994). The major cause for uncertainty lies with the interpretation 
of the word ‘while’ as it determines the weight given to the substantive part of section 5(2) 
and the latter half (section 5(2)(a-c).  
 
Although it was intended that ‘while’ should be read as ‘at the same time as’ and that 
matters in 5(a-c) are non-negotiable bottom lines that must be met in all cases (Armstrong, 
2014; Environment Foundation, 2016), the judiciary very quickly began to interpret it 
differently. Decision-makers have tended to treat Section 5(2) as the superior clause and 
therefore ecological, economic, social and cultural matters are given equal consideration 
(consistent with the ‘overall broad judgement’ approach, which renders the purpose of the 
Box: Section 5 Purpose 
(1) The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical 
resources. 
(2) In this Act, sustainable management means managing the use, development, and protection 
of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and 
communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being and for their 
health and safety while— 
(a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to meet 
the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
(b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems; and 
(c) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the environment 
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RMA very flexible). Despite the outcome of Environmental Defence Society Inc. v New 
Zealand King Salmon Company Limited case, in which ‘while’ was determined to mean 
‘at the same time as’, it is still too early to assess whether this will influence future practice 
and decisions (Armstrong, 2014; Environment Foundation, 2016).  
 
The results of this study show that, despite the King Salmon decision, decision-makers still 
see a lack of clarity in the way in which the purpose should be interpreted, causing them 
uncertainty in the resource consent decision-making process. The ‘Making Good 
Decisions’ documentation has not clarified this for decision-makers, but does urge more of 
a ‘broad judgement approach’(Ministry for the Environment, 2015). On the purpose of the 
Act, the guidance states that (page 33):  
“An overall judgement based on the weighing of the relevant RMA factors 
(particularly those in part two) is required: applying the RMA in practice involves 
a broad judgment of whether a proposal would promote the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources. The act has a single purpose in this 
regard. Making a decision often involves weighing up the significance of different 
factors and considerations, some of which maybe conflicting. Having said this, 
because of the RMA is not simply about achieving a balance between benefits in 
adverse effects preparing from the committee is about considering overall impact 
of a proposal” 
 
This is an issue which needs clarification and it will take time for the implications of King 
Salmon to become clear.		
 
6.3.5 Conclusion  
Decision-makers in this investigation have identified many sources of uncertainty that have 
the potential to emerge from almost all areas of the resource management process. Some 
uncertainties are reducible, or avoidable, while others are inherent and need to be accepted. 
Some of these sources may be important enough that decision-makers take them into 
account in the final decision while others may be easy to over come and have no impact on 
the final decision. The following section discusses the ways in which decision-makers 
manage uncertainty in resource management. 	
 
6.4 Management of uncertainty  
6.4.1 Broad characterisation of uncertainty management  
Simply acknowledging uncertainty in resource management is not sufficient; uncertainty 
needs to be actively managed in the decision-making process. Therefore, this study aimed 
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to understand and evaluate the management strategies used by decision-makers to cope 
with uncertainty in the resource consent process. Just over 90% of decision-makers 
surveyed actively take steps to manage uncertainty they are confronted with, but the 
approaches taken are anything but consistent.  
 
Although the strategies used are diverse and large in number, figure 6.3 simplifies this by 
considering them with respect to the broader context of the resource consent process. Some 
strategies are used in specific parts of the decision-making process, while others are used 
throughout. Another way to consider the management strategies is to consider the approach 
to uncertainty. Some strategies used by the decision-makers in this study can be broadly 
characterised as passive responses to uncertainty, such as being open minded and using 
past experience. However, the majority were mechanisms or techniques by which 
uncertainty could be either betters understood or reduced, so adopting a more active 
approach in responding to the uncertainty. In contrast, very few were strategies that could 
be used to cope in the face of uncertainties were mentioned.   
 
 
Figure 6.3: Strategies used by decision-makers to cope with uncertainty in the context of the 
resource consent and decision-making process. Blue = passive responses to uncertainty; Orange = 
active strategies used to understand / reduce uncertainty; and green = accepting strategies that are 
used in the face of uncertainty. 
 
6.4.2 Strategies used to understand and reduce uncertainty  
Decision-makers in this study placed considerable emphasis on reducing uncertainty, the 
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The hearings, and preparation for the hearing, appear to be an opportunity for decision-
makers to clarify and manage uncertainty.  
 
The two most commonly reported strategies used to understand and reduce uncertainty 
were formally requesting more information (under Section 92 (1 and 2)) and asking 
questions at the hearing. More than half the participants in this study rely on requesting 
more information, which is consistent with the fact that, on average, a third of all consent 
applications have further information requests (Ministry for the Environment, 2014). 
Despite the reliance on gaining further information, there are a number of issues associated 
with the process. One participant stated, “the legislation is intent on minimising the options 
for requesting additional information”. While streamlining and shortening the consent 
process and sharpening the processing of consents, the Resource Management Amendment 
Act 2009 (simplifying and streamlining), has placed time limits on consent processing 
times, and reduced the number of times councils can ‘stop the clock’ after information 
requests to twice (Section 88C). This means that if further information is requested more 
than twice, the council has to continue to process the application whilst waiting for the 
information. Moreover, if the applicant refuses, a council must still make a decision on the 
application under section 104 (Ministry for the Environment, 2009). Therefore, although 
formally requesting further information is heavily relied upon, decision-makers will not 
always be given the information they need to understand and reduce the uncertainty. The 
result of this pressure on councils to reduce the time and costs associated with the consent 
processing is that the decision-making process can be inhibited (Ericksen et al., 2001; 
Schijf, 2003).  
 
In addition, the reduction of uncertainty by gaining more information is seen to be a more 
traditional approach, which as previously mentioned, may not always make the uncertainty 
more manageable (Walker et al., 2003; Ascough Ii et al., 2008; Kasperson, 2008; Isendahl 
et al., 2010a; Mesa-Frias et al., 2013; van Bree and van der Sluijs, 2014). Before 
dedicating resources to reducing uncertainty, the nature, reducibility, level and relative 
importance/significance should be considered, otherwise efforts may be futile and 
resources wasted. Only those uncertainties which are critical for decisions to be made 
should be targeted with further analysis, to understand to what extent they can be reduced 
by further research and assessment (Peel, 2005; Kasperson, 2008). Results suggest that 
only a small proportion of decision-makers are considering the importance of uncertainty 
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before attempting to reduce it: less than 20% of participants mentioned strategies which 
took into account the level of uncertainty (ranking/prioritising issues of contention to 
establish their importance and determining the significance of impacts); and when asked 
about how they determine whether the level of uncertainty present in an application is 
significant enough to affect the final outcome of the decision, only a small proportion of 
participants made the connection between uncertainty and its significance or relevance to 
the decision outcome.  
 
The results suggest that, rather than causing uncertainty, the hearings process is a gateway 
for decision-makers to understand, reduce and manage uncertainty. The most commonly 
reported strategy was to identify issues of concern early on and ask direct/open questions at 
hearing to clarify issues. Moreover, one fifth of decision-makers explained that they read 
information thoroughly and do their best to understand all of the information in order to be 
prepared for the hearing. The ‘Making Good Decisions’ documentation places substantial 
emphasis on ensuring that decision-makers are equipped and prepared for resource consent 
hearings and provides considerable guidance on how to approach asking questions in 
hearings (Ministry for the Environment, 2015) 
 
A strategy that a small number of decision-makers used to reduce uncertainty associated 
with conflicting information was to consider the experience/credibility of expert witnesses. 
As noted earlier, this is not without problems. Isendahl et al. (2010b) advocates that a more 
useful strategy is to further understand the reasoning and judgement behind an expert’s 
recommendations or opinions, rather than solely relying on their credentials or experience. 
The ‘Making Good Decisions’ guidance supports this, suggesting that decision-makers 
consider the grounds on which an experts opinion is based, whether the opinions expressed 
are based on correct facts and valid assumptions as well as their experience and 
qualifications, objectivity, credibility and integrity (Ministry for the Environment, 2015: 
194). 
 
One strategy that is useful in managing and reducing uncertainty, but was only mentioned 
by a small number of participants, is undertaking public consultation. This is surprising 
considering a large proportion of decision-makers mentioned uncertainty associated with 
social systems. Public consultation is a vital, and beneficial, step in both the IA process and 
the resource management process (when determined necessary under the RMA). By 
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undertaking robust, or additional, public consultation, decision-makers can gain insights 
into the ‘social system’ that is likely to be affected by the activity in question, gain 
valuable local knowledge and reduce uncertainty (Dougherty and Hall, 1995; Newig et al., 
2005). 
 
6.4.3 Passive responses to uncertainty  
There were a number of strategies which can be broadly described as passive strategies, 
that were used to cope with uncertainty including using past experience and discussing 
with other decision-makers. As there is little to no guidance provided to decision-makers 
about uncertainty, it comes as no surprise that decision-makers are falling back on such 
intuitive coping strategies. Communication is an important approach to managing 
uncertainty; it can be used to understand uncertainty, or others’ perspectives about 
uncertainty, to alleviate uncertainty, or to negotiate the most appropriate way forward 
(Isendahl et al., 2009; Raadgever et al., 2011). Discussing uncertainty with other decision-
makers is likely to occur when a group of decision-makers are appointed, but is a less 
viable option when an individual is making decisions alone. Individuals may gain valuable 
insights by discussing uncertainty with other decision-makers, but it may also mean that 
the responsibility is pushed onto those who are more experienced,   
 
While a small number of participants identified the use of past experience as a 
management strategy, the majority of participants felt that their professional background 
and experience in decision-making were the two factors which assist them most in 
understanding and managing uncertainty. As previously discussed, experience is an 
important factor which influences an individual’s attitude towards uncertainty (Fazey et 
al., 2005; Upham et al., 2009). The results of this investigation suggest that commissioners 
have varied levels of experience (both in number of decisions made, years active, types of 
consent applications, and types of activity. Etc.). This may mean that if decision makers 
are relying heavily on experience, it could introduce inconsistency into the approaches to 
uncertainty. Moreover, if decision-makers are drawing on professional background, there 
is the possibility that this allows even more variation into the process, as the participants of 
this study came from many areas of specialisation. This is discussed in more detail in 
section 6.5.  
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6.4.4 Strategies used in the face of uncertainty 
The last group of strategies is used by decision-makers acting consciously in the presence 
of uncertainty (Larsen et al., 2013). This is an important group of strategies as often in 
certain scenarios uncertainty will be inherent or irreducible and will therefore need to be 
thoroughly considered. Decision-makers described three strategies that could be used once 
uncertainty was ‘accepted’: considering case law and how/whether the proposal meets the 
purpose of the RMA; considering management options and consent conditions; and 
declining the consent 
 
Decision-makers’ use of case law to guide decisions made in light of uncertainty is in line 
with the findings of Schijf (2003) who stated that decision-makers place considerable 
weight on the importance of legal precedence. Partly this is because they may be 
vulnerable to legal challenges if they ignore it. But it also provides solid examples to 
compare current consent applications to, and it is easier to rely on practical examples than 
guidance and generally worded policies or ambiguous plan rules.  
 
As explained in Chapter 3, under Section 108 of the RMA decision-makers can impose 
conditions on a consent. The ‘Making Good Decisions’ documentation stresses that 
“conditions are an important part of the resource consent because they are the main way 
of ensuring that any adverse environmental effects of an activity are avoided, remedied or 
mitigated and that good information gathering occurs” (Ministry for the Environment, 
2015: 227). Guidance is also provided to assist in producing fair, practical and enforceable 
conditions. However, very little information is provided about specific types of conditions, 
and there is no reference to uncertainty in this context. In contrast, Quality Planning (2016) 
explains that, in situations where there is uncertainty about some adverse effects, a range of 
consent conditions can be implemented, such as: 
• monitoring/investigating and reporting conditions, which can be useful when there 
is uncertainty about adverse effects; 
• ‘trigger and response’ conditions, which can be used so that if a certain situation 
occurs, there is a restriction on the exercise (for example, when the flow in a river 
drops below a specified level, the amount of the discharge into the river must 
reduce);  
• a ‘review condition’, which allows councils to review the conditions of a consent in 
the future – it gives them flexibility to address specific significant adverse effects 
that might arise. 
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If consent conditions are to be used to manage uncertainty successfully, they must be 
adhered to, monitored, and enforceable. The Ministry for the Environment (2014) survey 
of consent authorities, suggests that monitoring and enforcement practices are variable. For 
example, about 5% only undertake ‘reactive monitoring’ in response to complaints while 
84% undertake ‘proactive monitoring’ of resource consents. However, ‘proactive 
monitoring’ is also variable: some councils monitor all consents, some others only monitor 
land-use consents, and others adopt a risk-based approach by balancing the need for 
continuous and consistent compliance with keeping monitoring costs reasonable for the 
consent holder (dependent on history of compliance and the number and complexity of 
consent conditions). Moreover, Bachurst et al. (2002) raised concerns about the quality of 
self-reporting by councils, suggesting that there are discrepancies between the Ministry for 
the Environment (2000) annual survey information, which stated that 96% of councils 
were undertaking monitoring, and their investigation of a subset of council practices which 
suggested very little monitoring was taking place.  
 
Finally, declining the consent application was also mentioned as a potential strategy, 
although only a very small proportion of decision-makers mentioned it.  This is consistent 
with the Ministry for the Environment (2016) figures that on average only 0.6% of 
consents are declined each year. This could be because decision-makers ‘remedy’ the 
uncertainty in other ways (e.g. it is reduced/understood to the point that it is not large 
enough to result in the application being declined), or possibly because decision-makers do 
not consider that uncertainty is cause for not granting consent, except as a last resort in 
certain situations.  
 
The precautionary principle and adaptive management 
The precautionary principle and adaptive management are the two most widely recognised 
strategies for coping with uncertainty, according to the international literature. None of the 
study participants volunteered either as a strategy they employ. There are a number of 
possible reasons for this. Firstly, it is clear that a number of individuals were not aware of 
the strategies, or when their use is appropriate. Secondly, decision-makers may be aware of 
both strategies, but are not aware of their use in situations with uncertainty; however, this 
is unlikely as many individuals mentioned uncertainty when explaining situations in which 
the use of these strategies is appropriate. Thirdly, it may be that decision-makers place 
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more emphasis on understanding and reducing uncertainty, and that it rarely affects the 
outcome of the decision.  
 
Although the Act does not specifically mention the precautionary principle it is argued by 
many that it is inherent in the RMA, reflected in the fact that it specifically instructs 
decision-makers to consider ‘any potential effect of low probability which has a high 
potential impact’ (S3(f)) and implied through ‘avoiding, remedying or mitigation’ of any 
adverse effects from any proposed activity on the environment (S5(2c)) (Cameron, 2006; 
Rennie, 2006; Gillespie, 2011). Thus, under this interpretation, the precautionary principle 
is utilised as part of the overall broad judgement instead of expressly incorporated, and 
therefore as it is inherent, to apply the principle separately would lead to double-counting 
of the need for caution (Shirley Primary School v Christchurch City Council). Despite this, 
Schijf (2003) commented that it is disconcerting that the philosophy of the precautionary 
principle has not yet left its impression on resource management decision-making in New 
Zealand system. This may be because leaving it as part of the overall broad judgement 
approach relies on the decision-maker’s discretion (Olsen, 2015); alternatively, it may be 
that it has not yet seeped through to the resource consent decision-making level, or 
decision-makers do not feel that the precautionary principle gives adequate legal security 
to base decisions upon (Schijf, 2003).  
 
Because decision-makers have a high level of discretion as to when and how to apply the 
precautionary principle, it it will inevitably result in the regulatory framework being 
applied inconsistently, leading to unpredictable and inconsistent environmental 
management decisions (Fisher and Harding, 1999; Cameron, 2006; Peterson, 2006). 
Fougère (2013) observed this flexibility when decision-makers for the application 
Escarpment Mine on the Denniston Plateau were dismissive of precaution, in favour of the 
economic benefits of the proposal: 
“it would have been easy to reject this application had we been inclined to take a 
more precautionary approach. We are greatly influenced however by the 
significant economic gains that the district and region and the country as a whole 
will enjoy if the mine proceeds” 
 
 
It maybe understandable that decision-makers do not consider the precautionary principle 
to be a viable strategy when managing uncertainty. However, it is worrying to find 
considerable variation in the understandings of the principle in this study. Overall, it is 
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likely that few decision-makers are knowingly using the precautionary principle in their 
consent decisions. 
 
Adaptive management on the other hand, while not written into legislation, is written into 
case law, and the ‘Making Good Decisions’ documentation explains that it is a tool that 
can be used in consent decision-making (Ministry for the Environment, 2015: 231): 
“the process for reviewing consent conditions is quite involved and can sometimes 
factor in decisions to grant relatively short term consents. It is good practise to 
include one or more different types of ‘trigger and response’ or ‘adaptive 
management’ conditions in complex consent to provide more flexibility for consent 
holder and greater certainty for councils.” 
 
Its use in the resource consent process has become increasingly popular in the last decade 
so it is therefore somewhat concerning that there was such a wide spectrum of 
understandings of the tool in this study. While some decision-makers have a 
comprehensive understanding, others admitted that they had no idea what it was, or they 
provided the Wikipedia definition. Decision-makers’ opinions of situations in which the 
use of adaptive management is appropriate, or not, were again highly varied, and in many 
cases conflicting. Ironically, it may be that when decision-makers implement consent 
conditions, they are often using adaptive management strategies to manage uncertainty 
without realising that they are doing so. 
 
6.5 Professional background and experience and responses to uncertainty 
When analysed based upon background and experience, decision-makers’ understanding of 
uncertainty and their choice of management strategies used to cope with uncertainty 
showed that, although there were many similarities in behaviours, there were also distinct 
differences and certain groups had tendencies to behave in certain ways. This diversity in 
the way in which decision-makers respond to uncertainty, and that there are often 
differences in attitude towards uncertainty based upon professional training as well as 
experience, is consistent with previous research overseas (Fazey et al., 2005; Morss et al., 
2005; Upham et al., 2009). 
 
Those with more experience provided a wider range of reasons for uncertainty in resource 
consents, but focused more on the AEE, whereas those with less experience, while still 
concerned with the effect information, were also concerned with the interpretation of the 
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RMA and of terms such as cumulative effects. Those with more experience also relied 
more on direct procedural strategies (e.g. considering management options/consent 
conditions, hot tubbing experts, declining consents, etc.). A person’s attitude as well as 
their interpretation, acceptance and response to uncertainty, is influenced by new 
experiences and is dynamic and ever changing. It seems reasonable to conclude that 
decision-makers with more experience have had more opportunity to gain knowledge, 
skills and confidence with certain types of uncertainty and have a more robust 
understanding of the specific mechanisms available to them to manage uncertainty in the 
consents process. 
 
The type of experience also produced some diversity in results. Independent 
commissioners placed more emphasis on effects information (and specific types of effects 
information) as a source of uncertainty than internal commissioners. Not only that, 
independent commissioners provided a wider range of management strategies but relied 
heavily on asking questions at the hearing, formally requesting information, and 
considering consent conditions. It may be that independent commissioners (who are used 
by councils when there is a need for specialist expertise) have more experience in IA 
and/or the use of technical information and are therefore more aware of the different 
sources of uncertainty that may arise.  
 
When it came to the background of commissioners, one of the groups with the most 
distinct views were the RMA lawyers. For example, they placed more emphasis on effects 
information and having too much information as the main causes of uncertainty than any 
other group and identified the use of consent conditions as the primary way to manage 
uncertainty, an approach that other groups placed considerably less importance on. It may 
be that the decision-makers with an RMA law background have less experience with 
effects information than the other groups, and are therefore less confident with it, causing 
them to be hypervigilent about uncertainty. Moreover, lawyers will be more aware of the 
possibility of legal repercussions of decisions, and therefore use consent conditions more 
frequently as a safety net. 
 
In terms of the management of uncertainty, planners and RMA consultants used a range of 
approaches but relied more heavily on specific steps in the consent process (such as 
caucusing, hot tubbing and asking questions at hearings) than other groups. This suggests 
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that they have a strong sense of the procedural tools available to them. On the other hand, 
scientists relied more heavily than some other groups on asking questions at hearings and 
requesting more information.  Morss et al. (2005) found that those with a scientific 
background dealt with uncertainty by attempting to quantify, analyse and reduce it by 
obtaining additional data or conducting additional research, while other decision-makers 
viewed uncertainty as an unavoidable factor, and dealt with it by finding the best 
information that was quickly and easily obtainable, making a decision and moving on.  
 
It is very likely other factors are influencing the differences in opinion. For example, the 
system of resource management in New Zealand means that many different types of 
resource consent applications, for many different activities, are dealt with by 
commissioners.   So the type of experience one decision-maker has had may be very 
different to that of another individual with the same number of decisions; this will be 
particularly so for commissioners who tend to specialise in a certain types of projects. 
	
6.5 Wider implications of findings 
Across the resource management literature, there is an agreement that decision-makers 
need to be provided with pragmatic uncertainty guidance material that allows decisions to 
be made in a systematic, informed and consistent manner (Isendahl et al., 2010a). 
Decision-makers surveyed in this investigation had differing views about whether or not 
they were given guidance, but the majority did not believe that they were. Schijf (2003) 
also found that there is an absence of strong central guidance on dealing with uncertainty 
in the consent process in New Zealand, resulting in decision-makers not utilising expertise 
in uncertainty management that has been developed elsewhere. In the international context 
this is probably not unusual.  For example, Leung et al. (2015) observed that decision-
makers in Canada are given little guidance on how best to interpret and manage 
uncertainty. In such an environment, decision-making under uncertainty is often based on 
intuition, heuristics and experience (Isendahl et al., 2010a).  
 
This research has highlighted the lack of transfer of knowledge between uncertainty theory 
and practice. Indeed, decision-makers are predominantly relying on their background/area 
of expertise and personal experience in decision-making, as well as advice from other 
decision-makers. Therefore, although decision-making is guided by policy and planning 
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frameworks, and decision-makers are expected to evaluate the effects of decisions against 
these, when it comes to uncertainty, the individual decision-makers have great influence on 
the decision process (Schijf, 2003). 
 
With this in mind, it is not surprising that this research shows that decision-makers’ 
understandings of uncertainty, and approaches to management, are diverse. This diversity 
is by no means explained just by the experience and professional backgrounds of decision-
makers, and it is highly likely that there are other factors that influence decision-makers 
(such as their attitudes towards nature, complexity, and the unknown, and their values, 
beliefs and culture).  
 
The diversity in results may suggest that the accreditation process, which individuals must 
complete in order to become a decision-maker, is not moulding diverse individuals into a 
tightly defined group of decision-makers or providing them with advice about how to 
approach uncertainty. As a result, decision-makers have a certain level of freedom to 
respond as they see fit, and are falling back to a large extent on personal perceptions, 
values, feelings and coping mechanisms, in deciding how to manage uncertainty. It is 
important then to consider the ways in which this diversity will affect the resource consent 
process, and the outcome of consent decision-making. This is particularly important 
because, although commissioners are only involved in a very small proportion of resource 
consents, they are often the most controversial or technical decisions. In order to do this, 
the conceptual model, which described the key approaches used to manage uncertainty in 
the decision-making process in section 2.6, has been adapted (Figure 6.4).  
 
The model shows that decisions made under uncertainty can be approached in a number of 
different ways. First, some decision-makers may be more aware of uncertainty than others, 
possibly because of varied disclosure practices of applicants, or because decision-makers 
are more vigilant in their recognition of uncertainty. Following this, those who are aware, 
may or may not acknowledge it. While those who do not acknowledge it are likely to 
proceed to decision-making ignorant of, or just ignoring, the uncertainty, those who 





Figure 6.4:  Adapted model showing the different ways of managing uncertainty. Blue box 
indicated the importance of understanding and reducing uncertainty as decision-makers 
emphasised the use of this strategy. 
 
As explained previously, decision-makers in this study seem to place considerable 
emphasis on reducing and understanding uncertainty. This may be because the effects 
information that decision-makers are provided with is of poor quality, or is subjective 
and/or technical and therefore it requires considerable effort to understand the information 
and uncertainty. It may be that gaining more information in a complex and uncertain 
situation is an automatic and instinctive reaction for some individuals. For those who do 
not believe it is unacceptable for resource consent applications to be uncertain, the 
reduction/removal of uncertainty may be an important step in the decision-making process. 
Decision-makers may find that understanding uncertainty is more of a challenge than 
deciding a course of action once they are aware of the uncertainty, or that while these 
uncertainties are not significant enough to affect the outcome of the decision, they are 
substantial enough that decision-makers use approaches that allow them better understand 
the uncertainties and their implications, or reduce/remove the uncertainty. This is 
supported by Schijf (2003), who found that in some cases decision-makers carefully 
considered uncertainty, and methodologically discussed it, sought additional information 
and then made the judgment that the uncertainty was not large enough to effect the 
decision. However, decision-makers in this investigation did not place emphasis on 





making in denial of 
uncertainty  
Reduction  
Proceed with decision-making 
in light of uncertainty and 
manage accordingly  
Proceed with decision-making 
and ignore uncertainty (either 
because it has been removed 
or is not an issue) 
Increase understanding 
Proceed with decision-
making ignorant of 
uncertainty    
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then be that resources are wasted on reducing uncertainty that holds no bearing on the 
outcome of the decision.  
 
It is important to also consider the implications and contributions of this research on the 
wider body of literature. Despite the more than 40 year history of IA, the interest in 
uncertainty in impact information has really only grown in the last decade. Broadly 
speaking, the research addressing uncertainty in resource management decision-making 
and impact assessment is scarce. Most studies investigate a small number of case studies in 
detail and there is very little research into the ways a large group of individuals understand 
and manage uncertainty. By gaining a better understanding of this complex subject and the 
way in which a large group of decision-makers understand uncertainty, this research has 
made an important and unique contribution to the body of literature. 
 
Furthermore, , while there are broad frameworks explaining the management of 
uncertainty, there is a lack of literature addressing the specific ways in which decision-
makers actually manage uncertainty. This study has provided valuable information about 
the practical methods decision-makers use to cope with uncertainty. Not only that, it has 
also shed light on the treatment of uncertainty in the resource consent process in New 
Zealand. As previously discussed, it has also highlighted that there is a need for decision-
makers to be provided with more guidance about the many different reasons for 
uncertainty, as well as the ways in which uncertainty can be successfully managed.  
 
Moreover, as chapter 2 explained, uncertainty is a complex and difficult concept for 
individuals to grapple with. Within the literature there is little consistency in the way in 
which uncertainty is thought about: there is no shared terminology or typology or agreed 
ways of managing uncertainty. This research shows that resource management decision-
makers in New Zealand also demonstrate diversity in their understandings and 
management of uncertainty.  
 
6.6 Uncertainty guidance – where to from here?   
As already discussed, this research has highlighted the lack of transfer of knowledge 
between uncertainty theory and practice. There is a need for decision-makers to be 
provided with guidance to assist them understand and manage uncertainty, a notion that the 
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majority of participants were open to. As every resource management situation is unique, 
there are some difficulties associated with developing and using guidance (Kloprogge et 
al., 2007; Isendahl et al., 2010b; Petersen et al., 2010). This is particularly true of the New 
Zealand situation: as a large range of activities, of varying types and scales are regulated 
under the RMA, it would be unrealistic to recommend that decision-makers be provided 
with prescriptive guidance. Instead, a more informative and educational approach to 
guidance should be taken, so that if faced with uncertainty, decision-makers are better 
equipped to cope with it (and their views of it will be more consistent).  
 
A number of approaches could be incorporated into the process to improve decision-
makers’ understanding and treatment of uncertainty. First, decision-makers could be 
encouraged to ‘revalue’ uncertainty. Within resource management, uncertainty is often 
perceived as a disadvantage, but decision-makers could be more open-minded and positive, 
viewing uncertainty as a challenge and an opportunity to learn something new and make 
more considered decisions (Isendahl et al., 2010a). Decision-makers should be more 
willing to abandon the idea that uncertainties are a wholly negative aspect that must be 
removed, and accept that there are limits to what can be done to reduce uncertainty and 
that uncertainties will remain in spite of the scientific effort to overcome them (Grunwald, 
2007; Isendahl et al., 2010b).  
 
A research institute in the Netherlands has released a number of guidance documents to be 
used by policy makers in the management of uncertainty (Van der Sluijs et al., 2003; 
Janssen et al., 2005). They include broad checklist-style documents as well as in-depth 
detailed guidance documents. One specific approach from those documents that could be 
adopted by decision-makers is the mapping and assessment of uncertainty, which can be 
done by using review questions to extract information about uncertainty (such as those in 
Table 6.1), or by using a matrix approach involving identifying and classifying the most 
relevant uncertainties and characterising their nature, cause, location and consequences 
(Table 6.2). It seems that a particular area of focus for this guidance should be the 
level/significance/implications of uncertainty present in applications. An important step in 
the management of uncertainty, that needs to occur before determining a course of action, 
is determining whether the uncertainty is critical enough that it warrants further attention. 
For example decision-makers should be considering the implications of the uncertainty and 
	 121 
whether or not it is likely to have a bearing on the outcome of the application before 
requesting costly further information. 
 
Brugnach et al. (2007) conceptualized uncertainty in a broader sense than other authors, 
arguing that solutions to uncertainty are more easily identified if decision-makers 
understand uncertainty in a more relational context. They defined three types of 
uncertainty and the effect each has on knowledge (inherent uncertainty causing 
unpredictability, and lack of knowledge, and different knowledge frames, both causing 
conflicting information), and then developed management approaches based on the 
uncertainties. This approach has been developed further by Isendahl et al. (2010b) who 
asked decision-makers to characterize uncertainty that they experienced and develop 
strategies that could be used to manage the specific uncertainties.  
 
Table 6.1: Review questions that could be used by decision-makers to further understand 
uncertainty in resource consent applications (Janssen et al., 2003; Petersen et al., 2003; van der 
Sluijs et al., 2003; Lees, 2014; Lees et al., 2016). 
 
• Does the EIS directly disclose/address uncertainty?  
o What is the uncertainty about? (e.g., predictions, mitigation, project design, etc.)  
o What is the cause of the uncertainty? (e.g. lack of information, inherent uncertainty 
conflicting information) 
• Is uncertainty used as a criterion when addressing the significance of residual impacts?  
• When identified, how is uncertainty addressed/are any measures proposed to address  
o Is uncertainty justified or ignored?  
o Is uncertainty addressed by more research?  
o Is uncertainty explored through risk-based scenarios, worst-case scenarios, or 
probabilities?  
• In the uncertainty significant to the outcome of the decision? 
o Which aspects of uncertainty require additional attention and why (e.g. decision stakes 
are high, various assumptions are critical, a small change in an indicator estimate may 
have a significant influence on impacts) 
o What are the implications of the uncertainty? 
o Is the uncertainty reducible?  
o Can the uncertainty be mitigated? 
 
Table 6.2: Example of an uncertainty assessment matrix that could be used to further understand 
uncertainty (adapted from van der Sluijs et al. (2003), Walker et al. (2003) and Janssen et al. 
(2005). 
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Consultation        
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From the examples discussed, it is clear that there are a number of accessible and practical 
methods which have the potential to assist decision-makers work through uncertainty in 
resource management. There is an opportunity for these to be incorporated into the 
‘Making Good Decisions’ programme. 
 
6.7 Research reflections  
The limitations and shortcomings of social research methods are well documented. An 
important part of the research process is to reflect on challenges that arose and the ways in 
which the research could be improved. As discussed in the chapter 4, although there are 
many advantages to the use of questionnaires in social research, there are also a number of 
disadvantages. A few specific issues that were encountered will now be discussed, 
followed by a reflection upon the overall research strategy used.  
 
The identification and sampling of participants was not without problems. The use of 
councils to identify potential participants relied on them providing information, and 
because not all were able or willing, to assist, there may be potential participants that were 
not identified. While this was not unavoidable, the use of chain sampling, which was used 
by Leung et al. (2016) in a similar study, could be used to minimise the number of 
unidentified individuals. Chain sampling involves the initially identified potential 
participants being asked to further identify any other individuals who would be appropriate 
candidates to participate in the research (Hay, 2010). Due to the interconnected nature of 
the commissioner community it is likely that individuals have worked with a number of 
other commissioners and therefore have knowledge about potential participants. In fact, 
three individuals actually emailed the researcher with suggestions of other individuals to 
include in the study.  
 
Although it was stressed to potential participants that if they chose to participate, their 
responses to the questionnaire would be anonymous and confidential, a number of 
individuals still expressed concerns about their anonymity and did not wish to participate 
in the study as it could jeopardize their career. They explained that the business of acting 
as a commissioner was difficult to get into and if their anonymity was not totally preserved 
it would be very easy to identify them, as New Zealand is such a small place. Despite these 
issues, almost all questionnaires are subject to non-response (McGuirk and O'Neill, 2010; 
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Bryman, 2012), and it was never expected that all potential participants would choose to be 
involved in the research.  
 
The design of the questionnaire raised some issues. Upon reflection, there were too many 
questions in the questionnaire. Not only was there a large amount of information to 
process, the longer the questionnaire the higher the rate of response drop off (Neuman, 
2013). As well as making the questionnaire shorter, the number of open-ended questions 
could be reduced to one or two and the others be replaced with closed questions. For 
example, similar studies which published since the sampling took place predominantly 
used closed questions. Leung et al. (2016) used a larger variety of types of questions, some 
of which could be employed in this type of research to reduce the time taken to complete 
and process the questionnaire. Examples include questions that ask participants to allocate 
points among categories and questions that use category scales where participants are 
asked to specify where their opinion sits.  
 
In addition, a small number of participants suggested that some questions were too difficult 
to answer, as they were too subjective. As explained in chapter 4 there is an unavoidable 
degree of subjectivity involved in social research, particularly when it comes to the 
interpretation of survey questions (McGuirk and O'Neill, 2010; Halperin and Heath, 2012). 
Others commented that they would have liked uncertainty to be defined (a definition of 
uncertainty was actually provided in the introduction of the questionnaire, but as not all 
participants read this, it could have been emphasised, or moved to the start of the 
questionnaire rather than the introduction).   
 
Having said this, because there has been little or no research on the issue of uncertainty in 
resource consent decision-making in New Zealand, the use of a questionnaire was the most 
appropriate and effective way to gain a general understanding of the broad situation. The 
questionnaire yielded both qualitative and quantitative information about the way in which 
a large number of decision-makers across the country think about and manage uncertainty. 
This study has therefore set the foundation for future research to be undertaken on more 
specific areas of uncertainty in resource consents, impact assessment and decision-making 








Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
 
7.1 Main findings 
This investigation aimed to understand the role of uncertainty, particularly within the 
environmental effects information, in resource consent decision-making in New Zealand. 
The specific objectives were to understand what decision-makers recognise to be the main 
cause/source of uncertainty in resource consent applications, how they perceive 
uncertainty, and to characterise and evaluate the strategies they use to manage the 
uncertainty. The results suggest that, for decision-makers uncertainty within the resource 
consent process in New Zealand is anything but simple. 
 
Decision-makers identified many facets of the resource consent process which cause 
uncertainty, but the primary cause was applicants providing poor quality effects 
information lacking important detail. Other sources of uncertainty included conflicting 
information, inherent uncertainty, and difficulty interpreting certain parts of the RMA. 
While some of these uncertainties can be reduced or removed, others are implicit in 
environmental management, and need to be accepted as that. 
 
Decision-makers’ have varied perceptions of the acceptability of uncertainty, the need for 
the level of uncertainty to be reduced, applicants to communicate it and decision makers to 
take it into account. These perceptions could be influenced by a large range of different 
factors, but the diversity in the results suggests that the commissioner accreditation is not 
moulding diverse individuals into decision-makers who are able to cope with uncertainty 
in a consistent manner – they still have a certain level of freedom to respond as they see 
fit, and are falling back to a large extent on personal perceptions, values, feelings and 
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coping mechanisms, in deciding how to manage uncertainty. It is unsurprising, then, that 
decision-makers identified such a large number of different approaches for managing 
uncertainty. These strategies can be grouped into three main categories: strategies used to 
further understand and reduce uncertainty; passive strategies; and strategies used in the 
face of uncertainty once it has been accepted. Some strategies which have been identified 
within the literature were not used as frequently as they maybe could be, while others were 
used without properly considering the implications. Neither the precautionary principle nor 
adaptive management were mentioned as management options, despite the emphasis in the 
literature on the value of their use.  
 
Decision-makers appear to be given little to no substantive guidance about how to manage 
uncertainty. This needs to be remedied, as current practices inevitably lead to inconsistent 
treatment of uncertainty. Almost all participants were open to the idea of being provided 
with some form of guidance, and there are many examples within the literature that could 
be adopted in the New Zealand context.  
 
Finally, it seems that the background and experience of decision-makers influences the 
way in which they perceive and manage uncertainty, with the more experienced 
responding differently to the less experienced, internal commissioners differently to the 
independent ones, and lawyers, planners, scientists, councillors and other professional 
groups tending to respond in ways that reflect their particular backgrounds. However, 
these characteristics do not fully explain the diversity in results, and it is likely that there 
are many other factors influencing decision-makers and their understanding and 
management of uncertainty.  
 
7.2 Recommendations 
This study has highlighted that there is an opportunity to improve the treatment of 
uncertainty in the resource consent process. As decision-makers identified that the main 
cause for uncertainty is poor quality of effects information, the Ministry for the 
Environment may need to consider whether there is a need for the quality of effects 
information to be improved. There are many ways in which this could be achieved 
including changing the legislation so that independent consultants must produce effects 
information for certain applications, or the introduction of a mandatory professional 
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accreditation for practitioners. The simplest way to improve the quality effects information 
is to raise the expectations of effects information through more rigorous reviewing of 
applications, checking for both completeness and adequacy. 
 
It is also worth considering the need for the institutional framework to recognise 
uncertainty. The uncertainty, the precautionary principle and adaptive management should 
be more explicitly incorporated into the RMA. It has been argued that the precautionary 
principle is inherent in the RMA, and adaptive management is written into case law and is 
mentioned in the ‘Making Good Decisions’ documentation, however, there is little 
consistency in the way in which decision-makers think about the two approaches to 
uncertainty management. In fact, decision-makers did not even make direct links between 
the two strategies and the management of uncertainty. However it is likely that some 
decision-makers are invoking the strategies (either knowingly or unknowingly). 
Accordingly, the RMA could be amended so that it explicitly refers to uncertainty, the 
precautionary principle and adaptive management. If not, there is still a need for the 
‘Making Good Decisions’ programme to consider incorporating the two strategies into the 
documentation and training (or in the case of adaptive management clarifying and 
emphasising the existing information). Furthermore, applicants should be required to 
disclose uncertainty to decision-makers; this could be incorporated into Schedule 4. 
 
Whether or not uncertainty is explicitly addressed in the legislation, it is an issue that 
decision-makers are faced with, and accordingly they need to be provided with guidance 
about it. As explained, within the literature there are existing frameworks that can be used 
to assist decision-makers understanding and treatment of uncertainty including revaluing 
uncertainty and uncertainty assessment. It is likely that providing guidance to decision-
makers make them feel more comfortable when faced with uncertainty, possibly reduce 
costs for applicants, and in the end it is likely to lead to decisions that are more robust, 
defensible and consistent. 
 
7.3 Future research opportunities 
The findings of this study identified a number of areas in which further research could be 
undertaken. Overall there was a very positive response to the research: more than 40 
individuals expressed an interest in being interviewed. A number of individuals also stated 
that they would like to have been interviewed and make more meaningful reflections on 
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their past decisions in order to provide more detailed and helpful answers. This 
investigation has shed enough light on decision-makers’ broad treatment of uncertainty 
that there is an opportunity to undertake a more in-depth enquiry to investigate individual 
decision-makers’ views in more depth and detail, possibly involving a number of case 
studies (e.g. a number of nationally significant applications). 
 
In addition, a number of international studies have been undertaken investigating how 
applicants understand, communicate and manage uncertainty in the IA (Stenton, 2006; 
Allen and Gunderson, 2011; Lees, 2014). These studies have been undertaken using 
document analysis, predominantly looking at impact statements. There is the opportunity 
to undertake research combining key informant interviews with document analysis to 
allow for a deeper analysis of the role of uncertainty in resource consents.  
 
Similarly, a number of overseas researchers have found that the way in which different 
parties involved in resource management (applicants, consultants, decision-makers and 
submitters, etc.) view uncertainty differs significantly (Leung et al., 2016). It would be 
interesting to investigate this in the New Zealand setting, possibly combining interviews 
with observational methods. For example, the researcher could attend hearings of current 
applications to better understand the way in which applicants and decision-makers 
approach, communicate and manage uncertainty.  
 
Although the RMA does not specifically refer to uncertainty, the precautionary principle 
and adaptive management, the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf 
(Environmental Effects) Act requires those making decisions on marine consent 
applications to take into account any uncertainty or inadequacy in the information 
available (S61(1)). The way in which decision-makers perceive and manage uncertainty 
under this legislation could be investigated, or a comparative study could be undertaken to 
understand whether there are any difference in decision-makers responses under the two 
pieces of legislation.  
 
7.4 Conclusion  
Overall this research has identified that there is a large range of different uncertainties in 
resource consents in New Zealand, and that effects information is the primary cause of 
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uncertainty for decision-makers. There is a need for decision-makers to be provided with 
guidance on how to manage this uncertainty, as currently they are relying on their 
professional and decision-making experience. New Zealand has an opportunity to be a 
leader in the management of uncertainty in resource management, rather than a follower, 
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6. When will recruitment and data collection commence? 25th November  
7. When will data collection be completed? 1 month after commencing  
8. Brief description in lay terms of the aim of the project, and outline of the research 
questions that will be answered: 
Environmental and resource management decision-making is often complex and 
challenging and an important factor is information uncertainty. Impact assessment (IA) is 
a key tool used to inform decision makers of the likely environmental impacts of major 
proposals on the environment and local communities. An important part of this process is 
also to recognise and manage uncertainty about impact information and its implications 
for decision makers. However evidence suggests that the recognition and treatment of 
uncertainty in the IA, and in the subsequent decision-making process, is often not well 
handled and in many cases not recognised, managed or taken into consideration. The aim 
of this research is to understand the role of uncertainty, particularly the effects 
information, in resource consent decision-making. To achieve this aim a number of 
specific objectives have been developed: 
Ø To understand whether decision-makers recognise the presence of uncertainty in 
resource consent applications  
Ø To understand what decision-makers perceive to be the main cause/source of 
uncertainty in resource consent applications 
Ø To characterise and evaluate decision-maker’s responses and management 
strategies to uncertainty 
 
9. Brief description of the method. Include a description of who the participants are, 
how the participants will be recruited, and what they will be asked to do:- 
The intended participants of this study are commissioners making resource consent 
decisions under the Resource Management Act 1991. A list of individuals who hold the 
relevant qualifications to act as a commissioner (those who have completed the ‘Making 
Good Decisions’ Certificate) has been provided by the Ministry for the Environment. 
These individuals will be emailed and provided with details of the study and asked if they 
are willing to participate (see attached). If they agree, they will be asked to complete an 
online survey hosted by Survey Monkey, which will take them ~20-25mins to complete 
(see attached). The survey contains ~35 questions, which are a mixture of closed and 
open questions. 
 
10. Disclose and discuss any potential problems:  
None identified. Potential participants will have the clear option of not taking part in the 
survey. If they do take the survey all questions address their professional activities. No 
personal information will be collected. All information will be treated as anonymous and 
will be aggregated for analysis  
 
*Applicant's Signature:   .............................................................................   
Name (please print): ………………………………………………………. 
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 Date:  ................................ 
*The signatory should be the staff member detailed at Question 1. 
ACTION TAKEN 
 
Approved by HOD                              Referred to UO Human Ethics Committee 
            
           
            Approved by Departmental Ethics Committee  
 
Signature of **Head of Department: .......................................................................... 
Name of HOD (please print): ………………………………………………………. 





**Where the Head of Department is also the Applicant, then an appropriate senior staff 
member must sign on behalf of the Department or School. 
Departmental approval:  I have read this application and believe it to be valid research 
and ethically sound.  I approve the research design.  The research proposed in this 
application is compatible with the University of Otago policies and I give my approval and 
consent for the application to be forwarded to the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee (to be reported to the next meeting). 
IMPORTANT NOTE: As soon as this proposal has been considered and approved at 
departmental level, the completed form, together with copies of any Information 
Sheet, Consent Form, recruitment advertisement for participants, and survey or 
questionnaire should be forwarded to the Manager, Academic Committees or the 
Academic Committees Administrator, Academic Committees, Rooms G22, G23 or 
G24, Ground Floor, Clocktower Building, or scanned and emailed to either 












Appendix B: Sampling Strategy 
 
 
Table B1: Emails sent to consenting authorities when gathering the names of frequently 

















Subject: University of Otago Masters Research 
To whom it may concern, 
My name is Jessica Gerry and I am a Master’s research student at the University of Otago. As part 
of my research I am planning to undertake a survey of independent and internal commissioners to 
find out about their role in the RMA consenting process. Are you able to provide me with list of the 
independent commissioners and elected councillors or community board members that are most 
frequently used by the (name of council)? 























Subject: University of Otago Masters Research 
Dear (name), 
My name is Jessica Gerry and I am a Master’s research student in the Department of Geography at 
the University of Otago. I am undertaking research investigating how experienced decision makers 
perceive and respond to uncertainty in the resource consent process under the Resource 
Management Act 1991. 
I am looking for ~150 individuals who have acted as decision makers (for example as 
Commissioners or elected representatives on a hearing panel) to participate in this study. As an 
experienced resource consent decision maker, I would like to invite you to participate in this 
research. 
The information will be presented in a Masters thesis and may also be published in a research 
paper. In either event it will not be possible to identify participants, directly or indirectly. 
If you are willing to participate in this project, please follow this link and complete the online 
survey. It should take no more than 20 minutes. If you are able to complete the survey before the 
11th of December it would be greatly appreciated. 
If you would like any more information please email me at jessica.gerry@otago.ac.nz or contact 
my supervisor Professor Richard Morgan at rkm@otago.ac.nz or on (03) 479 8782. 
If you do not want to receive any further correspondence, please reply to this email and let me 
know. 




























Subject: University of Otago Masters Research 
Dear (name), 
I am following up on my recent email in which you were invited to participate in my Masters 
research investigating how experienced decision makers perceive and respond to uncertainty in the 
resource consent process under the Resource Management Act 1991. 
So far I have received very positive and constructive feedback, which has produced a wide range of 
information. If you have already completed the survey, I would like to thank you for the time you 
have taken to respond and I appreciate your invaluable input.  
If you have not yet competed the survey but are willing to do so, your participation would be most 
welcome. I do really appreciate the time you take out of your busy working day but would require 
the survey to be completed by this Friday, 11th December. 
Thank you again for your time and please don't hesitate to contact me if you have any further 
questions regarding the survey.  





















































Resource Consents and Uncertainty 




Department of Geography 
University of Otago 
jessica.gerry@otago.ac.nz 
 
Supervisor: Professor Richard Morgan, Department of Geography, University of Otago,  
email rkm@geography.otago.ac.nz phone (03) 479 8782 
 
Thank you for participating in this research. The project is being undertaken as a part of 
the requirements for Jessica Gerry’s Masters of Science and aims to understand how 
experienced decision-makers perceive and respond to uncertainty in the resource consent 
process under the Resource Management Act 1991.  
 
Environmental and resource management decision-making is often complex and 
challenging and an important factor is information uncertainty. Uncertainty can be defined 
as the imperfect and inadequate understanding of a system. Traditionally, uncertainty was 
 153 
considered to be a lack of scientific knowledge; however, it is more broad and diverse, 
encompassing societal, political and cultural systems. 
 
The following is a survey that contains ~35 questions about your experience as a resource 
consent decision maker and your perceptions of, and responses to, uncertainty. It should 
take no more than 20 mins to complete. No personal information is being sought. 
 
This intention of the research is to use the raw data to make observations and draw 
conclusions based on the analysis of this data in an aggregated way. The researcher will be 
the only person that will have access to this information in its raw form; it will be stored 
securely and will be destroyed at the end of research. It is not the intention that attribution 
or identification of any participant can be derived from the final thesis. The results of the 
project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but you anonymity will be preserved. 
 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to 
contact either Jessica Gerry or Professor Richard Morgan.  
 
Please read the following and click accept if you agree to participate in this research. 
I have read the previous information concerning this project and understand what it is 
about.  All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am 
free to request further information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
3.  The information provided by the participants will be used only for the purposes of 
research and possibly academic publications arising from this research.  
4. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of 
Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve 
my anonymity.   
 
o I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
This study has been approved by the Department stated above. However, if you have any concerns 
about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479-8256). Any issues you 















The following section is concerned with your decision-making background and experience. 
 
1) What do you consider your main area of specialisation, professional experience or 










3) Please indicate if you have completed any of the following ‘Making Good Decisions 
Programmes’: 
o Foundation Course 
o Recertification for Panel members 
o Recertification for Panel Chairs 
o None of the above (please indicate the way in which decision-making 
accreditation was gained _______________________________________) 
 
4) Please indicate the capacity through which most of your experience as a decision maker 
has been obtained: nternal Commissioner (elected member of consenting authority) 
o  Independent Commissioner (non-elected member of the public) 
o  I have served in both capacities equally 
o  I am a councillor and I have never acted as a Commissioner 
o Other (please specify_____________________________________) 
 
 
5) How many decision processes have you participated in as a decision maker?  
 
o <5 o 5-10 o 10-20 o >20 
 
If more that 20 please give approximate number ______ 
 
 
6) For what length of time have you acted as a decision maker? 
 
o <5 years o 5-10 years o 10-20 years o >20 years 
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7) For which of the following consenting authorities have you acted as a decision maker 
most frequently? If you have acted in equal capacities for two or more types of consenting 
authority please select multiple options 
o Regional councils 
o Territorial authorities  
o Unitary authorities  
 
 
8) Please indicate the council/s that you have acted as a decision maker for (if you have 





9) When acting as a decision maker for consenting authorities, which of the following 
types of activities have you most frequently dealt with? 
o Controlled 
o Restricted discretionary 
o Discretionary 
o Non-complying 
o I do not know 
 
When acting as a decision maker for consenting authorities, which of the following types 
of consent applications have you most frequently dealt with? 
o Non-notified 
o Limited notified 
o Fully notified  
 
10) In your experience as a decision maker, are there certain types of proposed activities 
that you deal with more frequently than others (eg roading projects, subdivisions, water 





The following section is concerned with uncertainty in the resource consent process and 
subsequent decision-making under the Resource Management Act 1991. Please rate how 
strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements by clicking on the 
appropriate box: 
 















o Agree o Neutral o Disagree o Strongly 
Disagree 
 








14) The level of uncertainty present in resource consent applications is too great and it 













o Agree o Neutral o Disagree o Strongly 
Disagree 
 
16) Uncertainty within resource consent applications is inadequately disclosed, poorly 




o Agree o Neutral o Disagree o Strongly 
Disagree 
 
17) Decision makers must accept that uncertainty is present in resource consents and it 




o Agree o Neutral o Disagree o Strongly 
Disagree 
 









19) In your experience, what do you consider to be the most common sources of 





20) Please rank the following types of information in order of which has the greatest 
potential for uncertainty to arise in (with 1 being the greatest potential and 5 being the least 
potential)  
o Information in the proposal  
o Information about the environmental effects 
o Information generated by the consultation and public submissions 
(where relevant)  
o Information generated by the hearing (where relevant)  
o Other information (please specify if applicable  
____________________) 
 
21) Research suggests that uncertainty can be caused by imperfect knowledge about a 
system (natural or social), or due to the inherent complexity of a system. Please rank the 
following in order of which you consider to be the main cause of uncertainty in the 
resource management applications you have dealt with (with 1 being the main cause and 4 
being a lesser cause)? 
o Lack of information 
o Conflicting information 
o Too much information  
o Inherent complexity of a system 
 
22) To what extent do you agree that the process of assessing effects is complex and 




o Agree o Neutral o Disagree o Strongly 
Disagree 
 
23) In your experience, what do you consider to be the main source of uncertainty in the 





24) Do you associate uncertainty more with: 
o Natural systems (eg biophysical environment) 
o Social systems (eg social, cultural and economic systems)  
o Both natural and social systems are of equal uncertainty 
 
 
25) In which of the following systems can associated uncertainty be more easily reduced 
o Natural systems (eg biophysical environment) 
o Social systems (eg social, cultural and economic systems)  





The following section of this survey is concerned with strategies used to manage 
uncertainty in the resource consent process under the Resource Management Act 1991. 
 
26) Are you provided with any general guidance (formal or informal) as to how to manage 
uncertainty in the resource consent process? If yes, what is the guidance and have you 






27) How do you determine whether the level of uncertainty in a consent application is 











29) Research suggests that people manage uncertainty in a number of different ways. 
Please list up to 6 strategies you used to manage uncertainty in the resource consent 










30) For the strategies you have listed please choose the two main ones and explain why 






31) Do you agree that the most effective way to manage uncertainty is to have more 








32) In a situation where there is significant uncertainty about a resource consent 
application, which of the following methods do you use to help reduce the uncertainty? 
Please rank them in order of most frequently used (with 1 being most frequently used and 
7 being least frequently)  
o Rely on documentation provided 
o Consult experts 
o Talk to council staff  
o Talk to applicant 
o Formally request more information 
o Conduct your own research (eg use the internet or ask someone informally)  
o Other - please specify __________________________________________ 
 
33) Research suggests that the ‘precautionary principle’ and ‘adaptive management’ are 






34) If you agree that the precautionary principle is a potential response to uncertainty, 
please outline: 
 
















36) If you agree that adaptive management is a potential response to uncertainty, please 
outline: 
 














37) Please rank the following in order of which best prepared you to be able to understand 
and manage uncertainty in the decision-making process (with 1 being the most and 7 
least). 
o Qualification (eg tertiary education) 
o Background/area of expertise 
o ‘Making good decisions’ program  
o Personal experience in decision making 
o Advice from other decision makers (eg when working on a panel) 
o Advice from council staff 




38) Keeping in mind the questions that have been asked and your responses, do you have 





I appreciate the time and effort that you have taken to answer these questions. From this 
survey a number of key informant interviews may take place. If you are willing to 
participate in an interview please tick the box below and provide your details. A summary 
of the research findings from this study will be produced. If you like to receive a copy 




o I am willing to participate in a key informant interview  
o I would like to receive summary results of this study 
 
Thank you for your time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
